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This dissertation examines the political thought of Cicero in order to shed light on 
the question of the extent to which politics is or can be made rational.  Much of modern 
political science and policy-making treats citizens as calculating pursuers of interests and 
preferences, if not as consistently rational.  But this view has been powerfully challenged 
by evidence that human beings are far less adept at the determination and pursuit of our 
preferences than we believe ourselves to be.  As a result, political scientists and policy-
makers alike have begun to grapple with the question of how regimes committed to self-
government ought to address the limits of our rational capacity, not only in the crafting of 
particular policies, but also in the rethinking of foundational and constitutional principles 
and institutions.  By considering Cicero’s presentation of virtue and republican politics 
together with his analysis of the popular philosophical schools that were widely 
influential in his day, I show that Cicero recognizes and reflects on the pervasive 
irrationality in human decision-making.  Like our modern critics of the irrationality of 
republicanism, the popular philosophical schools of Cicero’s day both deprecated politics 
for its inherent unreasonableness and sought to make the world as they experienced it 
conform to strict rules of reason.  Through a reading of Cicero’s evaluation and critique 
 v 
 
of the schools in De Finibus, De Natura Deorum, and De Officiis, this dissertation aims 
to shed light not only on his account of the limits of reason in the political arena and the 
danger of attempting to overcome them, but also on his insistence that the irrational parts 
of human nature are the source of much that is beneficial in republican politics.  Only by 
understanding this aspect of Cicero’s thought can we understand his reflections on the 
virtues of republicanism. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: The Weakness of Reason in Politics 
It is practically a commonplace of ordinary thinking that democratic politics 
requires an educated citizenry.  If citizens are going to rule themselves, the thought goes, 
then it is necessary for them to be able to debate, evaluate, and make judgments about 
what they desire from government and how those goals ought to be pursued.  Self-
government therefore seems to require that we cultivate and make use of the human 
capacity for reason, not only as individuals, but also as the body of citizens who pursue 
together the aims of the polity.  Just as common, however, is the lament that, especially 
when it comes to politics, we are guided less by reason than by things like passions, 
short-term thinking, prejudices, partisan loyalties, idealism, and fear.  As a result, the 
question of the rationality of ordinary political discourse, how rational we can hope to 
make politics, and the implications of the answers to these questions for our thinking 
about the organization and purpose of political institutions are of increasing concern to 
political scientists.  We are prompted to a new analysis of this question by the growing 
body of scholarship that challenges the dominant theory according to which human 
beings are rational actors who maximize preferences along an economic model.1  But 
while recent scholarship has once again brought the significance of these questions to the 
fore, the concerns that drive them are as old as politics itself.  This dissertation argues 
that by turning to the political thought of Cicero, we can both broaden and deepen our 
understanding the way that human irrationality manifests itself in politics.  To see why 
                                                
1 For examples of rational choice theory within political science, see William Riker’s “The Political 
Psychology of Rational Choice Theory” (1995) and “Political Science and Rational Choice” (1990; this 
essay is contained in a volume dedicated to the application of the rational actor theory to political 
processes).  The claim that human decision-making can be explained by and modeled on the maximizing of 
preferences has also had wide influence beyond those who subscribe explicitly to rational choice theory in 
many areas of political science.  See, for example, David A. Lake and Robert Powell’s Strategic Choice 
and International Relations (1999), Lee Epstein and Jack Knight’s The Choices Justices Make (1998), and 
Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth’s The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002). 
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Cicero’s political thought is especially valuable in this endeavor, it will be helpful first to 
examine the most powerful recent challenge to the view that human behavior can best be 
described as the rational pursuit of interests as well as the political recommendations 
proposed by those for whom this challenge is compelling.    
The view that human beings can accurately be described as rational actors has 
been most notably called into question by Daniel Kahneman, whose work has been a key 
source in the drive to reexamine how we ought to account for the weakness of human 
reason in the political arena.  Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow, argues that the extent 
to which we make thoughtful calculations in pursuit of our preferences has been vastly 
over-estimated by rational choice theory.  He argues, however, that this over-confidence 
in our rational capacity is not limited to models of behavior constructed by social 
scientists, but is rather a “pernicious illusion” to which all people succumb on regular 
basis (2011, 201).  On Kahneman’s view, while we “think of ourselves” as “the 
conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about 
and what to do,” we, more often than not, make decisions—even those we regard as of 
paramount importance—on the basis of involuntary “impressions, intuitions, intentions, 
and feelings” with “little or no modification” by deliberate and effortful calculation 
(2011, 21-24).  According to Kahneman, we form our judgments and make choices 
without noticing that we are making mistakes, for example, on the basis of irrational 
prejudices against certain types of behavior or the perception of patterns that do not exist.  
For these reasons, he argues, people cannot be expected to act consistently in ways that 
accord with their interests.   
Kahneman’s account leads him to the conclusion that best way for political 
institutions to address this fact of human psychology is to adopt an attitude of “libertarian 
paternalism,” popularized by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler’s Nudge (Kahneman 
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2011, 413). Like Kahneman, Sunstein and Thaler argue that human thinking is divided 
into two “systems:” one “intuitive and automatic” on which we unconsciously rely for 
most of our thought and action, and the other “reflective and rational,” to which we 
mistakenly attribute most of our thinking (2008, 19).2  They show, however, that this 
view of human psychology presents a fundamental problem for modern democratic 
politics.  On one hand, Sunstein and Thaler wish to maintain as a central tenet of liberal 
democracy “the straightforward insistence that, in general, people should be free to do 
what they like” (2008, 5).  But, on the other, they argue that the assumption that “almost 
all people, almost all of the time, make choices that are in their best interest or at the very 
least better than the choices that would be made by someone else…is false—indeed 
obviously false” (2008, 9).3  The political order that leaves its citizens wholly free to fail 
in the pursuit of their own interests cannot claim to rule for their good.4  It is, in addition, 
impossible for the regime to avoid shaping thought and behavior (2008, 10-11).  All laws 
and polices, by proscribing certain actions and encouraging others, influence the way we 
think and act.  Indeed, not only law, but also “social influence” shapes our thinking 
because of the great weight we lend to the approbation of our peers (2008, 54-55).  
Sunstein and Thaler conclude, then, that in order to resolve the problem of irrationality 
                                                
2 Sunstein and Thaler, however, build their political claims partly on the foundation of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s earlier psychological insights (Sunstein and Thaler 2008, 23).   For Sunstein and Thaler’s 
account of the basic ways that thinking we perceive as rational actually falls short of rationality, see (2008, 
22-37).  The same distinction drawn by Kahneman and Sunstein and Thaler has also been applied directly 
to moral thinking by Joshua Greene, who argues in Moral Tribes (2013) that our moral judgments can be 
divided into the automatic and instinctual moral reactions that have evolved over time, allowing human 
beings to live together in groups, and the reflective rational ability that adds flexibility to these instincts.     
3 See also Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1160-1163. 
4 Sunstein and Thaler do not address why the freedom of choice to which they are committed is worth 
preserving.  Ben-Porath, building on the work of Kahneman and Tversky, and Sunstein and Thaler, 
similarly assumes the commitment to freedom of choice, but argues that libertarian paternalism is necessary 
in order to balance freedom with the goal of promoting equality (2010).  Against Sunstein and Thaler, 
Sarah Conly’s Against Autonomy (2012) uses Kahneman’s psychology to argue that freedom itself is too 




without restricting liberty, the regime should use law and “social influence” to shape the 
way that difficult choices are presented so that citizens are more likely to choose what is 
good for them but remain free to choose the opposite (2008, 72).   
Sunstein and Thaler point especially to the difficulty human beings seem to have 
in pursuing what is good for us when it requires self-control.  In such cases, we 
experience conflict between our reflective side that “[tries] to promote…long term 
welfare” and the “feelings, mischief, and strong will” of our impulsive side that “is 
exposed to the temptations that come with arousal” (2008, 42, 73).  The pervasive 
irrationality and failure to pursue our interests is not then only a problem of the power of 
unconscious intuition, but of the way our intuitions, desires, and judgments interact with 
each other.  As Sunstein and Thaler suggest, we are conscious of conflict between them, 
but often fail to overcome the power of temptations and feelings for the sake of goals we 
recognize as good (2008, 42).  Moreover, their own presentation of the problem of self-
control suggests that, while they call the impulsive side of our psychology automatic and 
unreflective, it nevertheless carries its own considerations of what is good for us—the 
“strong will,” in their words—the force of which we are aware and with which we 
consciously try to grapple.  It is strange, then, that Sunstein and Thaler largely reject the 
usefulness or possibility of an education that might aim to enable citizens to grapple with 
this sort of psychological conflict more successfully (2008, 74-75).  They do not propose 
to attempt to alter or improve how we think, but rather to use the common inadequacies 
of everyday thinking to direct us toward goals the good of which we may or may not 
recognize.  They claim that with respect to life’s most difficult choices, discerning and 
pursuing what is in one’s own interest is closer to “solving the relevant mathematical 
equation” than it is to habituation or learning “through trial and error” (2008, 74; see also 
241).   
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In order for law and policy to address the way that human irrationality affects behavior, 
we must therefore look for guidance to experts, whose technical knowledge can 
determine what is best in a given case.  With their knowledge, experts can also predict the 
ways that citizens will fail to pursue their own interests, and attempt to circumvent these 
shortcomings by gently pushing us to the correct path (2008, 247).  In order to ensure that 
they act in the best interest of the citizen body, Sunstein and Thaler argue that these 
experts ought to be bound by “rules of engagement that reduce…abuses, that promote 
healthy competition, that restrict interest-group power, and that create incentives to make 
it more likely that the architects will serve the public interest” (2008, 240).  In other 
words, it is necessary also to nudge the nudgers.  But Sunstein and Thaler do not address 
where the moral framework that informs these rules comes from.  They also neglect to 
explain what it is about the expert’s knowledge that makes him less susceptible to the 
weakness of self-restraint that plagues most people most of the time.  Kahneman is 
somewhat less confident in the rule of experts than Sunstein and Thaler, but his 
reservation lies in his worry that experts may not “endeavor to protect the public” from 
painful irrationality as well as elected officials (Kahneman 2011, 144, see also 141-145). 
Indeed, Sunstein and Thaler and Kahneman—to a lesser extent—all seem to assume or 
simply have faith in the power of reason alone to overcome (what they claim) is the 
natural human condition.   
 If they are right, however, that we think of ourselves primarily as reasoning 
beings adequate to the task of making competent choices, it is questionable whether 
libertarian paternalism, however gentle, can be satisfying for us.  Indeed, their own view 
of the over-confidence we have in our rationality suggests that this is a characteristic of 
human thinking which cannot be so easily ignored or sidestepped.  It is worth asking also 
what the roots are of the commitment to the public interest that Sunstein and Thaler wish 
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to safeguard and on which the goodness of lawmaking depends.  It is here that turning to 
Cicero is especially helpful.  Cicero addresses the political implications of the pervasive 
irrationality identified by modern social science in such a way that takes better account of 
the importance of how we think about ourselves, even if that thinking is ultimately 
mistaken.  While “libertarian paternalism” discounts the attachment we tend to have to 
our own judgments, and attempts to circumvent sub-rational decision-making, Cicero 
cautions us that the proper guiding and understanding of politics requires a deep 
appreciation of the tangle of judgments, motivations, attachments, and concerns we bring 
to political life.   Moreover, he delves more deeply than the libertarian paternalists into 
the rational and irrational sources of the attachment to the common good and outlines on 
this basis a civic education that attends to the necessity of cultivating that attachment in a 
self-governing regime.  
As a result, scholars have recently begun to turn to Cicero’s republican teaching 
as the origin of a rich alternative to the Lockean republicanism dominant today.  Such 
scholarship, however, tends to miss that Cicero’s insistence on the importance of 
attending to ordinary opinions and desires does not come from a simple acceptance of 
their soundness or from an idealization of republican politics.  This has led to widely 
divergent interpretations of the basis of Cicero’s defense of republicanism.  Paul 
Weithman, for example, finds in Cicero a “perfectionist republicanism” based on a 
“highly moralized [theory] of politics” in which citizens are required “to develop and 
exercise traits of character which are genuine human excellences” (2004, 293).   
Conversely, Philip Pettit appeals to Cicero as the originator of a tradition of 
republicanism at the core of which is the understanding of freedom as “non-domination.”5  
                                                
5 See also Nicholas Buttle 2001, Quentin Skinner 1990, Maurizio Viroli 1990, Fott 2009, and Clarke 2014 
for treatments of the relation of Cicero to this republican tradition.  Skinner and Viroli both present a more 
detailed account of the influence of Cicero’s De Officiis on Renaissance republicanism and argue that 
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According to Pettit, non-domination is an “an ideal of liberty” that stems not only from 
the things people want, but also from what we esteem (1997, 25, 80-81).  He argues that 
“freedom involves emancipation from any [arbitrary] subordination” and requires “a 
shared awareness” that no citizen “has a power of arbitrary interference over another”  
(1997, 5, 19).  Such a view of freedom, he argues, offers a moral justification for 
democracy and grounds upon which democratic institutions can and ought to be 
organized (Pettit 2000, 54-55).  Pettit’s emphasis on non-domination points to an 
important aspect of Cicero’s political thought.  Indeed, Cicero’s reflections on the 
political significance of the desire for the kind of freedom that “does not consist in 
employing a just master” are a crucial element of his teaching about the organization of a 
good regime and the ends of government (DR II.43).6  Democracy, Cicero suggests, finds 
its greatest justification in the sweetness of freedom that is unavailable in any other 
political order (DR I.47, 55). 
 While it is true that unlike Aristotle, whose Politics emphasizes the justness of 
ruling and being ruled in turn, Cicero includes something like a view of freedom as “non-
domination” in his teaching, Pettit is mistaken in his association of this element with the 
core of Cicero’s political thought.7  Cicero’s republicanism is not straightforwardly 
democratic.8  The sweetness of freedom does not, for Cicero, prove the superiority of 
                                                                                                                                            
Machiavelli and other Renaissance humanists took from Cicero especially his understanding of the virtues 
and civic fellowship.  See Clarke’s essay for a thoughtful argument against Skinner’s view.    
6 Cicero’s works will be cited throughout using the following abbreviations: ATT = Letters to Atticus, DD = 
De Divinatione, DF = De Finibus, DND = De Natura Deorum, DO = De Officiis, DOR = De Oratore, DR 
= De Republica, PM = Pro Murena, TD = Tuscualanae Disputationes.  Specific editions used are noted in 
the bibliography.  Translations have been modified on occasion.  
7 See, for example, Politics 1261a32-b9. 
8 Rahe offers a compelling account of the ambivalence with which America’s founding generation regarded 
Cicero.  As he documents, evidence abounds that the founders read Cicero, but that “men like Adams and 
Jefferson openly doubted” whether the virtues he defended “really deserved admiration” (1994, 75).  This 
dissertation argues, however, that Cicero’s thought is of value to us not because it recovers the concerns of 
the founders, but because it offers serious, but underappreciated reflections on a question with which any 
republic must be concerned. 
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democracy to other forms of government.  According to Scipio, who leads the 
conversation in Cicero’s De Republica, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy all have 
advantages, but, of the three, monarchy is intrinsically preferable (DR I.54, II.43, 47).  
The mixed regime, which Scipio professes to prefer to any other option, is necessary not 
because of an unfairness of monarchy or the simple reasonableness of the people’s desire 
for freedom, but because “the nature of political things often defeats reason” (DR II.57).  
Cicero argues that attention must be paid to demands for this sort of freedom as a 
prudential calculation for the preservation of concord within a regime (DR II.54).  Thus 
Cicero’s republican teaching, which is recognized primarily for doing full justice to our 
deeply held opinions (see also Hammer 2008), derives not only from his admiration for 
republican self rule in which men of real virtue guide the regime, but also from his 
understanding of the irrationality of politics.  Whereas the libertarian paternalists’ 
response to irrational behavior is to point government toward the role of a benevolent 
care-taker, Cicero suggests that it is precisely because we tend to behave irrationally that 
we would not accept for long even a just and wise paternalism in which our “safety, 
equality, and tranquility” were ensured (DR II.43).    But Cicero’s understanding of the 
irrationality of politics does not lead him, as a result, to belittle or ignore it. He 
recognizes that it is especially in political activity—in our belief that happiness requires 
the active participation in and virtuous devotion to the regime—that the most noble and 
impressive parts of our nature shine forth.  Cicero shows that it is not only because of 
what is worst in us, but also because of what is best in us that political deeds often defy 
reason.  Most crucially, he shows that the cultivation of concern for the common good 
and the commitment to civic fellowship in a healthy polity rely not only on reason, but 
also, and perhaps more, on the kinds of nonrational and irrational attachments we form in 
friendships and familial life that extend the way we think about our own good beyond 
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calculations of self-interest.  Cicero argues that healthy politics depends upon and makes 
use of human irrationality in a way not recognized by contemporary political 
psychologists or by scholars of Cicero’s political thought. 
 The attempt to address irrationality in politics requires, in addition, reflection 
about the role that political science itself plays or ought to play in guiding political life.  
How much, for example, should law-makers rely on statistical analysis or behavioral 
models that reduce reality to a small set of variables when forming policy?  How do not 
only statesmen, but also ordinary citizens, develop the kind of judgment that can 
adequately evaluate their own and their government’s actions?  Just as Sunstein and 
Thaler argue that the rule of experts is necessary to identify and pursue what is best for 
human beings, the popular philosophical schools of Cicero’s day claimed to gain a better 
understanding of politics and human nature by standing above the fray of the nitty-gritty 
of ordinary political life.   Cicero, who was deeply involved both in the practical politics 
of his regime and in the study of human nature, makes reflection on this claim a central 
theme of his works.  As perhaps the first student of Socratic political philosophy to 
observe first-hand the influence of popular philosophy on politics, his perspective is 
unique in the history of political thought.  The rich political psychology that informs his 
view of the best political order brings to light his recognition that attempts to reduce 
politics to a set of rational rules obscure, rather than clarify, the way our judgments and 
concerns manifest themselves in the political arena.  The direct treatments of popular 
philosophy (primarily of the Stoics and the Epicureans) in Cicero’s works indicate that he 
viewed this reductionistic tendency as an essential characteristic of popular philosophy.  
Through his analysis of the schools, Cicero thus raises the question of the proper relation 
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of political science or political philosophy to practical politics.9 If, however, Cicero is 
right that popular philosophy has a tendency to oversimplification because of its need to 
reach a widespread audience, the ability of popular philosophy to provide guidance to 
political actors must be questioned.  As Walter Nicgorski notes, the schools “abuse 
reason by their forced attempt to explain with certainty and consistency all things” 
(Nicgorski 1984, 571; see also 1991, 236, 243).  Indeed, as Cicero shows, this tendency 
can have politically pernicious effects.        
This dissertation argues in addition that Cicero’s own claims to bring philosophy 
to Rome must be understood in light of his critique of popular philosophy.  He wished 
not only to make Rome safe for Socratic philosophy, but to preserve as much as possible 
the soil from which philosophical reflection might spring.  This required, in Cicero’s 
view, the defense of republican politics.  Analysis of Cicero’s presentation and critique of 
the Stoic school of thought reveals that Cicero’s political project was not the 
popularization of philosophy, but rather its opposite.  Tracing Cicero’s presentation of 
popular philosophy shed lights on the dangerous effects on both politics and philosophy, 
not simply of Stoicism, but of the popularization of the intellectual pursuits in general 
insofar as they share Stoicism’s reductionistic tendency. Only by understanding this 
aspect of Cicero’s thought can we understand his reflections on the nature of politics and 
the virtues of republicanism.  As will be shown, Cicero’s project seeks to return to 
politics the dignity that we naturally attribute to it and, by doing so, to preserve the 
possibility of serious statesmanship.  Through it Cicero seeks to direct us back towards 
                                                
9 Cicero speaks of the scientia rerum civilium or “the science of political things” and claims that it was 
studied by “those whose authority and reputation stand highest among learned men,” that is, Plato and 
Aristotle (DR I.11-12; DF IV.5, 61).  Insofar as he understands philosophy to require the concern with 
political things, and true knowledge of political things to be based upon a philosophic foundation, Cicero 
does not recognize a distinction between political philosophy and political science (cf. DO II.156, TD 
V.10).       
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the reflection on and understanding of the political elements of human nature as the best 
grounds for genuine political science. 
Much of the scholarship on Cicero’s political thought deals with the question of 
how he understood the relationship between politics and philosophy (in addition to the 
recent scholars, noted above, who look to Cicero for an alternative republican theory).  
Among these studies, few, however, take up Cicero’s evaluation and modification of the 
schools’ teachings thematically.10  Studies of Cicero seem to divide roughly into two sets: 
those who see a fundamental disconnect between Cicero’s apparently universalistic moral 
teaching and his political allegiance to the Roman elite, and those who claim that Cicero 
consciously attempts to synthesize philosophy and politics by turning philosophy to the 
service of the public good. It will be helpful to consider here a small representative 
sample.  The most influential scholars on each side of this debate have been Neal Wood 
and Walter Nicgorski respectively.11   
For Wood, Cicero’s thought is valuable especially because it marks the beginning 
of the “transition to modern political thought” from Greek philosophy (Wood 10-11).  
According to Wood, Cicero anticipates thinkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke 
by presenting the first “concise formal definition of the state” as having the “central non-
moral purpose” of the protection of property (Wood 11).12  But this understanding of the 
                                                
10  Douglas Kries 2000, Walter Nicgorski 1984, J. Jackson Barlow 1987, and Thomas Pangle 1998 are 
notable exceptions.  Martha Nussbaum 2000 includes a helpful discussion of the political implications and 
problems of classical Stoicism, but argues that Cicero’s departures from Stoic doctrine stem from his 
“highly partisan politicking” (Nussbaum 2000, 202).  Atkins 2013 offers a thoughtful analysis of Cicero’s 
response to Stoicism and his account of the limits of reason in political life, but focuses on De Republica 
and De Legibus rather than offering a systematic treatment of the works in which Cicero confronts the 
schools directly. 
11 Along with Wood’s Cicero’s Social and Political Thought, Nicgorski’s “Cicero and the Rebirth of 
Political Philosophy” (1978), “Cicero’s Paradoxes and his Idea of Utility” (1984), and “Cicero’s Focus 
From the Best Regime to the Model Statesman” (1991) are cited in most recent works on Cicero’s political 
thought. 
12 Against the view that Cicero presents a “non-moral” definition of the state, see Bryan-Paul Frost (2010), 
who argues that Cicero seeks to add philosophy to Roman civic education in order to provide political men 
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state reveals, on Wood’s view, a contradiction in Cicero’s thought.  Cicero, on the one 
hand, has a “deep and lasting belief in the moral equality of human beings” and, on the 
other hand, accepts “an inegalitarian society” (Wood, 76).  Moreover, says Wood, there is 
no evidence that Cicero himself is aware of the tension inherent in his theoretical and 
political positions (ibid).  Wood is ultimately compelled to see Cicero, if not as “solely an 
ideologist or simpleminded apologist for the existing ruling order,” then as “a spokesman 
for the supreme control of the Roman state by his own class” whose moral position goes 
only so far as to offer a friendly critique of that class in the hope of restoring its health 
(Wood, 209-10). In her study of De Officiis, Martha Nussbaum also finds a tension 
between Cicero’s purportedly proto-Kantian understanding of justice, which contains “an 
idea of respect for humanity, of treating a human being as an end rather than a means” 
according to a rational natural law, and the primacy he assigns in that work to 
conventional property rights (Nussbaum 2000, 183, 202).13  Although it will be shown 
that neither Wood’s nor Nussbaum’s view does justice to Cicero’s depiction of virtue, 
there is nevertheless something to their line of thought.  Cicero’s works present lofty and 
beautiful conceptions of virtue and civic dedication, but often fail to censure politics as 
usual when it falls short of virtue.14  That is, the tension to which each points is real. But 
we should not be too quick to accept the conclusion that Cicero is unable to distance 
himself from an elitist nostalgia for the power of the aristocracy in republican Rome.  
Against this view, I argue that Cicero’s works also show that his presentation of this 
                                                                                                                                            
of the future with a “moral compass” (2010, 392).  For others who see Cicero as a precursor to modern 
thought, see, in addition to the essays by Skinner and Viroli noted above, Gary Remer 2010. Insofar as 
Remer argues that Cicero presents a teaching about representation that foreshadows the thought of John 
Stuart Mill and Edmund Burke (2010, 1069-1073), he departs from Wood, who sees “no notion of political 
representation” in Cicero’s thought (Wood, 11). 
13 For additional critical assessments of Cicero along this line, see J.M. Carter 1972 and H.J. Haskell 1942.  
14 As Wood and Nussbaum attest, this is nowhere clearer than in Cicero’s discussion of property in De 
Officiis (see, for example, DO I.20-21). 
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tension is a deliberate attempt to help his reader reflect on the limits to which we can 
hope to cultivate reason and moral virtue in political activity and the extent to which 
citizenship in a republic is good for us in spite of its inevitable shortcomings. 
If the difficulties to which Wood and Nussbaum point can be addressed by 
attention to Cicero’s political pragmatism, a more serious critique of Cicero’s thought is 
presented by Eric Voegelin that brings to light the immediate problem with which any 
reader of Cicero’s philosophical works is confronted.  We might understand the problem 
in Cicero’s writings to which Voegelin responds in the following way.  While Cicero 
claims to be a student of Plato, he seems to have lived his life in an entirely un-Platonic 
manner and at times seems to express an entirely un-Platonic understanding of 
philosophy.  Cicero goes to great lengths to remind his readers that he spent the majority 
of his life deeply involved in politics as a statesman and defender of the Roman republic.  
Moreover, it appears that he turned to philosophical reflection and writing only when he 
was exiled from the political arena (DO III.1; but cf. DR I.7, DND I.6).  One might 
wonder, then, whether we can take seriously the philosophical claims of a man who 
merely dabbled in philosophy and regarded it as a distraction from the failure of his 
political career.  Furthermore, while Cicero seems to accord the highest dignity at times 
to political activity, at other times he accords this honor to the philosophical life (and 
sometimes he does both within one work).  He presents a simultaneous critique of 
philosophy on behalf of moral and political virtue and a defense of philosophy as the only 
truly virtuous activity.  In response to this difficulty, Voegelin writes:      
The thinker who can speak of philosophy as a "foreign learning," to be respected 
but nevertheless to be considered as a spice that will add perfection to superiority, 
has, one may safely say, understood neither the nature of the spiritual revolution 
that found its expression in philosophy nor the nature of its universal claim upon 
man. The peculiar way in which Cicero mixes his respect for Greek philosophy 
with amused contempt indicates that the truth of theory, while sensed as an 
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enlargement of the intellectual and moral horizon, could have no existential 
meaning for a Roman (2000, 161). 
This problem cannot be avoided by attempting to separate Cicero’s reflections on wisdom 
or the life of contemplation from his reflections on political activity, for Cicero makes his 
involvement in politics a major theme of his philosophical writings.  In De Officiis, for 
example, he appeals to his political experience has the justification of his claim to speak 
authoritatively about virtue (DO I.2).  Cicero thus forces his reader to take up the 
problem that his political activity raises for his political philosophy.  It is not clear, 
however, that in keeping in mind his political activity we must conclude, with Voegelin, 
that for Cicero “the highest rank…is held by the man who can add the ‘foreign learning’ 
to his ancestral customs” as “a spice that will add perfection to superiority,” or that “if a 
choice must be made…the vita civilis of the statesman is preferable to the vita quieta of 
the sage” (2000, 161).  Neither Cicero’s appreciation that philosophy is alien to the 
Roman political order nor his occasional statement that philosophy does not decisively 
improve that order prove that he therefore does not also appreciate the full meaning of 
philosophy.  According to Cicero, “philosophy is a pursuit which, once entered upon, 
cannot be limited or held back…I regard as more just those who would altogether turn 
me away from philosophy, than those who would set bounds on the infinite and desire 
moderation when the greater the study, the greater the reward” (DF I.2; see also TD 2.1, 
DR I.26-28).  Cicero seems, then, to reject just the sort of view that Voegelin attributes to 
him (and to all Romans).   
Voegelin’s characterization of Cicero is more understandable if we recall that 
Cicero also argues that virtue’s “greatest use is the governance of the city and the 
completion in fact, not in speech, of the same things as [philosophers] shout about in 
corners” (DR 1.2; see also DO I.19).  Cicero goes so far as to claim that “the philosophers 
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say nothing…that was [not] accomplished and strengthened by those who have 
configured laws for cities” (DR I.2).  Yet Voegelin, by attending only to this element of 
Cicero’s rhetoric, misses the depth of its purpose.  Preliminary reflection on Cicero’s 
theoretical works suggests that he made a conscious effort to present his writings in this 
problematic way.  Voegelin rightly sees that Cicero often and explicitly criticizes 
philosophy as of little importance to the real world of practical politics.  Because he 
disregards the fact that Cicero also praises the life of the philosopher as the only truly 
human life (DR 1.28, see also DO I.13, 18), Voegelin is unable to see that the 
subordination of philosophy to politics cannot be understood as Cicero’s final view on 
the matter.  It seems instead that by, on one hand, presenting himself both as a morally 
serious political man and a lover of wisdom and, on the other, insisting on the ultimate 
incompatibility of politics and philosophy, Cicero wishes to force his reader to notice and 
grapple with what seems to be the contradiction or tension in his own life.  Voegelin 
merely notices the contradiction.  What he does not notice, as I will attempt to show, is 
that Cicero notices it as well.  By clarifying the way in which Cicero presents a serious 
theoretical critique of Stoicism at the same time as he incorporates elements of it into his 
moral and political teaching, it will be possible to begin to untangle the apparent 
incoherence that has led Voegelin and others to accuse Cicero of almost impenetrable 
eclecticism and a lack of philosophical seriousness. 
Nicgorski has been the most consistent defender of the coherence of Cicero’s 
thought against the views put forward by Wood and Voegelin (see, for example, 
Nicgorski 1978, 68, 79; 1984, 558-9).  According to Nicgorski, the unifying principle of 
Cicero’s thought derives from his attention to the human “need for society, the need for 
moderation, and the need for seeking wisdom,” which are “different aspects of the overall 
requisites of human nature as revealed in its fundamental inclinations” (Nicgorski 1984, 
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563).  Of these inclinations, Cicero is concerned in particular with the possible tensions 
between wisdom and justice.  But while Cicero considers “the inclination to truth or 
wisdom…more so than others, as peculiarly characteristic of human beings,” Nicgorski 
argues that “as a way of life within the usual human condition, such philosophizing is 
contrary to the duties imposed on men” in Cicero’s view (Nicgorski 1984, 565-6).  
Cicero, he claims, makes the case for the primacy of the life of the statesman “largely as 
a matter of common sense” rather than “as a tight philosophical argument” (ibid).15   
Philosophy, says Nicgorski, is necessary only insofar as it guides and educates the 
statesman, whose virtuous activity is the necessary condition for all human goods 
(Nicgorski 1984, 572-3). While Nicgorski is particularly helpful in clarifying Cicero’s 
view of the way that political activity cultivates an expression of some of the highest and 
most impressive aspects of human nature, I depart from his reading insofar as he claims 
that, for Cicero, philosophy is “fitting and fulfilling” only “after all public tasks have 
been completed or in the life after death” (Nicgorski 1984, 566).  Although Nicgorski 
suggests once that Cicero understands philosophy to “[entail] searching for and laying 
bare the truth,” he concludes that “philosophy must, for Cicero, be justified at the bar of 
common sense,” and that this is achieved only if it is “made subject to the moral claims 
of the needs of human nature” (Nicgorski 1984, 558, 572).  If, as Nicgorski also notes, an 
“essential dimension of [politics] is not rational,” then philosophy, having been “made 
subject to the needs of political life,” cannot be measured by “that which survives the test 
of examination and argument” (Nicgorski 1991, 236; 1984, 558).  Nicgorski’s view of 
Cicero is, in this way, surprisingly similar to (though, of course, more sympathetic than) 
                                                
15 Hammer, however, argues that Cicero’s preference for the political life over philosophy rests not only on 
a practical moral claim, but also a theoretical one.  In his view “Cicero reverses [Plato’s] hierarchy: the 
statesman not only most resembles the divine in his ability to make a world, but the political life is superior 
to the philosophic because it affects more people” (2008, 44; see also Glendon 2011, 23-25). 
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that of Eric Voegelin, whom he wishes to refute.16  Ultimately, both argue that Cicero 
transforms a way of life committed to the rigorous rational examination of nature into a 
noble but subordinate pursuit that seeks clarity about politics only to the extent that it 
neither undermines nor detracts from the fulfillment of political obligations.   
Against this reading, I argue that Cicero indeed gives full expression to the 
complexity of healthy civic life and, in doing so, attends to the ways that it depends not 
only on reason but also on a moral teaching that draws on natural but nonrational—and 
perhaps irrational—passions and attachments.  The strength of Cicero’s articulation of 
political life is rooted especially in this attention, in his insistence that the scientific 
investigation of human nature must include an account of the fact that human beings are 
not perfectly rational by nature.  Cicero’s writings show, however, that he understands 
this investigation to form the heart of the way of life most conducive to happiness for 
human beings apart from any relation it may have to political utility.  For Cicero, then, 
the tension between the demands of politics and those of philosophy is not resolved 
unambiguously in favor of the primacy of politics.  Cicero nevertheless recognizes that 
because human beings most often fail to live according to the dictates of reason alone, the 
political order that not only allows an outlet for our irrational behavior, but also cultivates 
meaningful association among fellow citizens is truly beneficial for us.  He therefore 
attempts in his writings to navigate the tension between politics and philosophy in such a 
way that is conducive to the thriving of both (Strauss 1950, 155).17   
                                                
16 Cf. Voegelin’s claim that, for Cicero, philosophy “add[s] perfection to superiority” with Nicgorski’s 
formulation: “Cicero’s teaching about the priority of the active political life makes the point that men have 
served and can serve the public well with no special assistance from philosophy…It appears nonetheless 
that natural virtue can be strengthened and refined by that branch of philosophy…that produces prudence” 
(Nicgorski 1984, 568). 
17 See also Kries 2000 and Frost 2010.  Wilhelmsen and Kendall also claim that Cicero recognizes a 
discrepancy between “the demands of the transcendent and of society,” but conclude that this recognition 
leads Cicero to “invent two truths” that separately and irreconcilably ground philosophy, on one hand, and 
political orthodoxy, on the other (1968-69, 89, 99).  Against this view, it will be argued that Cicero shows 
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In order to shed light on the intention and the substance of Cicero’s political and 
philosophical project, this dissertation examines the works in which Cicero’s confronts 
directly and responds to the teachings of the popular philosophical schools.  I begin in 
Chapter 2 by tracing Cicero’s critique of the moral teachings of the schools and his 
evaluation of the effect of philosophical doctrine on both political life and philosophy 
itself.  Chapter 3 turns to De Natura Deorum, in which Cicero considers, on one hand, the 
relation of civic virtue to piety and, on the other, the possibility of wide scale 
enlightenment by means of the rationalistic theologies of the schools.  Finally, Chapter 4 
examines Cicero’s presentation of his own moral teaching in De Officiis as a salutary 
corrective of the practical and theoretical deficiencies of the schools.  By considering 
Cicero’s civic education in light of his critique of popular philosophy, will be possible to 
clarify more fully the connection that he draws between human irrationality and the 
virtue that is both admirable and necessary for healthy politics and the relation of that 
virtue to the good for human beings. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
that the different demands of politics and philosophy can be understood to spring from one coherent view 
of human nature. 
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Chapter 2: The Moral Teaching of The Schools18 
“He is the first, among the Romans, who rescued philosophy from the hands of 
scholars, and freed it from the confusion of a foreign language. He made it 
common to all men, like reason, and in the commendations that he received from 
them, men of letters found themselves in accord with the people.”19 
When we ask about the extent to which reason can rule the political sphere, we 
are really asking two different, but related practical questions.  On one hand, we wish to 
know whether it is necessary and possible for citizens to rule their own lives rationally in 
order to achieve the ends that we seek in political life.  And, on the other, we ask whether 
and to what degree the education of statesmen or those who guide the regime must 
include the mastery of political science (or political philosophy).  Perhaps more than any 
other classical political philosopher, Cicero’s writings show a deep concern both for the 
health of politics and for the health of philosophy.  Thus, his attention to the influence of 
the spread of popular philosophy and its impact on political life and philosophical inquiry 
is especially instructive in our efforts to understand the possibility of rational politics.  
Indeed, it is in those works in which Cicero confronts the teachings of the philosophical 
schools—teachings that explicitly claim, as does modern political science, to rise above 
the mistakes and incoherence in ordinary thinking and better to understand human nature 
and the primary motivations for our actions—that he presents an account of the pitfalls 
that plague philosophy in its popularized form and presents at the same time his own 
political psychology as a corrective. 
Cicero offers a few clues about where, among these works, to begin.  In De 
Divinatione, he presents a brief catalog and description of his theoretical works (DD II.1-
                                                
18 All citations in this chapter, unless otherwise noted, are to De Finibus (Cicero 2001).   
19 Montesquieu’s “Discourse on Cicero” (2002, 734). 
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4)20: “since the foundation of philosophy rests on the ends of good and bad,” he writes, 
“that subject has been explained by us in five books and in such a way that the conflicting 
views of the different philosophers might be understood” (DD II.2).21  Cicero thus alerts 
us to a number of important features of De Finibus. First, it contains the “foundation of 
philosophy,” by which Cicero understands especially human things: questions of what 
things are good and what bad, and what the goal is towards which these things point us.  
Second, Cicero also indicates that the purpose of De Finibus is not merely to catalog 
different views.22  The presentation of the views of the philosophers is a crucial element, 
but not the most important goal of the work.  Comparison of the views of the 
philosophers is rather the primary tool—the lens through which the inquiry will be 
made—by which Cicero explains (perpurgo) and helps his reader to understand 
(intellego) his fundamental reflections on philosophy and human nature.  
Cicero confirms the importance of De Finibus and its subject in the introduction 
to the work. He writes that “one who was accustomed to read carefully the things which 
we committed to writing about philosophy, will judge none to be more worth reading 
than this” (I.11; cf. II.86).  Cicero’s initial explanation of the subject of the book is, 
however, ambiguous.  In this work he treats “what the end [is]...to which all our 
deliberations on living well and acting rightly should be directed” and what “nature 
[pursues] as the highest of things to be sought, what she [shuns] as the greatest of bad 
things” (I.11).  Cicero thus presents the work’s central theme in the form of two separate 
                                                
20 De Divinatione was completed early in 44 B.C. and does not include De Officiis (written later that year) 
in the catalog of works.  
21 The “five books” refer to the three conversations presented in the five books of De Finibus. 
22 Many modern readers of Cicero have, nevertheless understood him in this way.  Consider, for example, 
Rackham’s introduction to his translation of De Finibus (1951).  
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questions: what is the aim or standard for right (recte) action, and what does nature 
pursue and flee?23   
If we follow Cicero’s suggestion to read closely, consideration of the relation of 
the two questions reveals the nature of the ambiguity.  It is possible that the second 
question is the answer to the first: understood this way, the highest things that our nature 
seeks would be the end to which all concerns about living well and acting rightly must 
refer.  But such an interpretation cannot quite account for the different standard from 
which each question begins.  Indeed, by formulating the main concern of the work as two 
different questions, Cicero quietly raises the possibility that each question may have a 
different answer.  The first question is specifically moral, for the question of what actions 
are right is a question about virtue and, above all, about justice.  The second question 
may be moral, but it also may not be.  The aim of virtuous action may not be in complete 
accordance with the highest thing that nature pursues.  The answers to the two questions 
converge only if the moral life is the life according to nature.  This, according to De 
Finibus, is the popular teaching of the Stoics and it is a possibility that Cicero himself 
takes very seriously.  Moreover, if the Stoic teaching were true, then its dissemination 
would likely be a salutary element of any civic education.  The seriousness with which 
Cicero considers the Stoic teaching does not, however, suggest his wholesale agreement 
with it.  Indeed, Cicero begins De Finibus by calling into question the character of the 
connection between right or virtuous action and the good according to nature.  He also 
                                                
23 Walter Nicgorski also takes the passage noted above in De Divinatione to indicate the foundation or 
“starting point” of Cicero’s philosophical investigations (1984, 561).  His focus on the connection of right 
and utility in De Officiis as indicative of that starting point neglects, however, Cicero’s subsequent claim in 
De Divinatione that he treats the foundation of philosophy in De Finibus.  Nicgroski thus departs from 
Cicero’s own indication of how his philosophical investigation progresses from this starting point.  While 
Nicgorski begins from the premise that “whatever way…Cicero understands the right or the good and, 
hence, the foundation of all philosophy, this right or good must be one with utility,” De Finibus shows that 




will come to question explicitly the good effect that Stoicism has on political activity.  
Reflection on and clarification of the proper relation between philosophy or science as it 
becomes increasingly popularized and politics is thus critical to Cicero’s investigation of 
nature and justice in De Finibus.        
CICERO’S AUDIENCE 
The ambiguity in the presentation of De Finibus’ central questions is also rooted 
in the different audiences to whom Cicero calls attention in the book’s opening lines.  
With almost his first words, Cicero reveals the criticism he anticipates receiving for 
writing a work of philosophy.  De Finibus thus begins by suggesting to its reader that 
Cicero does not presuppose the goodness of philosophy.  It is in need of a defense.  
Indeed, Cicero’s rhetoric in this section shows that he does not dismiss lightly the most 
powerful arguments of his accusers.  He presents and responds to four different audiences 
and their critiques.  There are people, Cicero says, “by no means uneducated,” who 
simply disapprove of philosophizing altogether.  Others do not disapprove so much “if it 
is done in a more easygoing manner, but consider that one should not devote so much of 
one’s enthusiasm and attention to it.”  Some others, “learned in Greek letters,” are 
contemptuous of Latin.  The final group questions Cicero’s subject out of a belief that 
“this kind of writing…[is] not worthy of [his] character and position” (I.1). 
The difference between Cicero’s own view and those of these accusers is, in fact, 
indicated even before he addresses them directly.  Cicero writes that in this work he puts 
“into Latin letters…speeches which have been treated in Greek” (1.1; cf. DND 1.6-8).  
While some scholars have taken statements like this in Cicero’s corpus to mean that 
Cicero understands philosophy to have been a Greek activity that he not only translates 
but also fundamentally alters in order to give it a home in Rome, the statement that opens 
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De Finibus does not require this interpretation.24  Indeed, the presence in Rome of many 
people who found philosophy quite attractive complicates the claim that philosophy is 
alien to Rome.25  The Roman statesman Cato, who describes his understanding of Stoic 
philosophy in Book III, already appears, according to Cicero, “to be teaching philosophy 
Latin and, as it were, granting her Roman citizenship” (III.40).  To take up new 
citizenship is to renounce the commitments and principles of one country in favor of the 
new, possibly quite different, principles of another country. By granting philosophy 
Roman citizenship, then, Cicero implies that Cato fundamentally transforms the meaning 
of philosophy into something that is more in keeping with the laws and customs of Rome. 
Cicero does not portray himself as engaged in the same activity as Cato.  Cicero 
states only that the speeches he discusses have, until his time, been treated in Greek.  
These speeches are not, or at least not necessarily, Greek in nature.  Cicero admits that 
philosophy is foreign to Rome but he does not accept that it must follow that a Roman is 
incapable of understanding Greek philosophy or that the Latin language is incapable of 
sophistication or of presenting philosophical accounts of the most serious kind.   
However, if Cato and others have already given philosophy a place in Rome, it is unclear 
what Cicero means even by the claim that the speeches have only until his time been 
treated in Greek.   Cicero cannot have meant that his own accomplishment was the mere 
translation or repetition of Greek thinking for Roman citizens, for this had already been 
                                                
24 Among Cicero’s modern readers, a number of both detractors and admirers understand him in this way.  
Consider, among his critics, Voegelin (2000, 151), Wood (1988, 209-210), and, among his defenders,  
Nicgorski 1984, Schofield 2012. 
25 These include, for example, all of the interlocutors in De Finibus as well as De Natura Deorum, among 
other works, and Brutus, to whom both works are dedicated.  Moreover, Clarke notes that by Cicero’s time, 
Stoicism “had become widely diffused” in Rome (1956, 18).   
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achieved.  Instead, as this chapter will show, Cicero seems to have thought that true 
philosophy, Socratic philosophy as he understood it, was not yet present in Rome.26         
To his first accusers, those who disapprove of philosophy altogether, Cicero states 
that he has already written a defense of philosophy (his Hortensius) with them in mind.27  
Having aroused their “enthusiasm” (studia) for philosophy through the Hortensius, 
Cicero may believe that he has dealt with such accusations sufficiently in the earlier 
work.  This response implies, however, that Cicero does not expect De Finibus on its own 
to convince such people that philosophizing is a worthwhile activity.  But, that he does 
not address these opponents of philosophy in the work that contains the foundations of 
philosophy suggests that he is not, in fact, worried by their attacks.  Cicero’s opening De 
Finibus with the discussion of its anticipated accusers reveals that he believes philosophy 
in his time to be in a precarious position, but his rapid dismissal of the critiques by those 
who disapprove of philosophy altogether indicates that he does not believe this group to 
present the most serious challenge.  Indeed, Cicero is more concerned in De Finibus to 
correct the mistakes of those to whom philosophy and science have some appeal. 
Cicero takes the second and third groups of accusers—those who do not 
disapprove of philosophy completely and those who, having devoted themselves to 
scientific or literary studies in Greek, are contemptuous of Latin—more seriously.  Both 
of these groups are attracted to philosophy in some way.  However, when Cicero turns to 
                                                
26 Virgil also recognized the subordinate place of science in Rome: “Others…will forge the bronze to 
breath with suppler lines, draw the block of marble features quick with life, plead their cases better, chart 
with their rods the stars that climb the sky and foretell the times they rise. But you, Roman, remember, rule 
withal your power the peoples of the earth—these will be your arts: to put your stamp on the works and 
ways of peace, to spare the defeated, break the proud in war” (2006, VI.847-853).  
27 Cicero’s description of Hortensius (the work is now lost) as written primarily with a view to those who 
blame (vituperator) philosophy and as intended to transform that blame into zeal (studia) may suggest that 
Hortensius did not contain Cicero’s deepest or most serious defense of philosophy.  His writing De Finibus 
suggests, at least, that the depiction of philosophy in Hortensius is partial or incomplete.  St. Augustine 
describes his reading of Hortensius as a young man and its great effect on him in his Confessions III.4.7.  
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reply to the second group, he alters the characterization of their attitude towards 
philosophy.  Whereas he initially describes the second group as one that does not criticize 
philosophy if it is pursued in a “more easygoing manner,” Cicero now presents them as 
“those who take great pleasure in philosophy, but want it to be practiced only to a 
moderate extent” (I.2).  On one hand, this group is now presented as far more favorable 
to philosophy.  Such people may not be accusers but, in fact, actual or potential allies of 
philosophers.  On the other hand, their hesitation about philosophy not only remains, but 
is now also sharpened.  As initially described, these people appear to have only a casual 
interest in philosophic study, but the emendation shows a conflict in their own minds.  
The root of their hesitation is revealed in subsequent lines to be a concern with virtue.  
The pleasure of philosophy is not enough to recommend it to people who are deeply 
concerned with living justly and honorably. For such individuals, activities or pleasures 
must be restrained or moderated so as not to distract from the importance of one’s 
obligations.  Cicero indicates, then, that educated, serious men can be persuaded that 
philosophy has some merit as an honorable activity for leisure or, perhaps, as one of a 
number of tools for the education for the young.  As a way of life, however—as an 
activity to which one devotes all of one’s efforts and attention—philosophy remains 
suspect to the morally serious man.  
Cicero’s reply to the doubt that philosophy can be practiced in moderation does 
not resolve the difficulty, or suggest that there is a harmony between philosophy and 
moral virtue.  Instead Cicero intensifies the difficulty by denying the possibility of 
moderating genuine philosophic activity.  Philosophy, he responds, “is a pursuit which, 
once entered upon, cannot be limited or held back…I regard as more just those who 
would altogether turn me away from philosophy, than those who would set bounds on the 
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infinite, and desire moderation when the greater the study, the greater the reward” (I.2).28  
The overwhelming effect of Cicero’s claim is to present a picture of philosophy as 
something high, the activity which pursues wisdom as the “most beautiful” object (I.2-
3).29  But Cicero also explicitly sets philosophy against virtue, which requires moderation 
of philosophy: the wholesale rejection of philosophy is more just, he says, than its half-
hearted acceptance (he therefore also leaves open the unmentioned possibility that the 
fully-embraced philosophic life is more just than its wholesale rejection).  This 
perplexing portrayal of philosophic activity as a pursuit that is simultaneously “most 
beautiful” and of ambiguous connection to moral virtue (a portrayal which is repeated in 
the explanation of De Finibus’ central themes) is directed especially at morally serious 
individuals who might be attracted to philosophy.  At the same time, De Finibus as a 
whole shows that Cicero is sympathetic to the fear that philosophy can undermine healthy 
civic-mindedness.  He emphasizes this danger in the case of Epicurean hedonism, but 
also, perhaps surprisingly, of Stoicism. 
The most important challenge to Cicero’s writings is presented by the third group 
of accusers who deny that anything of worth could be written in Latin.  The full import of 
this charge and Cicero’s answer to it, however, is best understood in light of Cicero’s 
response to the last set of accusers, those who believe the subject of De Finibus to be 
unworthy of Cicero’s “character and position” (I.1).   It will be helpful, then, to turn to 
                                                
28 In his conversation with Cato, Cicero states that the “study of nature offers the inexhaustible pleasure of 
acquiring knowledge. When our business is done, we have a noble and honorable occupation for our hours 
of leisure” (IV.12).  It may seem, then, that Cicero regards philosophizing as noble hobby to be taken up 
only when one’s duties have been attended to.  Nevertheless, he gives us reason to suspect that this is not 
his most serious view.  The claim that the study of nature provides an “inexhaustible pleasure” that 
nevertheless should be pursued only in one’s free time is precisely the charge that Cicero addresses from 
his second accusers.  When speaking to Cato, however, Cicero does not mention the rejoinder he offers in 
Book I.  If the pleasure of philosophizing is truly inexhaustible, one could never be satisfied attending to it 
only after business.   
29 To describe wisdom, Cicero uses the superlative of pulcher, which, like the Greek καλος, can mean both 
beautiful and noble. 
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this fourth group here.  To these accusers Cicero offers two replies.  On one hand, he 
simply asks for their indulgence, given the great variety of works he has already 
composed (I.11).  On the other hand, he addresses these accusers especially as if they are 
a group of concerned citizens. He takes seriously the possibility that by spending time 
writing philosophical investigations he may be neglecting his duty to serve and defend 
the Roman political order, a duty that is all the greater given his political power.  Indeed, 
Walter Nicgorski attributes to Cicero the view that “within the usual human condition, 
such philosophizing is contrary to the duties imposed on men” (1984, 566).  But Cicero 
does not take this view of his own life. To the concerned citizens who charge him with 
shirking his duty, he responds: “I consider myself never to have deserted the post at 
which the Roman people placed me.  Surely, then, I ought to strive as hard as I can to put 
my energy, enthusiasm, and effort into improving the learning of my fellow-citizens as 
well” (I.10).  Cicero presents his philosophic writing as not only in accord with, but also 
connected to his political responsibilities.  He claims to be an enlightener, the bringer of 
philosophy for the benefit and glory of Rome.        
Although Cicero allows the character of his enlightening project to remain vague 
at this stage, he begins to clarify it in his response to the third set of accusers.  These 
individuals are “learned in Greek and contemptuous of Latin” and, he playfully claims, 
“it is more difficult to satisfy” them than anyone else (I.1,4).  Cicero responds at first to 
these Grecophile intellectuals with an exaggerated and comic patriotism, declaring that he 
would rather read a poor translation of Sophocles in Latin than the Greek original (1.5).    
The more serious challenge presented to Cicero by these intellectuals’ concerns, 
however, is not the mere preference for Greek over Latin, but the question of why, given 
the existence and availability of the great political works of thinkers such as Plato or 
Aristotle, Cicero ought to bother writing at all (1.5-6).  To this challenge Cicero offers 
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two replies.  He denies twice that he is merely a translator of Plato or Aristotle (I.6-7).  
Instead, he “preserve[s] the views of those whom [he] consider[s] sound while 
contributing [his] own judgment and order of composition,” covering “the same 
subjects…in a different way” from the Greek philosophers (I.6).  The difference in the 
manner of writing, Cicero suggests, is rooted in a difference in circumstance: Cicero 
faces a political situation and tradition quite different from that which Plato and Aristotle 
encountered.30  “The different way” in which Cicero presents his philosophical work may 
therefore refer to the rhetorical differences that are necessary to accommodate the change 
in circumstance.  Yet Cicero does not claim that he differs from the Greek thinkers 
merely in the rhetorical surface of his work, but rather that he adds his own “judgments.”  
Cicero thus believes himself to make a significant contribution or addition to the study of 
human nature initiated by classical Greek philosophy.31      
On its own, however, this explanation is not quite sufficient, for it does not reveal 
the characteristic differences between the Greek and Roman audience that leads Cicero to 
conclude that a reformulation of Greek philosophy for a Roman audience is necessary.   
Cicero allows this question to remain open for now rather than explicitly resolve it.  But 
in what follows he does indicate the outline of a possible explanation. Cicero goes on to 
note that unlike the Roman satirist Lucilius, he “will [not] forbid anyone from reading 
[his] work” (I.7).  According to Cicero’s description of the satirist’s writing in De 
Oratore, Lucilius wished to keep his work from both the least and the most learned 
                                                
30 Mansfield draws attention especially to the absence in Rome of a poetic tradition that might act as “both 
lantern and foil for philosophy” as it did in Greece and argues that Cicero sought to replace poetry in Rome 
with rhetoric which, “when tamed…could do the same useful service to philosophy as poetry and without 
the political disadvantages of quaintness and daintiness” (1966, 33).  Frost 2010 also argues that Cicero 
turned to the public education in rhetoric in order to make philosophy appear safe to politics and attract 
potential philosophers. Neither, however, take up the importance of the increasing public presence of the 
philosophical schools in Cicero’s time. 
31 Cicero, in addition, may have understood part of his task to be the correction of certain rhetorical errors 
of his philosophic predecessors (Macrobius 1990, I.1.9).   
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people, “because the one part understood nothing; the other perhaps too much” (DOR 
II.25).  Lucilius is also reported by Cicero to have singled out a man named Persius as the 
sort of learned man whom he rejects as a reader (DOR II.25).  In De Finibus, Cicero 
proclaims his wish that this same Persius were alive so that he could be among Cicero’s 
readers and adds to Persius Scipio and Rutilius.32  Unlike Lucilius, then, Cicero does not 
primarily address the ordinary, “good and not uneducated” men (DOR II.25; cf. DF I.1).  
He wishes to reach the most excellent readers (and that he does not share Lucilius’ view 
that these readers “perhaps [know] too much” is implied by his statement on 
philosophizing at I.2-3).   
But, according to Cicero, no such excellent men (of the kind that Lucilius feared) 
were alive during Lucilius’ lifetime (I.7).  This is a strange statement, for we know, and 
certainly Cicero knew, that Scipio and Rutilius were Lucilius’ contemporaries.33  Perhaps 
he means to imply that Lucilius was excessively or falsely modest, but Cicero also draws 
attention to the existence in other epochs of an intellectual class above Scipio and 
Rutilius that Lucilius was scarcely cognizant of.  By placing the short section on Lucilius 
immediately after his indication that he will cover the same subjects as the Greeks but in 
a different way (I.6), Cicero is perhaps quietly indicating that the difference may depend 
on a crucial difference between his own inferior readers and those addressed by the 
Greeks: Cicero is not optimistic that there are many readers among the present or near 
future generations of Romans that will reach the political or theoretical heights of even 
Scipio or Rutilius, let alone Plato or Aristotle.  Indeed, much about the social and 
                                                
32 Little seems to be known about this Persius.  Scipio, who was responsible for the destruction of 
Carthage, is the chief interlocutor in Cicero’s De Re Publica.  Rutilius is said to be the person responsible 
for relating the conversation in that dialogue to Cicero when the two met in Smyrna.  Rutilius had been 
exiled from Rome on corruption charges (DR I.13).     




political climate which Cicero reflected upon and was active in could have led him to this 
conclusion.  Not only decades of civil wars, but also increasing opportunities for personal 
aggrandizement in the empire had weakened the austere virtue of and devotion to the old 
republic.34  Cicero makes clear his awareness of the depth of the transformation taking 
place in the Roman regime and his regret at being unable to prevent it.  “If I had been 
followed,” he writes, “we would still have some sort of republic, if not the best, whereas 
now we have none” (DO II.35).  Cicero suggests, moreover, that the popularity of the 
philosophical schools did not alleviate, but rather exacerbated the moral and political 
crisis.35  By emphasizing the moral deficiencies and corruption of the active life and 
revealing it to present obstacles to our happiness rather than paths to its attainment, the 
schools drew people away from politics (cf. DR I.4-6).  The effect of their popularity 
therefore also impeded Cicero’s project of bringing true philosophy to Rome by turning 
the gaze of potential students away from politics, the study of which he saw as key to 
philosophy altogether.  Thus, Cicero’s recognition that in his own time the potential for 
political and theoretical excellence was being extinguished, as well as his attempt to 
understand the cause of this decline and to counteract it to whatever extent possible, seem 
to be the crucial reasons for discussing and interrogating the opinions of the popular 
philosophical schools in De Finibus. 
                                                
34 Tacitus, who lived a generation after Cicero, wrote that “the inveterate desire for power, which was long 
ago inborn in mortals, matured and broke forth with the greatness of the empire. For in moderate 
circumstances equality was easily preserved. But when, with the world subdued and rival cities and kings 
cut down, there was room to desire secure wealth, then contentions blazed up…and in the city and in the 
forum there were attempts at civil wars. Thereafter Caius Marius from the lowest plebian stock and Lucius 
Sylla, cruelest of the nobles, turned liberty, conquered by arms, into tyranny.  After them came Pompey, 
more disguised but no better, and never afterwards was anything sought except the principate” (Histories 
II.38.1, quoted in Leake, 1987).  
35 As Adler puts it, “the Roman order has been desperately undermined by the ambitious rivalries of the 
greatest men appealing against each other to the plebs; in this extremity, the ‘plebian philosophers’ too step 
in, ambitious to attach the multitude to atheism and pleasure as against the Roman order constituted by 
religion and virtue” (2003, 50).   
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That this is the case is further indicated by the dedication of the work to Marcus 
Junius Brutus.  Brutus, according to Cicero, was an avid student of philosophy and was 
widely known to be well versed in philosophical books and especially Stoic ideas (III. 6).  
He was a respected republican and, one year after De Finibus was written, joined in the 
assassination of Julius Caesar.  Cicero states that he dedicates De Finibus to Brutus not in 
order to instruct him, but in order to associate it with Brutus’ good name.  Brutus, apart 
from his own good repute, descended from Lucius Junius Brutus who, with Lucius 
Collatinus, overthrew Rome’s ancient monarchy and founded the republic.  But Cicero 
presents his assessment of Stoicism as a dialogue with Cato, Brutus’ uncle and adoptive 
parent, who was said to have introduced Brutus himself to Stoicism.  The dialogue also 
contains a short conversation about the importance of the education that Cato will give to 
the young Lucullus (Brutus’ cousin) who has also come under his charge (III.8).  The 
conversation with Cato about Stoicism thus takes place in the context of a concern for the 
education of young men who were expected to bear political power and responsibility.  
The education that Cato imparts to Lucullus is the education he has already given to 
Brutus.  Thus, while Cicero explicitly disavows any claim to teach Brutus, the 
conversation with Cato and concern for Lucullus shows that it is precisely men like 
Brutus and the sort of education they receive that Cicero wishes to address.36  Indeed, 
Cicero leaves his reader wondering if he presents Brutus to us as the wise and virtuous 
defender of the republic, a model to be imitated and hoped for, or if he regards Brutus, 
                                                
36 Kries, however, argues that Cicero refers to Lucullus in order to emphasize his absence from the 
conversation, and to point to an opinion that one “should criticize Stoicism when the young are not present” 
(2003, 391 with n.31).  On this view, the critique of Stoicism is philosophically necessary but ought not to 
form a part of a civic education.  But Kries does not attempt to reconcile this claim with the concern for 
education that Cicero’s reference to Lucullus shows, or with Cicero’s decision to include his critique of 
Stoicism as a whole in a work addressed explicitly to the philosophically and politically inclined alike.  




and in particular his education in Stoicism, as a problem—for we do not know how 
powerful the memory of the virtue of his ancestors is in Brutus’ soul, and whether his 
Stoicism supports or undermines it.  
THE PARADOX OF STOICISM 
  We might state the difficulty of the education in Stoic virtue in the following way.  
On one hand, Cicero sees in Stoicism a potential support for the moral and political 
virtues which, to some extent, had previously been nurtured by the civic education of the 
regime itself.  Stoicism, according to Cicero, is a particularly high-minded and 
impressive example of popular philosophy.  The primary doctrine of the Stoic school—
the defense of moral virtue as the only human good and the perfection of human reason 
as the precondition for possessing that virtue—can cultivate an admirable and stern self-
reliance in many of its followers.37  This allows the Stoic to regard himself with pride in 
his own excellence.  It is, for example, this pure devotion to virtue that gave Cato his 
reputation as an incorruptible moral authority.38  But, on the other hand, although the 
Stoics share with common opinion the admiration of noble deeds and moral 
steadfastness, Cicero indicates that Stoicism ultimately undermines the attachments to the 
civic and social order, accelerating the weakening of these bonds and the turning away 
from politics already set in motion by the corruption of the Roman republic and 
expansion of the empire.  Indeed, the Stoic’s claim that moral virtue is the only good 
                                                
37 The excellence of character cultivated by Stoicism has been noted in our time as well.  Decorated navy 
pilot and former vice-presidential candidate Admiral James B. Stockdale argues that the radically self-
reliant teaching of the Stoic Epictetus could serve not only to strengthen the resolve of the military in times 
of great conflict, but also to ennoble and reinvigorate the moral and civic life of modern liberal 
democracies (see Stockdale 1993 and 1995).  Tom Wolfe also presents a sympathetic portrayal of Stoicism 
through the character Conrad Hensley in A Man In Full.   
38 Plutarch reports that Cato “devoted himself especially to ethical and political doctrines [of the Stoics]. 
He was possessed, as it were, with a kind of inspiration for the pursuit of every virtue; but, above all, that 
form of goodness which consists in rigid justice that will not bend to clemency or favor, was his great 
delight” (Cato the Younger 1919, 4.1; see also Cicero’s eulogy of Cato in De Officiis I.112). 
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requires an uncompromising pursuit of virtue that rejects the prudence and compromises 
necessary in political life.   
This way of thinking has practical and dangerous consequences, shown by Cicero 
most clearly in his speech in defense of Murena, whose election to the consulship sparked 
the Catilinarian conspiracy.39  Following Cicero’s uncovering of the conspiracy and while 
Catiline was organizing forces outside of Rome, Murena was prosecuted, in part by Cato 
himself, for bribery and electoral corruption unrelated to the crimes of Catiline.40  In his 
speech, Cicero attacks Cato’s adherence to Stoicism’s “fixed pattern of reasoning” so 
uncompromisingly devoted to justice that it “is a little too harsh and hard for truth or 
nature to endure” (PM 3, 60, see also 65).  If virtue is the only good as Stoicism teaches, 
then “all misdeeds are equal,” and we must acknowledge that “the casual killing of a 
rooster is no less a crime than strangling one’s father” (PM 61).41  This rigidity, 
according to Cicero, robs Cato of the good judgment that distinguishes between the 
crimes of Catiline and the alleged crimes of Murena.  Cato’s Stoicism blinds him to the 
fact that his prosecution of Murena serves Catiline’s ends, because it “dislodges from his 
defense of the city and his protection of the citizen body an uncorrupt consul” while 
Catiline and his followers plan to “destroy the city, slaughter the citizens and obliterate 
the name of Rome” (PR  79-80, see also 82-83).  Against Cato, Cicero argues that it is 
                                                
39 Murena stood in the election against Catiline, who, having been defeated, conspired to gain power 
through a violent coup.  Murena’s trial took place in 63 B.C. (Murena was to be consul in 62), eighteen 
years before the writing of De Finibus.  For a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the speech as it relates to 
Cicero’s political philosophy, see Stem 2006, to which the account of Pro Murena that follows in this 
chapter is indebted.   
40 For a detailed account of the Catilinarian conspiracy and the events leading to Murena’s trial, see 
Macdonald’s prefaces to Cicero’s speeches against Catiline and for Murena (1977, 2-20, 169-184) and 
Stem (2006, 210-211). 
41 Stem rightly notes that Cicero’s depiction of Cato’s Stoicism is laced with a rhetorically powerful 
“mocking humor” (2006, 217).  This humor, however, seems not only intended, as Stem argues, “to lull the 
jury laughingly into accepting” Cicero’s claims (2006, 217), but to underscore the absurdity of about a 
teaching about virtue that disregards all external goods and circumstance (PR 61-62). 
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natural and wise not only to differentiate between kinds of viciousness, but also to take 
into account expediency (PR 63; Stem 2006, 222).  And while he insists throughout the 
speech that Murena is innocent of the charges brought against him, Cicero implies that 
because Rome is not now faced with “a question of an unjust law, or ruinous bribery, or 
the sort of plot against the republic with which we are familiar” (PR I.79)—that is, 
because the survival of the regime is at stake—the good statesman would maintain 
Murena in his consulship even if he was guilty, if doing so would preserve the republic.42   
Cato’s Stoicism fails to recognize that “peace, leisure, concord, liberty, and 
safety” are goods because it does not recognize that they make possible the justice that 
Cato believes himself to be defending in the trial against Murena (PR 78).  Because Cato 
attempts to apply Stoicism’s strict rules to political life, he is unable to judge what justice 
requires even though he sincerely wishes to uphold it.  Cicero’s speech suggests, then, 
that not only Stoicism, but also any rigid “pattern of reasoning” must impede our ability 
to judge well about political things.  Cicero’s Pro Murena indicates that Stoicism is 
particularly problematic because it mistakes uncompromising strictness or severity for 
virtue and therefore threatens the preservation and possibility of virtuous action while 
claiming to defend it. 
The Stoic teaching also presents a serious theoretical difficulty.  As Cicero’s 
conversation with Cato in De Finibus shows, the ostentatious pride the Stoics take in 
their virtue, which they claim to pursue with complete rationality, hides from their own 
view that they hope that virtue will both bring them good fortune—in particular, praise—
and make them immune to the dependence on fortune’s favor.  Stoicism’s claims to 
                                                
42 Here I depart somewhat from Stem, who argues that “the strategy by which Cicero sought to neutralize 
the moral authority of the prosecution, especially that of Cato,” is “what saves the Pro Murena from being 
merely the exculpation of the guilty through an appeal to expediency” (2006, 213).  It seems instead that 
Cicero’s critique of Cato’s moral authority implies and defends the necessity—and therefore the 
goodness—of such an exculpation in certain cases.  
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perfect human reason are thus belied by a lack of self-awareness that is inculcated by the 
school’s central teaching.  Moreover, the Stoic claim that virtue is the only good neglects 
the multiplicity of less lofty objects that we consider also to be goods that are necessary 
for our happiness.  In spite of its claim to direct us to the life according to nature (DF 
III.12, IV.14), the Stoic teaching abstracts from what Cicero argues are the variety of 
natural human goods and concerns.  The spread of Stoicism among educated citizens and 
its tendency to detach its followers from politics therefore also obscures the full 
complexity of natural human concerns from view and, as a result, presents significant 
obstacles to the scientific understanding of human nature for them and those they 
educate.  Because the Stoic misunderstands his own soul, he is unable to think well not 
only about his relation to the political order, but also about how human beings stand in 
relation to the whole of nature.      
Cicero states twice that although Stoicism regards itself as superior to and 
distinguishable from common moral opinions, Stoicism’s moral teaching ultimately 
shares the ordinary moral outlook of most decent people (IV.21-22, 56-57).  Thus, while 
Cicero’s evaluation of Stoicism and the influence it has or could have on civic education 
is itself of value, his analysis and critique also have a second, deeper purpose.  Through 
them he offers his own account of the psychology of moral and political life, the many 
desires, motivations, concerns, and obligations that together form the foundation of the 
way we think about our lives and that manifest themselves especially in political 
discourse.  Cicero’s examination of this popular moral and philosophical teaching, then, 
begins to lay the foundation for a political science that better understands not only 
political activity, but also human nature.      
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CICERO’S PARALLEL CRITIQUE OF EPICUREANISM 
In the first two books of De Finibus Cicero shows that the Epicureans share with 
the Stoics the failure to examine the roots of their own view of happiness.  The Stoics and 
the Epicureans each believe themselves to understand nature in a way that is directly 
opposed to the other, but Cicero suggests that Epicureanism presents similar obstacles to 
its students for the understanding of nature as Stoicism.  Although the Stoics teach that 
virtue is the sole good and the Epicureans teach the same of pleasure, Cicero indicates 
that both popular philosophic movements promise perfect invulnerability against chance 
and an attractive, but ultimately unsustainable, happiness above the fray of ordinary 
political and moral life in spite of the apparent opposition of their moral teachings.  
Cicero’s Epicurean interlocutor grants that like Stoicism, Epicureanism teaches that “no 
fool is happy and no wise man is not happy;” he claims, however, that “we support this in 
a better and truer way than do the Stoics” (II.61).  It will be helpful, therefore, to turn to a 
brief outline of Cicero’s understanding of the alternative presented by Epicureanism and 
the effect it has on its students.     
The bulk of Cicero’s conversation about Epicureanism takes place with Lucius 
Torquatus, a young Roman from a famous family who aspires to political office (I.23-24; 
II.72-74).  Cicero relates that the young Torquatus is also “learned in every philosophical 
system,” but associates himself with Epicurus as his “master” (I.13-14).  Cicero’s 
depiction of Torquatus’ defense of Epicureanism and Cicero’s own response to that 
defense ultimately shows that Torquatus is deeply attracted to the Epicurean promise of 
pleasure without pain and the security that wisdom gives against the vicissitudes of 
chance.  Cicero also reveals, however, that Torquatus maintains deep moral attachments 




Torquatus attempts to show that the only reason human beings will undergo pain 
in the present is to achieve greater pleasure or suffer less pain in the future, but he cannot 
help himself from appealing to blame and duty.  He claims that 
wholly deserving of our odium [are] those who are so seduced and corrupted by 
the blandishments of immediate pleasure that they fail to foresee…harm to come.  
Equally blameworthy are those who abandon their duties through mental 
weakness—that is, through the avoidance of effort and pain…In certain 
circumstances it will often happen that either the call of duty or some sort of crisis 
dictates that pleasures are to be repudiated and inconveniences accepted. (I.33) 
Torquatus had declared earlier that not only human beings, but all animals, seek pleasure 
and avoid pain by nature (I.30).  Upon concluding his explanation, he takes himself to 
have proved that the wise man knows that “pains are selected when this avoids worse 
pains” (I.33).  Torquatus’ argument may, indeed, support the view that harm comes to the 
one who lacks some kind of self-control with regard to the pursuit of pleasure.  This 
argument cannot, however, account for the anger he displays towards those who lack that 
self-control.  Torquatus is full of hatred for those who are unable to control their pursuit 
of pleasure, and he blames those who do neglect their duty by seeking to avoid pain, 
which he had earlier described as the greatest evil.  In the direst circumstances, Torquatus 
says, one must think not of pleasure—that is, of one’s own good—or even postponing 
present pleasures for greater ones in the future, but of duty.  Real sacrifices must, on 
Torquatus’ view, be made if one is to escape blame.  If pleasure is the good, however, 
Torquatus’ view is incoherent.  If human beings naturally pursue pleasure and avoid pain 
above all, one cannot be blamed for pursuing pleasure (or the absence of pain) rather than 
one’s duty in a crisis.  Cicero thus shows that in spite of Torquatus’ attempted adherence 
to Epicurus’ teachings about pleasure and pain, Torquatus is unable to detach himself 
from the moral concern for duty and admiration of sacrifice.  Through his depiction of 
Torquatus, Cicero also shows what may be untenable about Epicureanism as a popular 
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philosophy.  Torquatus, perhaps without realizing it, portrays Epicureanism as perfectly 
in harmony with civic concerns although its teaching is necessarily in conflict with them.  
Indeed, his inability to complete his detachment from civic morality is rooted in his 
devotion to and participation in political life (II.74).43  
Torquatus maintains these concerns even as he is deeply attracted to Epicurus’ 
claims for the superiority of a wholly self-sufficient life detached from politics. He 
delights especially in Epicurus’ teaching that “wisdom alone teaches us to bear the slings 
of fortune lightly” and that “if the wise suffer any pain, the pain will never have sufficient 
force to prevent them having more pleasure than distress” (I.46, 62).  Wisdom, according 
to Torquatus’ account of Epicurus’ teaching, is that alone which “drives misery from our 
hearts” and “stops us trembling in fear” and allows us to “live in peace, the flame of all 
our desires extinguished” (I.43).  The wise man, as Torquatus explains, understands that 
many desires are insatiable and are therefore the root of all discord.  He therefore comes 
to recognize Epicurus’ helpful distinction between those desires which are natural and 
necessary, and therefore easily fulfilled, and those which are neither natural nor 
necessary, and thus not only endlessly multipliable, but also insatiable (I.45).  The wise 
and happy life would thus include the continual seeking and fulfilling of the modest and 
simple desires that find their support in our nature and the pleasure that arises from their 
fulfillment.   
Cicero thus allows us to see the sensible and, perhaps, politically salutary core at 
the center of the Epicurean teaching.  Wisdom, according to this view, consists especially 
in coming to a moderate understanding of our natural desires and in pruning back the 
unnecessary or unnatural ones.  Through this process we free ourselves of the attachment 
                                                
43 Cf. Lucretius (1977, II.7-14).   
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to illusory pleasures (of luxury or wealth, for example) and can direct our souls to the 
more solid satisfactions that can be found in friendship, or family and civic life.  Such a 
teaching could, to some extent, support healthy civic life by schooling citizens in true 
moderation (which was rapidly disappearing in the Roman empire).  It might also clarify 
the degree to which some of our natural desires are dependent upon other people for their 
fulfillment.  Indeed, on this basis, Cicero would have had little to complain about in the 
popularity of Epicureanism.  But Cicero draws our attention to the problematic character 
of the combination of this element of Epicureanism with the claim that wisdom gives the 
wise man a happiness invulnerable to pain or external circumstances.  For together these 
teachings undo the potential political advantages of Epicurean moderation. 
Torquatus, indeed, turns out to be attracted to the most extreme form of self-
sufficiency which is promised by the Epicureanism.  He wishes not only to dispose of 
illusory pleasures or unnecessary desires, but, above all, to attain the wisdom that 
extinguishes the flame of all desires.  He is thus drawn to the radical, rather than 
moderate, view of the life of the wise man.  Torquatus had, in an earlier part of his 
speech, explained that Epicurus held “the lack of all pain…to be not only true pleasure, 
but the highest pleasure” (I.38).  Torquatus shows that he ultimately understands this 
teaching to promise a condition lacking desire altogether.  Indeed, he is far more 
enthusiastic about the possibility of extinguishing desire forever than in maintaining and 
fulfilling those desires that are naturally moderate.  Whereas death “hangs over” most 
people “like Tantalus’ rock” (I.60), Epicureanism ultimately promises to release its 
students not only from the fear of death, but from the pain of death, and from all the 
desires and needs that plague the human condition.  Both Epicureanism and Stoicism, in 
Cicero’s presentations, attribute to wisdom the recognition that death—not merely the 
fear of death—is no barrier to happiness.  According to Torquatus, Epicurus teaches that 
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“no more pleasure could be derived from a life of infinite span than from the life which 
we know to be finite” (I.63; cf. III.61, DND II.153).  Wisdom thus mollifies desires 
which, Torquatus says, are “shut up inside the heart” and “quarrel and fight amongst 
themselves” (I.44).  To the extent that he senses that his desires for a pleasure that brings 
perfect tranquility and security from fortune is incompatible with the concern for civic 
virtue or duty, Torquatus’ own desires are in conflict with each other (II.80).  As a result, 
his Epicureanism exacerbates the psychological condition it is meant to alleviate.     
Cicero’s response to Torquatus’ speech takes a tone of indignant moralism that 
veils, to some extent, the substance of Cicero’s view (II.12, 47,74; cf. II.27 with I.3).  
Indeed, Cicero goes so far at times as to attack Epicureanism not in his own name, but in 
the name of virtue itself (II.63-66).  The effect of this tone is to emphasize especially the 
threat that the Epicurean teaching poses to ordinary civic virtue.  Indeed, this rhetorical 
strategy adds emotional weight to some of Cicero’s critiques of Epicurean philosophy 
that seem on their own terms deficient or, at the very least, incomplete.44  But Cicero’s 
moralism also implies that the attacks he makes in De Finibus are directed especially at 
Epicureanism in its capacity as a popular philosophy, its wide appeal, and the effect it has 
upon the ordinary citizens it attracts. 
Thus, Cicero accuses the Epicureans of the consistent attempt to “drag pleasure 
into the company of the virtues, like a common harlot in a gathering of well-bred ladies” 
(II.12).  On the surface, Cicero simply attacks Torquatus and the Epicureans for debasing 
virtue by associating it with something as low as pleasure.  Yet Cicero here also calls 
                                                
44 Brochard 2009 points convincingly to a number of the difficulties in Cicero’s portrayal of Epicurean 
philosophy.  Adler argues, however, that since it is “Cicero’s view that the practical danger of vulgar 
Epicureanism is such as to require resistance,” he addresses “always…what the Roman Epicureans are 
known by everyone to say and think” rather than what they wrote (2003, 50-51).  See on this subject her 
helpful discussion of the relationship of vulgar or popular Epicureanism in Rome with its more serious 
philosophical teaching (2003, 43-51).        
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attention to the very fact that Torquatus wishes not to disassociate himself from virtue, 
but to make virtue and pleasure coincide.  The political danger, however, is that although 
Torquatus is able to maintain (even if only in a somewhat confused manner) both his 
attachment to virtue and his attraction to the promise of perfect tranquility which 
Epicureanism offers, there is little in Epicureanism that can help cultivate the moral 
concerns which politics requires.  But, just as importantly for Cicero, Epicureanism 
presents an obstacle to philosophy.  It denies the importance of understanding the 
concerns and hopes associated with virtue on their own terms and as they reveal 
themselves in our lives (cf. I.34-35 with I.23, II.60-61).  For this reason, it cannot form a 
true account of or explain our desires and opinions about the good.    
THE LIFE ACCORDING TO NATURE  
That Cicero intends his reader to keep in mind both the political and theoretical 
problems of Epicureanism as he turns to discuss Stoicism in Books III-IV is clear at the 
outset of Book III.  Cicero introduces his conversation with the Stoic interlocutor Cato 
with the recollection that he chanced upon Cato in a library “surrounded by Stoic works.”  
Cicero reminds his reader that Cato has “a passion for reading” and would often “appear 
to be gorging himself on books” (III.7).45  The first portrait that Cicero presents of Cato is 
thus one of him indulging an appetite, however honorable it may be.  Cato’s indulgence 
reintroduces the question of the good of pleasure (which is the major theme of Books I-
II), for it raises the question both of the status and the end of such an appetite.  In the first 
two books of De Finibus, Cicero had claimed that whereas those who understand 
pleasure to be the good can never be secure in their happiness, “one who regards good as 
entirely a matter of virtue is entitled to say that one has a completely happy life when 
                                                
45 Cato’s “passion” for reading is called by Cicero an aviditas, which suggests a strong longing or desire. 
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completely virtuous” (II.88).  Moreover, “a successful eulogy of virtue must shut out 
pleasure” (II.118).  Because the Stoic understanding of happiness revolves entirely 
around the claim that the moral (honestum) is the only good, Cicero’s conversation with 
Cato can be understood in part as a test of Cicero’s assertion in Book II.  Indeed, as Cato 
insists almost from the beginning of the conversation, “unless it is maintained that what is 
moral is the only good, there is no way of establishing that it is virtue that brings about 
the happy life…If it were possible for wise person to be unhappy, I fear I would set little 
value on glorious and wonderful virtue” (III.11).  Cato thus indicates that the central 
promise of Stoic philosophy is an unchanging happiness for the wise or virtuous man.46  
Virtue, says Cato, would lose its place as an object of admiration as well as its value to 
human beings if it were not both the necessary and sufficient condition for complete 
happiness.  By the peculiar way in which he makes this statement, however, Cato also 
reveals that his devotion to virtue precedes and colors his understanding of what reason 
prescribes or the good according to nature (III.11; cf. III.17, 29). For although the claim 
that moral worth is sufficient for happiness would seem to be a conclusion that must 
derive from something like an interpretation of human nature, this claim is the premise 
from which Cato begins his argument.     
After noting the disastrous consequences that would follow if virtue were not 
alone considered the good, Cato turns to what seems to be the necessary account of 
human nature to support his initial claim: he begins with a presentation of the nature of 
animals and human beings from birth that appears to be much like the account of our 
natural inclinations that Cicero himself gives in Book II.  According to Cato, all animals 
desire preservation from birth.  This desire is rooted in a self-love that leads us to seek the 
                                                
46 The centrality of Cato’s claim for Stoicism as a whole is attested to by other Roman Stoics whose 
writings survive.  Consider, for example, Seneca’s “On Providence,” and Letter 124 (1958, 27-46, 256-
261) and Epictetus’ Discourses I.12 “On Contentment” (1940, 247-249).  
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good and avoid the bad.  These goods are called by Cato “the primary objects of desire” 
(III.17).  There is, however, a crucial difference between Cicero’s account and Cato’s 
concerning the status of pleasure.  Whereas Cicero explicitly leaves open the possibility 
that pleasure is a primary natural good (II.33-34), Cato wishes to reject even the 
possibility.47  Here Cato’s argument echoes his initial defense of the self-sufficiency of 
virtue.  He states that “if nature were thought to have included pleasure amongst the 
primary objects of desire, then a host of base consequences would follow” (III.17).  If 
pleasure is accepted as a natural good, it must be included among the standards we use to 
judge the appropriateness of whatever choices we are faced with.  But virtue, as Cato 
seems to realize at this moment in his speech, often requires the denial of pleasure.  
Indeed, self-restraint or self-sacrifice is often at the heart of the deeds we admire as 
virtuous.  Perhaps Cato fears that the pull of pleasure is so strong that if it were admitted 
to be good it would not fail to outweigh in our minds the desire to act nobly.  But Cicero, 
having called on “virtue herself” to pronounce who she believes to be happiest in Book 
II, states that she would “not hesitate to rank Marcus Regulus,” who allowed himself to 
be tortured in captivity by the Carthaginians in order to keep a promise, above anyone 
who counts pleasure as the good (II.65; DO I.39, III.99-113).48  The indication that not 
he, but virtue, declares Regulus happiest of all, requires us to wonder whether Cicero 
agrees with virtue’s assessment.  Indeed, Cicero shows his disagreement by declaring that 
he “dare[s] not say” whom he would name (II.65).  If his estimation of Regulus were the 
same as virtue’s, he would have no reason to hide it.  But unlike Cicero, Cato rejects 
pleasure as a natural good because such noble but self-sacrificial actions would no longer 
                                                
47 Nussbaum 1987 offers a thorough account of the Stoic rejection of pleasure and the passions good for 
human beings, but because she does not attend to the crucial disagreements brought out by their dialogue in 
De Finibus III-IV, she takes Cicero to accept the Stoic teaching (1987, 133-134).  
48 Regulus’ torture and death have been the subject of at least two paintings: Salvatore Rosa’s “Death of 
Regulus” (1650-52) and Joseph Mallord William Turner’s “Regulus” (1828). 
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be commanded by nature if it were.  He is thus not quite sincere in his desire to discover 
the natural principles and to live by them.49  He wishes, Cicero shows, to be moral above 
all and, only secondarily, to live the life that is most according to nature. Or, to put it 
another way, Cato wishes to live the life according to nature only if or insofar as that life 
is the perfectly moral one.  It is only on these grounds that wisdom, the perfection of 
human reason and judgment, can be understood as the life of perfect virtue (III.11).  Here 
again, however, Cato presumes that the moral life is the life according to nature, but this 
is the proposition that was meant to be proved.  It must remain for now a question 
whether Cicero’s openness to the possibility that pleasure is a primary natural good 
suggests that he, unlike his Stoic interlocutor, is genuinely open to the possibility that the 
morally virtuous life does not constitute the peak or perfection of our nature.   
The natural self-love and desire for preservation in all human beings develops, 
according to Cato, into a duty “to preserve oneself in one’s natural constitution” (III.20; 
cf. III.16).  The transition away from the discussion of our primary desires to the 
discussion of duty occurs when Cato calls attention to the fact that he will begin to 
address “grander themes” than the “basic elements of nature” for which a “rather 
threadbare” style was appropriate (III.19).  These more majestic subjects, in Cato’s view, 
warrant a similarly “more splendid speech” (III.19).  It is worth noting that Cicero, who 
never hides his high opinion of skill and elegance of rhetoric, registers an explicit 
objection to Cato’s claim.  Cicero states that he prefers “clarity” to splendor with respect 
to the most important subjects and that the desire to treat these subjects with ornate or 
adorned speech is “childish” (III.19). But as Cato approaches the central claims of his 
                                                
49 Nussbaum reports that Epictetus “says that if he discovered that the belief that the external is nothing to 
us was false, and the arguments that support it deceptions, he would still cling to those deceptions” (1987, 
164; Epictetus’ Discourses, 1.4.27, cited in Nussbaum 1987).  Cicero suggests that Epicurean natural 
science, by positing the swerve of atoms in order to maintain freedom of will, falls into a similar sort of 
error (I.17-21).    
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speech, he gets more and more carried away by his admiration of the moral perfection he 
describes (III.74-76).  Cicero thus shows that Cato’s way of speaking about and 
approaching the analysis of human nature is not conducive to clarity about the truth of the 
matter.   
Cicero’s critique of Cato’s rhetoric raises an additional question about the 
character of Cicero and Cato’s conversation as a whole.  Cicero began Book II with a 
brief comparison of Socratic dialogue and the speeches of the Greek sophists (II.1-3).     
According to Cicero, “it was the method of the sophists” and of the philosophers of his 
own day “to expound a formal lecture” on a given topic (II.1).  But “Gorgias and the 
other sophists were mocked by Socrates,” whose “own technique was to investigate his 
interlocutors by questioning them” (II.2).  Cicero approves of Socrates’ technique 
because it is 
more manageable if one stops after each individual point and ascertains what each 
of the listeners is happy to concede, and what they would reject.  One can then 
draw the inferences one wishes from the points conceded and reach one’s 
conclusion.  When on the other hand, the speech races on like a torrent, carrying 
with it all manner of material, there is nothing the listener can grasp at or get a 
hold of.  There is no way to check the raging flood. (II.3) 
Cicero gives the impression that the present conversation will take the Socratic dialogue 
as its guide, but in fact both the conversation with Torquatus and the conversation with 
Cato consist in large part of two long speeches, one presented by each of the main 
interlocutors.  The conversations in Books I-II and III-IV thus more closely resemble the 
Sophists’ speeches than the Socratic dialogue that Cicero prefers.50  Neither Cato, 
                                                
50 Nicgorski attributes the difference between the Ciceronian and the Socratic dialogue to Cicero’s 
following the style of Aristotle’s lost dialogues, which contain long speeches and in which the author 
himself speaks (1978, 70).  Cicero’s letters describe his intention to use the structure of Aristotle’s 
dialogues in De Republica.  De Finibus seems to follow the same pattern (though Cicero never mentions 
that he uses the Aristotelian dialogues as a model in this work).  Nevertheless, this does not explain 
Cicero’s reason for constructing De Finibus in this way, for it does not account for why Cicero calls our 
attention to the difference between the conversations in this work and the Socratic refutations, on one hand, 
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Torquatus, nor even the followers of Plato—the Academics—of Cicero’s day employ the 
method of philosophical investigation that allows for the greatest clarity and 
understanding (cf. III.14; II.17).  Nor does Cicero himself attempt, since he responds to 
the long speeches of Torquatus and Cato with long speeches of his own, to help his 
interlocutors out of their confusions by insisting on maintaining a true dialogue in their 
conversations.  Indeed, the structure of these conversations can be traced to Cicero’s 
primary purpose for presenting them in De Finibus.  Whereas Socrates’ refutations were 
the best way for him to test and confirm conclusions for himself or to educate his 
interlocutors, Cicero shows himself engaged in a somewhat different activity.  He wishes 
to put on display for his readers the opinions and confusions of his interlocutors and 
especially the way in which grand teachings about the good have influenced their moral 
and political opinions.  The dogmatic teachings of the schools perhaps created for the 
interlocutors themselves an obstacle to the expression and understanding of their own 
opinions that Socrates did not have to navigate.  Letting the interlocutors speak for a long 
time with little interruption allows this to come through precisely because Cicero does 
not attempt in the most forceful way to educate or correct them.51  Yet, by alerting the 
reader to the philosophic deficiency of these conversations, Cicero puts us in a position to 
evaluate them in the spirit of the Socratic dialogue.  Cicero thus follows Platonic 
philosophy by asking his reader to act as “the most impartial critic and judge” as he 
presents his deepest teaching of the work through the invitation to examine both his own 
claims and the opinions of his interlocutors about morality and the good (III.6).    
                                                                                                                                            
and the similarity between the long speeches here and those of the sophists on the other.  Gorman  argues 
that the structure of De Finibus indicates “Cicero’s own concerns about the limitations of the Socratic 
[m]ethod” (2005, 62), but takes Cato’s objections to Socratic exchanges as evidence of Cicero’s own view 
(2005,  131-134). 




VIRTUE AS THE SOLE GOOD  
In order to explain how one ought to understand virtue or wisdom as the life 
according to nature (that is, as the good), Cato presents two analogies.  In the first, we are 
asked to consider an archer whose task is to shoot an arrow straight at a target.  Through 
this analogy, Cato hopes to clarify the relationship of virtue to the “primary objects” we 
naturally desire.  According to Cato, “it is to shoot straight that one must do all one can; 
nonetheless, it is to do all one can to accomplish the task that is really the ultimate 
aim…[t]o actually hit the target is, as we say, to be selected but not sought” (III.22).  
Cato cautions us against believing that, since moral action “is not included among our 
original natural attachments,” that there are two separate goods (III.22): that which is 
aimed at by our initial natural inclinations (actually hitting the target) and that which is 
aimed at by moral action (to shoot straight).  He wishes to demonstrate that, to the archer, 
shooting straight is the only true goal.  
 Cato’s depiction of the archer reveals a potentially wise and politically healthy 
aspiration to reduce the extent to which our happiness depends on the results of our 
actions, while still maintaining in some way the significance of their success.  Stoicism, 
according to Cato, modifies our conception of our goals so that their attainment is always 
in our power.  We can therefore think of the archer’s efforts to shoot straight and to hit 
the target in terms of ultimate and proximate goals.  Cato’s speech suggests two 
alternatives for conceiving of the archer in this way.  We might take the archer’s ultimate 
goal be to hit the target (to succeed in his task).  But by focusing all of his attention on his 
proximate goal, that is, on what he can control in order to shoot straight, the archer gives 
himself the best chance of attaining in his ultimate goal and, therefore, of happiness.  If 
Stoicism were to help us think in this way, never to discard the importance of attaining 
the ends we pursue, but to hold on to their importance as lightly as possible, it would 
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allow us to be as happy as possible in our own activity without undue dependence upon 
the whims of fortune.   
Stoicism insists, however, that we must think of the archer’s efforts to shoot 
straight as his only goal.  Rather than attempt to moderate or loosen our dependence upon 
things external to our control, Cato wishes to dissolve it entirely.  Indeed, he has already 
expressed the opinion that the goodness of virtue depends upon its being the sole 
condition of happiness for the wise man (III.11).  The wise man must therefore be 
concerned only with the excellence of his own activity.  Moreover, his wisdom cannot be 
judged by the extent to which it allows him to complete the task he sets out to perform, 
since that completion depends at least to some extent on favorable circumstances outside 
his control.  While this way of thinking would appear to encourage an admirable and 
healthy self-reliance, Cicero shows in what follows that, in fact, it prevents the Stoics 
from being completely honest with themselves about how much things external to their 
own activity—the actual attainment of objects of desire or success in their tasks—matter. 
Thus, when Cato adds that the archer’s actually hitting his target is, “as we say, to 
be selected but not sought,” he introduces a distinction that seems counter to the explicit 
intention of the analogy.  Although Cato does not yet explain the difference between 
selecting (seligendum) something and seeking (expetendum) it, the distinction anticipates 
the emphasis he will soon place on the Stoic claim that the difference between the 
moral—the only good—and things that are “preferred” but neither necessary nor 
sufficient for happiness is one of kind rather than degree (III.34, 52).52  According to 
Cato, we should accept certain objects of natural desire, such as health, nourishment, or 
                                                
52 When speaking later of these kinds of objects, Cato shifts away from speaking in terms of selecting 
(seligo) to speaking of things that are preferred (producta).  Cato means largely the same thing in both 
cases, with the possible difference that preferring one object rather than another implies even less of an 
active desire to attain that object than selecting it does.  
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leisure, in our lives, but our pursuit of virtue and hence our happiness neither relies upon 
nor is benefited by these things.  Stoicism thus attempts to maintain that virtue is 
connected to (“aims at”) our “natural attachments,” but is in no way dependent upon 
them.  But rather than demonstrate this claim, Cato’s analogy begins to show the 
difficulty of rejecting the inclusion of these natural attachments in our conception of the 
good.  The analogy of the archer thus leaves the reader unsatisfied about the relation of 
wisdom and virtue to nature.  In this way, Cato also leaves one in doubt that the wise 
man’s virtue, as Stoicism understands it, can rightly be conceived of as sufficient for our 
happiness.   
Cicero’s Cato anticipates, or perhaps himself feels, this dissatisfaction, because he 
proceeds almost immediately to a second analogy that addresses directly the questions 
raised by the first.  Wisdom must not, Cato asserts, be understood as analogous to the arts 
of navigation or medicine, but rather to acting and dancing.53  According to Cato, “just as 
actors and dancers are not assigned arbitrary roles or steps but certain fixed ones, so too 
life is to be led in a certain fixed way” (III.24).  Whereas navigation and medicine require 
one to act based on one’s own judgments and expertise in the art, actors and dancers are 
given their roles by a director.  Their acting well depends far less on expertise than on 
conforming as closely as possible to the directions they have been given. Cato’s 
understanding of wise action that is in harmony with nature thus consists in conforming 
to nature’s commands rather than gaining knowledge through which prudent action is 
possible (this latter view is described by Scipio at De Republica, II.45).  Moreover, as 
Cato explains the meaning of his analogy, he shifts between speaking of “wisdom,” 
“right action,” and “virtue” in such a way as to blur the possible differences between 
                                                
53 It is possible that Cicero’s Cato picks out navigation and medicine because of their common use in 
Socratic dialogues.  In doing so, Cicero invites his reader to consider the difference between the Socratic 
and the Stoic view.  See, for example, Plato’s Republic, 332a-332e and 342a-e. 
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them (III.24).  But wisdom, says Cato, is further distinguished from all other arts because 
it is “directed at itself in its entirety” (III.24).  Cato thus attempts to emphasize the self-
sufficiency of wisdom, but this attempt is ultimately belied by the context of the present 
analogy.  On one hand, the arts of acting and dancing are more ends in themselves than 
navigation or medicine.  Whereas the excellence of a pilot or a doctor depends on his 
ability to achieve a certain outcome, the excellence of a dancer consists in dancing well 
or, in other words, in his own activity.  But, on the other hand, an actor or dancer 
normally depends upon a director for the content of his role.  According to Cato, through 
wisdom human beings participate most fully in a great and beautiful natural order (cf. 
III.21).  Yet, on the basis of this view, wisdom would more justly be ascribed to the 
director for assigning to each performer his fitting role than to the individual for 
following it.  Indeed, the significance of our own intelligence drops largely out of the 
picture and is replaced by the intelligence of nature.  To the extent that we can be said to 
have wisdom it consists, according to Cato, in the trust that a wise and benevolent mind 
has a grand design for the whole of nature in which we have a fixed part and, therefore, in 
playing our part within that design to the best of our ability.  In this way, Stoicism 
removes from the conception of wisdom any element of utility or instrumentality.  The 
Stoic is therefore able to separate the attainment of wisdom from contingencies that may 
be outside our control and to admire wisdom as something to pursue for its own sake.  
This can be achieved, however, only because the work of determining what ends we 
should seek and of answering questions about our place within the whole of nature is 
already completed for us by nature acting as a wise and benevolent director. 
The questions raised by Cato’s depiction of the actor and the dancer provoke us to 
wonder whether we can conceive of wisdom in such a way that approaches Cato’s claim 
that wisdom, unlike the other arts, is “directed at itself” but does not restrict it to the 
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performance of a fixed role.  Indeed, the discussion of the wise man as a dancer calls to 
mind Socrates recounting his dancing alone in Xenophon’s Symposium.54  On one hand, 
Socrates’ dancing is self-sufficient: he neither performs for others nor requires (or even 
desires) a partner.55  In this way Xenophon’s Socrates seems to possess the kind of 
wisdom that Cato describes.  But, on the other hand, Socrates does not dance for its own 
sake or in order to engage in a beautiful or noble activity (Pangle 2010, 142).  Instead, he 
dances in order “to exercise for better health,” to gain “more pleasure,” and “to create a 
complete equilibrium” in “every part of [his] body” (Xenophon 1996, II.17).  Thus, 
unlike navigation and medicine, Socrates’ activity is not meant primarily to serve others, 
but, like the pilot and the doctor, Socrates engages in his activity in pursuit of particular 
benefits.  The doctor serves others, while Socrates serves himself.  And if Xenophon 
intends us to see Socrates’ physical activity as indicative of his philosophic activity,56 we 
are then presented with a picture of the pursuit of wisdom as the attempt to achieve “a 
complete equilibrium” not simply in one’s physical being, but even or especially in one’s 
soul.  Against Cato’s emphasis on and admiration of human wisdom that is perfected by 
participation in a grand and beautiful design, Socrates offers a conception of wisdom that 
requires an understanding of the deficiencies and limits of human nature together with its 
excellences.  Because this Socratic conception has fitness as its end or goal, it does not 
satisfy Cato’s desire that wisdom be pursued for its own sake wholly apart from any 
benefit to us.57  Nevertheless, Xenophon’s depiction of Socrates shows him more truly 
                                                
54  Cicero was an avid and serious reader of Xenophon’s works.  Not only do his own works contain many 
references to Xenophon’s corpus, including the Symposium (see, for example, DF II.92, DD I.25, 54; TD 
II.62, V.99; DOR IX. 32, IXX.62), but he also translated the Oeconomicus into Latin. 
55 Cf. Xenophon 1996, II.17-19, with II.1 and Socrates’ silence in response to Callias’ offer of partnership 
in dancing at II.20. 
56 Pangle 2010 offers good reason to read this scene in this way. 
57 Socrates, moreover, does not share Cato’s view that wisdom eschews pleasure as a good. 
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engaged in an independent activity that pursues the perfection of one’s nature than Cato’s 
dancer who plays a fixed role according to nature’s plan.   
Xenophon reminds us, however, that Socrates’ activity is so strange that it gives 
one of his interlocutors reason to fear that he has lost his mind (1996, II.19).  This 
strangeness concerns especially Socrates’ dancing alone, whereas most dancers perform 
as part of a display for an audience.  Although Cato is silent about this aspect of 
performance in his discussion of actors and dancers, he soon takes up the question of the 
praise that is owed to virtue in what follows.  Cicero thus invites us to consider whether 
the honor and praise for a beautiful display is a crucial element that lurks under the 
surface of Cato’s attraction to thinking of wisdom as a performance.  Indeed, while the 
dancer derives satisfaction from his own skilful performance, it is also the case that, in 
most instances, the performer’s opinion of his own ability comes from the recognition 
and praise of a splendid performance by his audience.  An actor or dancer does not serve 
his audience in the way that a pilot serves his passengers or a doctor his patients, but an 
audience’s praise seems crucial to the happiness of the performer.  It follows, then, that 
the importance of the audience is in direct tension with Cato’s claim that wisdom is 
“directed at itself.”  The difficulty in maintaining the self-sufficiency of wisdom or virtue 
that is posed by the desire for praise is, in this way, brought to the foreground by Cato’s 
insistence on discussing wisdom in terms of arts that emphasize the artist’s dependence 
upon external approval in explicit contrast with the pilot or the doctor, for whose 
successful activity praise or good reputation have little importance. 
Cicero thus prepares us for an important shift that occurs in Cato’s way of 
thinking immediately following the analogy of the performers. In the opening stages of 
the conversation, Cicero had proposed that the doctrine that the moral is the only good 
prevents the Stoics from being able to differentiate among all other things (III.14).  
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Though he initially rejects Cicero’s depiction of the Stoic view, Cato follows his two 
analogies by taking up explicitly the position he first rejected (III.12-14).  Wisdom and 
virtue depend, Cato says, upon the recognition that “all things are indifferent and 
indistinguishable from one another except for virtue and vice” (III.25).  This 
contradiction reveals in Cato a struggle with the tension at the heart of the Stoic doctrine.   
To a certain extent, Cato recognizes that differentiation and distinction among the various 
objects, especially those we call goods, is necessary in order to allow for their ranking 
and evaluation.  Without such differentiations, there would be no grounds upon which to 
prefer certain objects of desire to others.  But if such differentiation results in finally 
attributing to some of these objects the character of goods, then they force one to question 
the status of virtue as the sole good.  If Cato were to concede that other objects of desire 
are goods, objects that one cannot be sure of attaining, he would also have to concede that 
wise man’s happiness is not wholly within his own control.  Cato recognizes, moreover, 
that the beauty of virtue begins to diminish if it cannot claim to be sufficient for human 
happiness (III.11).  The Stoic solution to this difficulty is to call certain middle or 
intermediate things “valuable” or “preferable,” such that one would choose to have them 
if possible, but to deny that these have any effect on our virtue and thus, on our happiness 
(III.20, 43-44, 50; cf. III.22). 
Cicero shows that this solution ultimately leads Cato and the Stoics to mislead 
themselves about their own souls, and, in so doing, to misunderstand human nature.  
Those who are wise, according to Cato, live “happy, perfect, and blessed lives, with no 
impediment or obstacle, lacking nothing” (III.26).  At the same time, however, Cato 
argues that the happy and moral life is not only that which is praiseworthy, but one that 
actually “wins praise” (III.27-28).  Underneath Cato’s portrait of the happy life as perfect 
and sufficient unto itself is revealed a deeper desire for honor and praise (rather than 
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simple praiseworthiness), and, therefore, a dependence upon others.  Happiness, to Cato, 
requires that one’s life be “marked out” or recognized on account of its moral excellence 
(III.27-28).  In spite of this desire for honor and recognition, Cato insists that he agrees 
with those of his predecessors who teach that “good reputation…aside from any 
instrumental benefit it may have…[is] not worth lifting a finger for” (III.57).  Thus, Cato 
claims that happiness both requires and is indifferent to praise.  If, as Cato suggests, 
wisdom consists in, or at least includes, the complete knowledge of human nature (a 
suggestion with which, we may suspect, Cicero would agree), then Cato’s confusion 
about the extent to which human happiness is dependent upon others is a severe 
impediment to his attaining that wisdom. His lack of clarity about the desire for praise 
prevents him from acquiring that self-knowledge which is a crucial step on the path to 
happiness, if not also to wisdom.  
Cato insists that “goodness itself, which is found in one’s being in harmony with 
nature [does] not admit of cumulative enlargement” (III.45).  Because there is only one 
good, there can be nothing truly good to add to virtue that could enhance its goodness.  
Cato adds, as a primary implication of his view, that “one who has made some progress 
towards the acquisition of virtue is just as unhappy as the one who has made no progress 
at all” (III.48).  For Cato, either virtue is complete, or it is completely lacking.  He 
recognizes that this view “seems strange” (III.48).  Indeed, it appears at first not to accord 
at all with how virtue is commonly understood, for it would require us to believe that, 
with respect to true human excellence, we cannot distinguish between Brutus (or Cato 
himself) and Julius Caesar or George Washington and Ted Kaczynski (III.48).  Cicero 
responds that it requires also that one consider Plato, “that great man,” though perhaps 
not wise according to the Stoic understanding, to have “lived no happier a life than the 
most wicked of us” (IV.21).  Cato claims that this implication is simply the logical 
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consequence of his position, but it is odd that he would insist on a position that denies the 
virtue of obviously virtuous individuals.  Cato, however, seems especially moved to this 
position by the hope held out by the promise that the wise man is always happy.  The 
attainment of virtue may be as rare as it is difficult, but, according to the Stoic teaching, 
the man of perfect virtue—the man “we are trying to produce”—lives in a permanent 
state of happiness and, above all, is invulnerable to and has a lofty scorn for chance, pain, 
or anything that might “move a human being” (ΙΙΙ.29; III.25).       
Cicero indicates, however, that these confusions are not limited to the Stoic 
teaching.  It is when he responds to Cato’s apparently radical understanding of virtue that 
Cicero notes that the Stoics hold “the same views as everyone” and that they merely 
invent “new terms for concepts whose meaning is unchanged” (IV.21).  Although 
Stoicism believes itself to be “a revised and amended version of the old philosophy,” 
Cicero does not here assert (as he does elsewhere) that the Stoics hold the same views as 
their philosophical predecessors (cf. for example, IV.2).  Instead, he claims that the 
Stoics’ opinions about the strictness and self-sufficiency of virtue unwittingly maintains 
something of the views of all people (omnes) about virtue: the hope that hard work and 
strength of character will lead to a happiness that can survive all manner of adversity is 
not at all alien to ordinary opinion.  But Cicero also emphasizes the confusion that the 
Stoic doctrine would cause in political life (IV.21-22).  He describes the difficulty a 
speaker would have in defending criminal punishment in Stoic terms or appealing to 
citizens to take up the defense of their city against an approaching enemy in Stoic terms 
(IV.22).  Cicero thus begins to indicate the threat that Stoicism poses to politics.  The 
success of such a speaker, if he is not simply a demagogue, would turn on his ability to 
appeal to his audience’s devotion to the city, to the their belief that a real injustice and 
harm occurs when a crime is committed or an enemy wins.  The restraint that law can 
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exercise upon its citizens also requires that they believe the punishments it hands down to 
those who violate it to be true deprivations.   
Nevertheless, Cicero’s accusation about the absurdity of expecting that an orator, 
“with Hannibal at the gates,” would “declare that captivity, enslavement, death, and the 
loss of one’s homeland are not evils,” exaggerates the strangeness of the Stoic 
terminology in one important respect (IV.22).   It is often the case that the statesman must 
deprecate the evil of death when addressing his people in war.58  Indeed, such deprecation 
is crucial if we are to believe it right or just to risk death in defense of the common good.  
In these circumstances, we do believe, in a way, that death is not an evil or, at least, that it 
is not the worst evil.  This belief is, however, rooted in the thought that “captivity, 
enslavement…and the loss of one’s homeland” are, in fact, evils that we would prefer to 
die resisting rather than accept.  In other words, the willingness to die is deeply connected 
to a devotion not simply to virtue, but to the political order that makes the virtuous life 
possible and whose bonds center around family and fellow citizens.  Although the Stoics 
share with ordinary civic morality the hope in the self-sufficiency of virtue and the 
contempt for death, their belief that their understanding of virtue is perfectly rational, 
independent of external circumstance, and superior to the common view, disregards the 
passions and attachments that are a powerful source of the very virtues they esteem and 
wish to cultivate.    
                                                
58 Consider, for example, how Pericles, in his Funeral Oration, depicts the Athenians who died in the 
opening battles of the Peloponnesian war: “For giving in common their bodies, they took individually the 
praise which is ageless and the most distinguished tomb: not that in which they lie, but that in which their 
fame is left forever remembered on every opportune occasion in speech and in deed” (Thucydides, History 
of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Thomas Pangle, II.43.2).  To the British and American people confronting 
war with Nazi Germany, Winston Churchill affirmed that “we need not bewail the fact that we have been 
called upon to face such solemn responsibilities. We may be proud, and even rejoice amid our tribulations, 
that we have been born at this cardinal time for so great an age and so splendid an opportunity of service 
here below” (Churchill 2001, 810). 
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Cicero complicates his argument, however, by gently suggesting to his reader that 
the Stoics themselves do not accept their own teaching wholeheartedly.  Instead, Stoic 
philosophy “speaks a common language in public, but its own language in its treatises” 
(IV.22).  Only the text of the Stoic books, says Cicero, contain their new terms.  It is 
possible that Cicero wishes to indicate that the Stoics wrote esoterically and kept their 
true doctrine—that which was laid out in their books—for the advanced students initiated 
into their school.  Cicero discounts this possibility, however, when he criticizes the Stoics 
for lacking the subtlety of rhetoric employed by Plato and Aristotle (IV.5-7).59  Cicero 
implies, rather, that the Stoics fall back on more traditional understandings of virtue as a 
good but not the sole good when speaking in public, which shows that their deepest 
concerns comport with the ordinary, rather than novel way of speaking.  The obscure 
language they use to speak of virtue, however, prevents them from acknowledging their 
own attachment to the ends that virtue serves.  Cicero does not deny that there is 
something powerful in the Stoics’ terminology; he does deny, however, that this 
terminology does justice to the hopes and concerns the Stoics themselves maintain. 
While Cicero suggests that the Stoic teaching obscures one’s own desires from 
oneself, Cato declares that it provides the wise man with judgment so clear that he will be 
able to pick the right time for his own death (III.59-60).  It is a duty (an action that aims 
at a natural principle) to live “when most of what one has is in accordance with nature” 
(III.60; cf. III.22).  When one believes oneself to lack what is in accordance with nature, 
death is most appropriate.  While Cato courageously declares that it may be the case that 
“it is the duty of the wise man to depart from life though happy,” he also reminds us that, 
                                                
59 Cicero’s main interlocutor in Book V, Piso, notes explicitly that Aristotle distinguished between his 
esoteric and exoteric works (V.12).  Cicero does not, however, rule out entirely the possible existence of an 
esoteric Stoic teaching, although he does seem to imply that such a teaching, if it exists, must be subject to 
the same difficulties as its popular counterpart.  
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for the Stoic, “living happily—that is, living in harmony with nature—is a matter of 
timeliness” (III.60-61).  Cato thus presents a portrait of the Stoic whose happiness is 
independent of the length of his life and who would look upon death as nothing bad in 
comparison with a life that must be inconsistent with the dictates of nature.  Moreover, 
the Stoic would choose death not simply in the latter case, but even as soon as it is merely 
“envisaged,” or merely appears to be the case (III.60).  But happiness, as Cato recalls, is 
precisely the life lived according to nature, and he maintains throughout his speech that 
this can be achieved only through the life of virtue.  Virtue, however, once attained, is 
immune to pain or suffering and impossible to subjugate: “the wise may have their body 
put in chains, but you will never chain their soul” (III.75).  Cato’s comment provokes us 
to wonder, then, in what way the wise man, who possesses virtue permanently, can ever 
be said to lack most of the things that are in accordance with nature?60   If the answer to 
this question involves difficulties of external circumstance, then one must drastically 
reduce the extent to which one believes virtue, and through it happiness, to be self-
sufficient.  Indeed, Cato claims that “the whole rationale for either remaining in or 
departing from life is to be measured by reference to those intermediates” he has already 
discussed (III.61). Cato had distinguished virtue, the good, from intermediate things that 
should be “selected but not sought” (III.22, 52-54).  This distinction was made, however, 
in order to explain the view that there are many things or qualities in life that we might 
prefer, on balance, to have—such as health, sufficient nourishment, and leisure—but that 
are ultimately in no way necessary for our happiness, which requires only that we live 
virtuously.  Cato now holds that these desirable but unnecessary things are the sole 
consideration upon which the decision to live or die must be based!    
                                                
60  This contradiction is apparent in the writings of other Stoics as well.  Compare, for example, Seneca’s 
“On Providence” with his seventieth letter, on the subject of suicide.  Cato’s own suicide is discussed at 
length in each.   
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Cato’s surprising assertion that the wise man’s duty may require him to sacrifice 
his life even when he is happy (because he is wise) presents the additional problem of 
setting virtue against happiness, but it also goes some way toward explaining the 
strangeness of Cato’s understanding of suicide.  Suicide, in Cato’s view, is the 
appropriate action if circumstances lead one to the opinion that living a virtuous, and 
therefore, happy life seems impossible.  But the duty to sacrifice one’s happiness that 
Cato mentions in passing contradicts the duty to maintain one’s life when “most of what 
one has is in accord with nature” and the belief that what virtue prescribes and what our 
happiness requires are always the same thing.  For if the sacrifice of one’s happiness can 
indeed be a duty, then it must either be the case that sometimes death is most appropriate 
even when the life according to nature is available to us or that sometimes the dictates of 
virtue are inconsistent with our own happiness.  Moreover, only suicide that includes the 
element of sacrifice seems to have a place among noble or beautiful deeds (cf. II.65-66).  
Cato’s attraction to the nobility of suicide, therefore, forces him to call “living happily” 
that which is actually a transcending or sacrifice of happiness.  Thus, although he takes 
up the discussion of suicide in order to emphasize the ease with which the wise man can 
relinquish the false goods of fortune, he must, in the end, admit their real goodness in 
order to preserve the nobility of giving them up.   
STOICISM’S COSMOLOGY  
The doubts about the self-sufficiency of the life hitherto praised as complete and 
blessed raise questions about Cato’s view of the gods and his understanding of the 
relation between the human things and the divine.  These issues come to the fore of 
Cato’s speech when he turns to consider the social and political relations of human 
beings.  He states that all human association springs, at bottom, from natural familial 
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love.  This love extends beyond our immediate families and creates “mutual and natural 
sympathy between humans, so that the very fact of being human requires that no human 
be considered a stranger to any other” (III.62-63).  For the first time in his speech, 
however, Cato also here begins to talk about the existence and power of the gods, or 
divine will.  His discussion weaves back and forth between assertions about the force or 
strength (vis), of nature, on one hand, and the will (numen) of the gods on the other.  Cato 
attributes the origin and bond of human fellowship in separate instances to both sources 
(cf. III.62-63 with III.64) but never explains the connection between them.  He seems at 
first to conceive of the gods as buttressing the inclinations and acts to which nature on its 
own first points us.  Cato notes that the “safety of men lies in [Jupiter’s] protection,”61 but 
also that men “are joined and brought together among ourselves by nature into civic 
communities” (III.66).  If human welfare were solely the province of the gods and in no 
way shaped by our own actions, says Cato, “there would be no place for justice or 
benevolence” (III.66).  At the same time, however, he states that human beings “place the 
common advantage before our own” as a consequence of the belief that we live with the 
gods in a world that “is ruled by divine will” (III.64).  Cato thus articulates two 
considerations that appear to be in serious tension with each other.  If the virtues are 
controlled by the gods or are merely their gift, rather than natural to human beings, he 
suggests, then we cannot rightly call a man just or moderate, since he is not the author of 
his own deeds.  Virtue, Cato claims, is possible only if we understand ourselves—and not 
the gods—as primarily responsible for our own well-being and happiness.  But, according 
to Cato, belief in the goodness of virtue—with the sacrifice of narrow self-interest that it 
often entails—also requires the belief that the order of the cosmos and the common good 
                                                
61 The Latin salus which is translated as “safety,” need not connote simply physical preservation, but also 
the welfare or salvation of the soul. 
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are held together by divine rule.  Cato seems, then, unwittingly to admit that there is 
something lacking in the goodness of virtue, on account of which the promise of divine 
reward is necessary. He shows for a moment a quiet doubt that virtuous action is 
sufficient for our happiness. 
Cato turns lastly to the study of logic and natural science, which he calls virtues 
for the first time.  Logic provides the method by which one must study and natural 
science is the substance (III.72-73).62  It is impossible, according to Cato, “to make 
judgments about good and evil unless one understands the whole system of nature, and 
even the life of the gods, as well as the question of whether or not human nature is in 
harmony with that of the universe” (III.72-73).  In spite of Cato’s effort to show 
otherwise, Cato’s initial statement reminds us of the degree to which the place of 
humanity in the universe remains a question.  Indeed, if Cato is right that we cannot make 
true judgments about the good without knowledge of the place of human beings in the 
universe—as parts of the whole—then, insofar as we lack knowledge of the whole, the 
status of virtue and the meaning of human happiness must also remain questions.  At the 
same time, if the study of the whole of nature is the precondition for knowledge of the 
good and can alone “foster justice and preserve friendship,” then it is surprising that Cato 
spends so little of his speech addressing it (III.73).   
Indeed, Cato also appears to leave open the refutation of his own view should the 
investigation of nature point instead to the conclusion that there are no gods or that nature 
lacks a benevolent intention with respect to human beings.  At the very least, Cicero 
gives us plenty of reasons to question Cato’s teaching about nature and, therefore, his 
teaching about the status of human beings within the natural (or divine) order.  It is not 
                                                
62 It is striking that Cato does not mention at all political science or political philosophy. 
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Cato’s intention, however, to encourage such skepticism.  Cato has full confidence that 
natural philosophy directs one to the support of justice.  He believes that the study of 
nature is most important because through it the gods are revealed as supporting our 
endeavors.  Just as the opinion that the Stoic teaching about virtue is perfectly rational 
leads Cato to neglect the extent to which the virtue he admires is tied to civic and familial 
associations, it obscures the fact that he fails to submit to rational examination the pious 
hopes he attaches to virtue.    
Cato, however, shows himself to be somewhat uneasy with his own revelation.  
He claims that he has been carried away in his speech beyond his original plan, inspired 
with admiration for the “marvelously systematic” Stoic doctrines (III.74).  Cato goes so 
far as to praise the structure and neatness of Stoicism above that of the natural order 
while he simultaneously asserts that “nothing is more finely arranged than nature” 
(III.74).  Cato thus once again reveals that his admiration of nature is founded upon and 
preceded by his moral concerns.  The appeal of Stoicism lies, for him, in its claim to 
adhere to the commands of nature while also promising the transcendence of nature in a 
way that conforms to our deep-seated hopes about the life of virtue.  To Cato, wisdom 
seems to consist less in the culmination of a rational examination of nature than it does in 
a kind of worship or admiration of nature.  Cato closes his speech with a dramatic 
peroration extolling the excellence of Stoicism and the wise man it cultivates, but his 
almost inadvertent admission about just how important piety is to him is the last 
substantive claim that he makes before Cicero begins his reply. 
STOIC TERMINOLOGY  
Cicero begins his response to Cato’s long speech with the claim that the Peripatetics 
“expound the same doctrines” as the Stoics with less innovative vocabulary (IV.2).  
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Cato’s extreme resistance to this assertion leads one to question its validity and even 
Cicero’s seriousness in making it, yet he repeats it in various forms throughout their 
conversation (cf. for example, IV.60, 70-73).  Moreover, through Cato, Cicero calls our 
attention to the fact he is not the first to identify the views of the Stoics with those of the 
Peripatetics, but that this claim was originally articulated by the Academic Carneades 
(III.41).63  Cicero points nevertheless to a particular shift in vocabulary as the very source 
of the supposed disagreement between the Stoics and their Peripatetic counterparts.  
Those things that the Peripatetics called good in addition to virtue, the Stoics insist, are 
“actually ‘preferred,’ not good…[and] are to be ‘adopted’ rather than ‘sought’” (IV.20).  
Cicero first mockingly decries this shift as wholly arbitrary.  Yet, as he later indicates 
more clearly, these new terms are deeply revealing and not arbitrarily chosen. To speak 
of something as preferred or adopted, rather than simply good, or sought, suggests that 
one has a great degree of control over the selection or rejection of the objects of one’s 
choice and desire.  The Stoic, according to Cicero, calls “disease, poverty, and pain not 
evil, but…worthy of rejection” and those things which have value he “speaks not of 
seeking but of selecting, not of wishing for but of adopting” (IV.72).  The Stoic attempts 
through this shift in words to show his desire to be less subject to the passions, or even to 
                                                
63 Carneades, who lived during the second century B.C., was a head of the Academy, the school which 
claimed to follow the philosophy of Plato.  Whereas in other works Cicero associates himself explicitly 
with the Academy (DND I.11), he makes his own relation to any of the schools especially difficult to 
determine in De Finibus.  By using the position of an Academic to defend an apparently Peripatetic 
position (the school which took its teaching from Aristotle) Cicero indicates that he is not simply a partisan 
or follower of any one school or doctrine (cf. I.6).  Indeed, in his discussion with Cato, Cicero never claims 
allegiance to the Academic school.  On what he considered to be the most important part of philosophy—
political science—Cicero also argues that there was fundamental agreement between Plato and Aristotle 
(IV.5, 72).  It follows, then, that insofar as they overlook or obscure this basic agreement, both the 
Academic and the Peripatetic schools fall into errors not made by the thinkers they claim to follow.  
Cicero’s refusal to declare his allegiance to any one school in De Finibus’ investigation into the good for 
human beings helps to emphasize the schools’ philosophic deficiencies.      
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wishes, and to have complete control over his vulnerability to pain and, as Cato’s 
discussion of suicide shows, above all to death.64  
Cicero’s depiction of Cato in particular and Stoicism in general as 
misunderstanding their own desires reveals, however, a serious point in his puzzling 
argument that, in spite of the different terminology, the Stoics agree with Cicero in 
substance.  If the Stoics were able clearly to examine their own souls unencumbered by 
the fancy language of Stoic philosophy, they would find themselves in agreement with 
Cicero.  Such an agreement, however, could take place on the basis of two different 
views of the relation of Stoicism to the correction that Cicero articulates in De Finibus.  
On one hand, when Cicero argues that “not one of our views is different, once one alters 
the terminology and compares the actual substance,” he may mean that although the 
teaching of Stoicism already agrees, at bottom, with his own view, the Stoics’ way of 
speaking prevents them from recognizing it (IV.60).  On the other hand, Cicero’s 
argument may imply instead that Stoicism makes crucial mistakes in its teaching which, 
if it could see past the “glorious grandeur of language,” it would have to abandon, and 
with them all objections to Cicero’s position (IV.60).   
Cicero shows that he ultimately takes the second view when he stops his speech 
for a moment in order to reply in Cato’s name (and at Cato’s request) to this puzzling 
argument.  Here Cicero indicates clearly the gulf between Stoicism and Platonic and 
Aristotelian philosophy (IV.62-64).  If Cato were to reply honestly to Cicero’s 
arguments, Cicero says, he would have to admit that he “simply could not bear it” that the 
ancient Greek philosophers “thought that a morally good life which also had health, 
reputation and wealth would thereby be a preferable, better, and more desirable life than 
                                                
64 Howes, however, questions whether “Cicero tried to take seriously the purpose of the Stoic attempt to 
revise our language of evaluation” because neither Cato nor Cicero address the proto-Kantian claim made 
by some Stoics that “only a morally good will was unqualifiedly good” (1972, 58; italics in the original).   
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one which was equally moral but, as with Alcmaeon in Ennius, was ‘beset on all sides by 
illness, exile, and poverty’” (IV.62).  Not only does Stoicism truly diverge, then, from 
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, but it is also  led to this divergence on the basis of a 
powerful hope about the goodness of virtue  which it refuses to examine.  But, while 
Cicero does not restrain himself from picking apart and revealing many of the 
inadequacies of Cato’s defense of Stoicism, he does not force Cato to examine this hope 
and account for it.  Because he does not seek to make Cato and the students of Stoicism 
philosophers, but good citizens, Cicero only quietly reveals the distance between his own 
thought and Stoicism’s, while seeming, on the surface of his speech, to refine the Stoic 
moral teaching on the basis of the claim that Stoicism already agrees with his own view.65   
Cicero shows, then, that the Stoic terminology which is meant to clarify and 
distinguish the good from the merely preferable, together with their doctrine that we 
should live according to nature, leads to confusion about how we understand the good.  
Just as “Zeno was wrong to claim that nothing other than virtue carries any weight in the 
attainment of the supreme good,” so too is it a mistake to think “that nothing else has any 
effect on the happy life, yet that other things can affect our desire…as if this desire of 
ours were not aimed at attaining the supreme good” (IV.47).  Stoicism maintains virtue at 
the top of its hierarchy of desires, but the relation of everything else to the highest good is 
ambiguous at best.  The Stoics rank the various objects of desire, but they insist that these 
objects “have no bearing on whether one lives happily or miserably” (III.50).  Cicero’s 
response questions the possibility of sustaining this sort of thinking.  He implies that the 
only way that we can rank the priority of what we desire is by the extent to which each 
thing helps us attain the good for ourselves.  The truth of this claim is illustrated by the 
                                                
65 Cato’s conclusion at the end of Cicero’s speech, that although Cicero rejects the Stoics’ “new 
terminology,” he “actually accept[s] all [their] doctrines” signifies, perhaps, Cicero’s success in this part of 
his project (IV.80; cf. IV.2). 
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lengths Cato must go to in order to maintain the distinction between the good and the 
preferable (or what is to be selected, but not sought) and by Cato’s ultimate failure in this 
task.  According to Cato, “everything that is good”—namely, virtue alone—“we say, 
occupies the first rank” (III.53). Next, “what we call advantageous or superior must be 
what is neither good nor bad,” and is therefore defined as “indifferent” (III.53).  It is not 
clear, however, how one thing can be superior or preferable to another if neither has any 
significance for the attainment of our happiness.  Moreover, Cato’s explanation of the 
criteria by which we judge between the secondary objects of our desire belies the 
insistence upon their indifference.  Virtue, says Cato, can be thought of as a king at court.  
Our preference should be for those things which, “while lower in order, [approach] 
nearest to the pre-eminence of the king” (III.52).  But if this is the case, then the 
secondary objects, far from being indifferent, are distinguished precisely by their ability 
to bring us closer to the king or, in other words, the good.                
But, according to Cicero, the Stoics make the mistake of believing that 
one returns to nature to seek out a principle of action and duty once one has 
grasped what the supreme good is.  Considerations of action and duty do not 
motivate us to desire the things that are in accordance with nature.  Rather the 
latter are what motivate our desires and our actions. (IV.48)    
The Stoic psychology again puts the cart before the horse.  Their desire to live according 
to nature is founded upon an already present conviction that virtue is the supreme good 
and the opinion that nature can lead them toward it.  Against this view, Cicero argues that 
our desires are rooted in nature and naturally diverse in their objects.  Only by being open 
to what these multifarious desires suggest about our nature can we then come to 
understand what is good for us. And only on the basis of this understanding can we begin 
to determine how we should live.   
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THE DESIRE TO TRANSCEND HUMAN NATURE     
It is the hope for a permanent happiness that is invulnerable to fortune that leads 
the Stoics to hold out virtue as something exceedingly difficult to achieve, but complete 
and permanent upon its attainment.  But this standard by which virtue is virtue only in its 
complete form is, as Cicero now states explicitly, completely unconnected to human 
experience, especially our experience of ourselves as political.  Not only must this 
standard of virtue fail to account for the true happiness of the philosophic life exemplified 
by Plato, but it also fails as a political standard.  This view, Cicero argues, can “have no 
place in the life of the city…No one could take seriously anyone who spoke like that, and 
set themselves up as an authority on the wise and dignified conduct of life” (IV.21).  By 
proclaiming all people miserable who lack complete virtue, the Stoics detach themselves 
from the concern of crucial civic virtues and devotion: “in declaring what is moral to be 
the only good, [they] do away with…the direction of public affairs, the conduct of 
business, and the duties of life” (IV.68).  Thus, according to Cicero, the Stoic 
understanding of virtue is a standard to be adopted neither by serious philosophers nor by 
serious political men.   
Cicero’s charge that the Stoics’ devotion to virtue ultimately undermines duty 
itself brings a second side of his critique to the fore. He begins from the Stoics’ total 
disregard for human nature insofar as they disregard the concerns of the body.  Cicero 
asks, “how and where did you suddenly abandon the body and all those things that are in 
accordance with nature but not in our power, finally discarding duty itself?” (IV.26).  If, 
as suggested above, the Stoics associate especially the passions and pains of the body 
with the vulnerability to chance (III.25), then it is not surprising that they attempt wholly 
to remove bodily concerns from their conception of the good.  But, as Cicero now 
suggests, it is impossible to conceive of the good of any living creature whose end is to 
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live according to nature that does not include some cognizance of its physical existence.  
The nature of every animal necessarily includes its body (IV.26-29).   
Nevertheless, Cicero indicates that the Stoics are not alone in their disparaging of 
the body.  Certain other philosophers (whom Cicero does not name) began their 
examination of nature with the evidence available to sense perception, but, having 
ascended to a “grander and more divine vision," "they abandoned the senses” (IV.42).66  
In the same way, the Stoics “moved on from original desire to the beautiful vision of 
virtue and cast aside all that they saw apart from virtue” (IV.42).  Human beings, like all 
animals, have a nature that is fixed and permanent.  Both human and animal nature is 
rooted in self-love and “there is none that ever abandons either itself, or any part of 
itself…or indeed anything, whether process or state, that is in accordance with its nature” 
(IV.32).  On this basis, however, Cicero wonders, “how is it, then, that human nature 
alone should abandon itself, forgetting the body and placing the highest good not in the 
whole but in a part of itself?” (IV.34).  Cicero thus suggests that while the Stoics are 
mistaken, there is something peculiar about human nature that invites their particular 
mistake.  Human beings, alone among the animals, are not simply at home in their bodily 
nature.  Human nature alone wishes, in some way, to abandon this part of itself and exist 
as something more noble and pure.  With this recognition, then, Cicero concedes that 
there is something inherently and deeply appealing for human beings in the Stoic promise 
of invulnerability to bodily concerns or external forces.  But both the attraction and the 
promise, as Cicero has already emphasized, are based on a misunderstanding of our 
natural happiness.     
                                                
66 These unnamed philosophers may, in fact, be the Epicureans since they too, as Cicero shows in Books I-
II, hold out the promise of a life impervious to fortune for the wise man. 
 69 
 
Because their understanding of virtue took account of only half of nature, the 
Stoics “failed to realize that they were undermining the foundations of those beautiful 
objects of their admiration” (IV.42).  This undermining occurs in both a theoretical and a 
political sense (and this would seem to go along with the fact that Cicero places the 
beautiful things that are undermined in the plural: “illarum pulchrarum”).  Stoicism 
draws on a powerful attraction to the nobility or beauty of moral virtue but, because it 
calls the attainment of that nobility wisdom, it obscures the path to an adequately 
capacious and honest understanding of the desires and passions of the soul.  The truly 
rational—and therefore wise—understanding of human nature, Cicero intimates, must 
include an account of what is subrational in us.  At the same time, the denigration of the 
bodily concerns—which in many ways are the basis of our involvement in and 
attachment to political life—draws the followers of Stoicism away from the messy and 
often undignified life in politics.  The Stoics’ uncompromising quest for perfect virtue 
turns them away from the primary arena in which noble deeds are possible.  That Cato 
maintained his political involvement in his own life may indeed bear witness to his 
attachment to civic virtue apart from his devotion to the Stoic school.67  But Cicero warns 
that virtue, once severed from politics, a primary source of our moral concerns, loses its 
foundation and, therefore, its support. 
CICERONIAN WISDOM 
Cicero presents his own conception of wisdom which clarifies how we might 
begin to account for the whole of human nature rather than only its most majestic or 
                                                
67 In De Natura Deorum, a dialogue also concerned with the teachings of Epicurean and Stoic philosophy, 
the only interlocutor not explicitly said to be involved in politics (in a group consisting of a Stoic, an 
Epicurean, and an Academic skeptic) is the Stoic interlocutor, Balbus.  He is described as “so accomplished 
a student of Stoicism as to rank with the leading Greek exponents of that system” (DND I.15). 
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beautiful aspects (IV.34-36).  In order to illustrate his understanding of wisdom, he 
begins by using the analogy of a sculptor who “can start a work from scratch…or can 
take over an incomplete work from someone and perfect it” (IV.34).  Human wisdom, he 
says, “corresponds to the latter case. It did not itself create the human race; it took over, 
incomplete, from nature” (IV.34).  In his brief account Cicero mentions three times that 
the formation of human nature is left unfinished or imperfect.68  It follows, according to 
Cicero, that the first question that must be asked is “what is the character of human 
beings that nature left incomplete?” (IV.35).  Whereas the Stoics allow themselves to be 
carried away by admiration for what they believe is the perfection of our nature, Cicero 
emphasizes instead a fundamental imperfection in it.  As he has already noted, this 
imperfection consists especially in the lack of a perfect correspondence between our 
natural desires and the happiness that our nature is capable of attaining (IV.32).  
Wisdom’s task—to finish the sculpture which nature began—is then understood as the 
attempt to bring the desires in harmony with, rather than transcend, the truth of our 
natural happiness.   
This task can be accomplished only, says Cicero, if we “watch nature closely” and 
do “not hesitate to inquire what has been achieved by the whole of [man’s] nature” 
(IV.34, 36).  Stoicism’s moral teaching prevents it from adequately undertaking this 
inquiry.  Because this teaching holds that “there is nothing to be perfected except a 
certain operation of the intellect,”  it not only discards the body as a concern, but also 
attends only to a certain part of the soul.  As a result, the Stoics hide from themselves the 
motions (motum) of the soul that do not always comport with their view of reason.  These 
elements are therefore simply neglected or, as Cicero’s depiction of Cato suggests, 
                                                
68 The word Cicero uses in all three cases is a form of the verb incoho.   
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conflated with the perfection of our reason.  But only by accounting for the whole of the 
soul together with the body can we understand what it means to take nature as the guide 
for how we should live. 
Cicero also mentions briefly that a sculptor can begin a work from scratch.  He 
thus considers for a moment the possibility that nature does not give us guidance about 
ourselves or that the good for human beings is not tied to a permanent human nature that 
has been, so to speak, set in stone beforehand by nature.  Cicero rejects this possibility 
almost as soon as he raises it, but he gives his reader license to wonder what kind of 
natural order (or lack of it) the sculptor who begins his work from scratch might 
represent.  If we take Cato’s speech as a guide, we are led to consider that the art of the 
sculptor may be not human but divine wisdom and to picture a cosmos ruled by wise 
gods who created the human race.  But Cicero’s intimation of the work that human beings 
must undertake in order to attain a happiness founded in knowledge rather than hopes—
the difficulty of bringing our desires into harmony with the facts of our mortality—does 
not seem to allow for a natural order designed by a benign intelligent mind.  Wisdom, 
therefore, “did not itself create the human race” (IV.34).   Cicero does not here offer a 
full justification of his rejection of this possibility; his primary goal in this section is, 
however, to set his reader on a path toward understanding the crucial questions that we 
must ask in order to do so ourselves.  By presenting the shape that a serious inquiry about 
human nature must take, Cicero puts his reader in a position to evaluate for himself the 
evidence for Cicero’s claims. 
Nevertheless, although Cicero is not inclined to reject the attention that human 
wisdom must give to understanding nature, he assigns to nature a somewhat ambivalent 
relation to human beings.  Nature must be our guide, he says, but we lack a complete 
picture of nature’s project.  Cicero thus gently leaves open the extent to which we must 
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work for our happiness and, to some modified degree, be our own product and not simply 
the product of nature. 
Cicero shows that by neglecting subrational elements of our moral concerns, the 
Stoics threaten to undermine virtue itself.  When the foundation of virtue is shaken, 
Cicero continues, wisdom has “nowhere to put its feet” (IV.69).  To say that wisdom 
must rest its feet upon duty suggests that duty must be the starting point for wisdom.  
Indeed, Cicero may intend for us to recall his depiction of Socratic philosophy in the 
Tusculan Disputations: “Socrates was the first to call philosophy down from heaven and 
set her in the cities and bring her also into homes and compel her to ask questions about 
life and morality and the good and bad things” (TD V.4).  It is necessary, according to 
Cicero, for philosophy to concern itself with the opinions that reveal themselves 
especially in our familial and political associations.  Thus, the more that Stoicism—or 
Epicureanism—believes itself to have risen above these concerns without adequately 
understanding them, the more it disconnects itself from the only source of knowledge 
about our nature.  In the Tusculan Disputations, however, Cicero does not say that by 
turning philosophy to the human things, Socrates altered the purpose or founded a new 
kind of philosophizing.  Instead, Socrates is depicted as directing philosophy’s gaze 
toward that which might help it attain what it had been seeking from the beginning.  
Similarly, that the feet of wisdom stand upon duty does not require wisdom to be merely 
an articulation of our opinions about duty.  Because philosophy requires questioning 
these opinions and evaluating our moral concerns, the pursuit of wisdom must begin 
from, or set its feet upon, these opinions in order to fully understand them, but the head of 
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wisdom, so to speak, ascends from those opinions toward a comprehensive understanding 
of nature with the account of human nature at its core.69              
Although De Finibus sets us on the path toward this understanding, Cicero 
indicates that the study of nature requires also an account of the gods’ role in the universe 
and the relation of virtue to the divine.  The “study of the heavenly things,” and 
observation of “the gods’ works and their acts,” he says, instills “a certain sense of 
moderation,” a “greatness of soul,” and a “sense of justice” (IV.11).  But Cicero does not 
undertake this study in De Finibus.  His depiction of Cato shows that the Stoic theology, 
though it comes to the surface of Cato’s speech only once (III.64-66), plays a crucial, if 
still ambiguous, role in his hope for the self-sufficiency of virtue for our happiness.  But 
in spite of the implication that an understanding of the gods not only forms a fundamental 
part of the understanding of the whole of nature but also plays an important role in 
inculcating virtue, Cicero’s interlocutors do not make the gods central to their speeches  
This omission suggests that, to some extent, their devotion to the philosophical schools 
has begun to replace the more traditional piety.  In order to continue to trace Cicero’s 
evaluation of Stoicism and the popularization of philosophy, it will be helpful next to turn 
to De Natura Deorum, in which he treats both the relationship of the moral teaching with 
the theology of the schools and the possibility that philosophy might fully replace piety as 
the foundation of civic virtue. 
  
                                                




Chapter 3:  Cicero’s Political Piety 
“What a pleasure to see him, in his book On the Nature of the Gods, make all the 
sects pass in review, confound all the philosophers, and mark each prejudice with 
some stain! Now he fights against these monsters; now he makes sport of 
philosophy. The champions whom he introduces destroy themselves; that one is 
confounded by this one, who finds himself beaten in turn.”70 
 
In De Finibus, Cicero indicates that a crucial stumbling block in the path of the 
Stoic attempt to equate virtue with the perfection of reason is an inattentiveness to the 
significance of the pious hopes that accompany and support their teaching.  In De Natura 
Deorum, Cicero takes on this problem directly and reveals that he understands reflection 
about it to be of supreme importance.  It is also in De Natura Deorum that Cicero 
considers, through his presentation of the interchanges between the interlocutors Balbus 
and Cotta, whether, in fact, an enlightenment that liberates citizens from pious 
superstitions can successfully take the place of religion in supporting virtue in a regime 
where religion no longer holds sway over men’s souls.  The questions and problems 
confronted in this work are thus very much akin to questions we face today.  Indeed, the 
multitude of controversies in recent years over the sincerity of religious faith among our 
political leaders suggests, among other things, the strength of the opinion among many 
people that piety is the foundation of the moral goodness, or virtue, required among 
ruling citizens.  At the same time, others argue that in spite of its apparent strength, 
religion has lost its moral force on the modern soul.  We no longer live in a world 
inhabited by the supernatural beings to which religion commands that we devote 
ourselves, and that make vivid and enforce the moral commitments we value in our 
fellow citizens and leaders.  It would be appropriate, then, for us to consider, with Cicero, 
                                                
70 Montesquieu (2002, 734). 
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what role piety plays in the cultivation of virtue and whether or to what extent reason can 
do so in its place.       
In many ways De Natura Deorum is the most puzzling of Cicero’s dialogues.71  
On one hand, Cicero begins the work by defending his allegiance to the Academic school 
(an allegiance which is never mentioned in De Finibus). But, on the other, he closes the 
dialogue with a vote of approval for the speech of the Stoic interlocutor, rather than the 
refutation of that speech by another Academic.  The puzzle of the dialogue’s framing is 
compounded by additional complications.  To begin with, Cicero himself is present at the 
conversation recorded in the dialogue, but apart from a few preliminary remarks, says 
nothing at all to the interlocutors.  Moreover, in spite of the fact that Cicero ends the 
dialogue by favoring the Stoic speech, none of the interlocutors—neither Velleius, nor 
Balbus, who advocate the Epicurean and Stoic views of the gods, nor Cotta, who attempts 
to refute them—comes to sight as a clear winner in their disputation.  Indeed, 
Montesquieu sums up well the overall impact of the dialogue when he writes that “the 
champions whom [Cicero] introduces destroy themselves” (2002, 734).  Most of Cicero’s 
readers have taken the interlocutor Cotta as Cicero’s spokesman in the conversation, but, 
as this chapter will attempt to show, Cicero gives us reason to think that we should be 
hesitant to do so.   
As a step towards resolving these puzzles, it will be helpful first to examine 
Cicero’s presentation of the purpose of the dialogue.  Indeed, Cicero’s introduction to De 
Natura Deorum sets the standards by which the speeches that follow it and Cicero’s 
ultimate approval for Balbus’ speech must be judged.  In doing so, it presents the 
framework for Cicero’s reflections about the role that reason might play and that religion 
                                                
71 All citations unless otherwise noted are to De Natura Deorum, (Cicero 1997). Translation has been 
modified on occasion. 
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ought to play in a healthy republic, as well as the alternative grounds that might be found 
for virtue when religion’s traditional supports have been decisively undermined.  
Following Cicero’s indication that the exchange between Balbus and Cotta is the heart of 
the dialogue (III.2-3), this chapter will then turn to consider their speeches. 
CICERO’S INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS 
As he did in De Finibus, Cicero dedicates De Natura Deorum to Brutus, who is, 
he asserts, “by no means ignorant,” of the fact that the “question of the nature of the gods 
is particularly difficult and obscure” (I.1). The claim that the “question of the nature of 
the gods” is especially perplexing directs Cicero’s reader to consider first the meaning of 
the question itself.  Whereas a number of Cicero’s philosophical predecessors had written 
works entitled On the Gods (περι θεων), Cicero’s insertion of “natura” in the title is 
striking.  Indeed, to seek the nature of the gods suggests that the gods have an 
understandable, if not also permanent, character.  Thus Cicero’s interlocutors present the 
theologies of their philosophical schools and speak of the nature of the gods in the same 
way that we might speak of human nature.  Whereas the traditions about the gods of 
Rome held them to be changeable and mysterious, the gods as described by Velleius (the 
Epicurean) and Balbus (the Stoic) are part of nature, pieces of a scientifically knowable 
universe.  The core of their speeches concerns how human beings relate to the gods as 
part of this kind of nature.  Cicero complicates the picture by presenting Cotta, a student 
of Academic skepticism, as calling into question not only the assumptions and arguments 
made by the other interlocutors, but also, though sometimes only indirectly, the ancestral 
traditions.  For this reason, although Cicero claims in the end to approve of Balbus’ 
account, the presentation of Cotta’s counter-arguments and refutations suggests at the 
very least that Cicero does not wish us to accept too easily Balbus’ speech as the truth, 
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nor does he expect his audience to return wholeheartedly to Rome’s ancestral gods.  The 
heart of the dialogue therefore comes to sight as an examination of how the popular 
philosophies understand piety and incorporate it into their own teachings and what 
political influence these teachings might have. 
Cicero stresses the importance of this inquiry from the outset.  He declares it to be 
“the most beautiful [noble] (pulcherrima) for the understanding of the soul and necessary 
for the regulation (moderandam) of religion” (I.1).  But he anticipates a critique of his 
undertaking the investigation according to the philosophical approach of the Academic 
school, to which he claims allegiance.  He begins to present this critique and to defend 
the Academy against it by first embarking on a defense of the prudence of the Academic 
teaching.  The Academics alone, according to Cicero, recognize that “the opinions of the 
most learned men are so varied and so much at odds” that it is “prudent to withhold 
assent” (I.1).  Prudence is thus singled out as the chief virtue of Academic skepticism, but 
Cicero knows that this same prudence leads many to believe that the Academy “snatches 
away the light and spreads night, so to speak, over things” (I.6).  Against this criticism, 
Cicero offers both a philosophical and a practical defense, echoing his appeal to both the 
practical and philosophical importance of reflection about the gods.  If, as Cicero 
suggests in the opening lines of this work, the inquiry about the nature of the gods—part 
of the quest to understand human nature—is a most beautiful or noble task, then virtue 
requires that one refuse “either to hold a false opinion or to defend without hesitation 
propositions inadequately examined and grasped” (I.1).  For what, he asks, “can be more 
base (turpius) than rashness, and what can be so rash and unworthy of the seriousness and 
steadfastness of a wise man” as inadequate and hasty judgment? (I.1).  Because it is only 
through the prudent refusal to accept what is inadequately defended that clarity is 
possible, skepticism is a necessary prerequisite in the attempt to distinguish false 
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opinions from true ones rather than an obstacle to sound judgment.  Yet the moralism 
with which Cicero here defends the skepticism of the Academy—his emphasis on the 
baseness and the lack of dignity and gravitas of the alternative—indicates his awareness 
that the criticism of skepticism is not simply abstract or epistemological, but moral and 
practical.  The light which skepticism denies us, according to the critique, is clarity about 
what is right or just and what actions are required of us at any given moment.  
For this reason, Cicero also denies that philosophical skepticism must lead to 
practical inaction. Academic skepticism, says Cicero, is not radical skepticism.  
Academics “are not those to whom nothing seems to be true” (I.12; but cf. I.60, III.79).  
They claim instead that human nature is such that we cannot judge with full certainty 
whether something is true; we can go only so far as to say that something is “probable 
(probabilia)” (I.12). Nevertheless, these probabilities are, according to Cicero, clear 
enough to “guide the life of the wise man” (I.12).72   
But this is, at best, an incomplete defense.  Cicero’s introduction also notes that 
the disagreement about the nature of the gods exists not just among the wise or educated, 
but among the “unlearned” as well (I.5).  His defense of the Academic teaching thus 
provokes his reader to wonder whether the “probable” can give guidance not only to the 
wise man, but also to the unlearned, or, to put it another way, whether a political 
community can be guided according to an acknowledgment of our limited access to the 
truth.  Cicero himself gives us reason to doubt that this is possible.  The crucial 
controversy about the nature of the gods, he writes, concerns whether they maintain an 
active concern for and presence in human affairs or are aloof and uninterested in our 
fortunes (I.2-5).  Cicero claims that the resolution of this controversy must have profound 
                                                
72 Fott thus mistakenly takes Academic skepticism to be a teaching that offers only “a method, not…any 
substantive conclusions” (2012, 153). For, as Cicero describes it, the method is important insofar as it 
ultimately leads to the clearest conclusions possible for a human being about how we ought to live. 
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political consequences.  Piety, according to Cicero, is a “tribute which must be paid to the 
gods” only if there is also a “tribute by the immortal gods” paid in return to us (I.3).  The 
introduction to De Natura Deorum thus presents a picture of piety as fundamentally a 
contract or exchange by which human beings pay the gods for the benefits they bestow 
upon us.  All other possible elements of pious devotion—reverence and holiness, for 
example—are reduced to a condition of this quid pro quo, since gods who take no interest 
in human affairs can make no claim to be owed payment by us.73  Without belief in this 
exchange of “tribute,” says Cicero, 
it is necessary that sanctity and religion are carried away. And when these are 
gone, perturbation of life and great confusion follow; and with the disappearance 
of piety towards the gods, I know, loyalty and society in the human race and 
justice, the one most excellent virtue will be carried away.  (I.3-4) 
By homing in on this part of piety, he establishes from the outset its necessity as the 
foundation of civic virtue.  Whereas he writes that the wise man can live according to the 
guidance of what he understands to be “probable” and refuses to accept inadequately 
examined opinions, Cicero claims here that justice loses its foundation without the belief 
in providential gods.  That he mentions in the same breath that piety is the foundation of 
“loyalty and society” suggests that Cicero speaks here of human beings insofar as they 
live together and are citizens or members of a regime.  He subjects to intense scrutiny in 
this work the root of Cato’s view in De Finibus that human beings “place the common 
advantage before our own” as a consequence of the belief that we live with the gods in a 
world that “is ruled by divine power” (DF III.64).  Indeed, Cicero here seems quietly to 
accept the objection which he explicitly denies, that skepticism about the gods “snatches 
                                                
73 In his speech recounting the Epicurean view, however, Velleius attempts to make the case that we ought 
to worship non-providential gods not in spite of their lack of concern for human affairs, but because of it.  
They ought to be revered, according to Velleius, for their possession of the total freedom from care to 
which human beings aspire (I.45 with 51-53). 
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away the light” by which human beings live.74  To the extent that controversy or 
uncertainty about the gods exists among the unlearned, civic virtue will be undermined. 
The good statesman, it seems, must do all he can to encourage people to accept an 
opinion about the gods which Cicero admits is philosophically uncertain.  Cicero gives an 
example of such a statesman in his De Republica.  In that work, Scipio recounts that 
under the rule of Romulus the early Romans had “spirits which were then monstrous and 
wild with eagerness for making war (DR II.27).  Numa’s great expansion of the official 
religious rites and laws was required in order to “infuse” the Romans “with a love of 
leisure and peace, through which justice and trust most easily grow strong” (DR II.26).  
Indeed, Scipio points to the religious establishments by Numa as crucial for the cohesion 
of the republic at its founding and for its ultimate longevity. In De Natura Deorum, 
however, Cicero suggests that the religious institutions are powerless without the 
underlying belief in divine providence.  Without this belief, he claims, the trust and 
concern for justice that secure the republic will wither away. 
 Nevertheless, this view does not keep Cicero from defending skepticism as a 
philosophical necessity.  His defense of the Academy includes a brief consideration, 
almost in passing, of those of his readers who wish, above all, to know his own opinions 
about the gods (I.6, 10).  To these readers, he writes that those “who are keen to learn” 
must “look to the weight of reason rather than authority,” for “the authority of those who 
claim to be teachers” often presents “an obstacle,” which causes students “to cease to 
apply their own judgment” (I.10).  By warning his readers that they should want to learn 
what reason dictates rather than what Cicero thinks, Cicero underlines the necessary 
difference between those who seek “the understanding of the soul,” and those who wish 
                                                
74 Cicero is therefore less confident than Nicgorski takes him to be that “when philosophy presents itself 
humbly, acknowledging its ignorance in the most uncertain and obscure matters, then it is most acceptable 
to intelligent and practical men” (1984, 571). 
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to undertake “the moderating of religion” (I.1), for whereas the former must subject all 
opinions to questioning, the latter is required to reinforce a particular authoritative 
opinion.   
 Cicero also offers us a glimpse of his own philosophical activity and its intimate 
connection with politics.  He states that while the opportunity to write was provided only 
by his exclusion from politics, his own philosophic study is not the fruit of a recent 
interest (I.6-7).   It is rather the case, Cicero states, that “I was most philosophizing when 
I least appeared to be doing so” (I.6, emphasis added).  To demonstrate this, Cicero calls 
our attention to his “speeches, which are filled with the opinions of the philosophers,” 
and his “familiarity with the most learned men who often graced my house” (I.6).  There 
is perhaps something playful not only in Cicero’s pointing to his acquaintance with the 
most learned men in Rome as an instance of his least appearing to philosophize, but also 
his declaration that he was most philosophizing when he would mention a philosophic 
bon mot in an oration.75  As Baraz puts it, “the actual examples of this phenomenon that 
he provides are inconsistent with the grandness of the initial claim” (2012, 138).  But this 
playfulness carries with it the serious suggestion that Cicero understands his speech-
giving, that is to say, his political activity, to be part of his philosophizing.76  And if 
Cicero was indeed most philosophizing when engaged in political activity, he suggests 
that for him, not only the observation of, but also the participation in the political life of 
his regime may have been a crucial part of his attempt to understand human nature.  To 
put it another way, Cicero indicates that he believes that his own political activity serves 
                                                
75 See, for example, Cicero’s Pro Archia, Pro Sestia, and Pro Murena. 
76 Baraz argues that Cicero uses these examples in order to convince those suspicious of philosophy that it 
has a role to play in “demonstrably approved Roman activities” and that “philosophy is not separable from 
public life, let alone a threat to it” (2012, 139).  When discussing Cicero’s view of the contribution 
philosophy might make to politics, however, she does not attend closely enough to the tension Cicero 
intimates between skepticism and the authoritative opinions that politics requires, nor does she discuss 
Cicero’s suggestion that, for him, participation in public life contributed to his philosophizing. 
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a philosophical end in addition to, but separate from, his civic obligations.  We may 
speculate that he sought to observe how his own soul was moved by his ambitions, 
passions, and feelings of civic obligation (See, for example, DR I.7-10), just as he 
observed the same workings in others.77    
Cicero’s initial praise of the Academy appears to apply, then, only to its 
theoretical prudence.  He gives us additional reason to doubt whether the prudence of the 
Academic school extends to political life when he reminds his readers that the skepticism 
required in the attempt to understand human nature is difficult to sustain on any kind of 
wide scale.  Indeed, Cicero expects many in his audience to be surprised that he defends a 
teaching that was “long ago given up” by its own practitioners (I.6).  To this objection he 
responds in two ways.  He states first that “when men die their opinions do not perish 
with them, though perhaps they suffer from the loss of their authoritative exponent 
(auctoris)” (I.11).  But he also admits that Academic skepticism is “almost bereft” of 
students in Greece, where it originated (I.11).  Moreover, as he notes this, he appeals to 
three authorities of the Academy—Socrates, Arcesilas, and Carneades—as evidence of 
the school’s greatness (I.11).  Without rejecting his own insistence on the obstacles that 
appeals to authority place in the way of clarity of judgment, Cicero indicates that the 
Academy as a school depends on the authority of its teachers as much as any other 
school.  He thus implicitly distances himself from most of the students of the Academy 
insofar as they are not able to live according to what he identifies as its fundamental 
teaching.  Cicero states, in addition, that the apparent failure of the Academy as a school 
is no fault of its own, but rather attributable to “the dullness of mankind” (I.11).  But this 
                                                
77 Cicero’s portrayal of himself is thus quite different from his portrayal in De Republica of Scipio, who 
also pursued both politics and philosophy.  For Scipio relates that he used to philosophize while engaged in 
public service, “even under the walls of Numantia itself,” but he does not suggest that his public service 
was part of, or contributed to, that inquiry (DR I.17). 
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strange and qualified praise suggests the serious difficulty that must be faced by a school 
whose basic teaching, as Cicero indicates, seem openly to fly in the face of moral 
uprightness and undermine the healthy cultivation of civic virtue.  If the establishment of 
a popular philosophic school is the method by which Academic philosophy sought in part 
to acquire the allegiance, or at least the tolerance, of those threatened by skepticism,  
Cicero suggests it has not succeeded.  Indeed, Cicero shows that the Academy—and 
therefore genuine philosophy as he understands it—is particularly ill-suited to 
popularization.  Its skeptical teaching, in the rare cases that it is truly understood, 
undermines the weight of authority that schools must bestow on their leading lights in 
order to attract new students. And when this skeptical teaching is only partially 
understood, as Cicero’s discussion of the objections against the Academy suggests it 
usually is, it is dangerous rather than beneficial both to the student and to the regime.  
Cicero follows his presentation of Academic skepticism by describing the 
ultimate goal of the dialogue as the setting out of “the opinions of the philosophers” in 
order to “judge which of them is true” (I.13).  He thus shifts from defending a philosophy 
that takes its bearings from what is “probable” or similar to the truth to speaking of the 
need to find the truth without any qualification.  He draws attention to this shift by 
following it with an oath that calls for divine aid in satisfying the need for certainty 
(I.13).  Cicero’s oath quotes from Caecilius Statius’ comedy The Fellow Youths: “gods, 
and all citizens and youths, I pray, beg, demand, implore, beseech your aid.” (I.13).78  But 
in the same breath Cicero playfully points to the absurdity of such an oath in this context.  
For he adds to this quotation an explanation that at this moment in the play a woman has 
spurned a lover’s gift, and he offers a second quotation, in which the play’s speaker 
                                                
78 Only fragments of Caecilius Statius’ plays, many of which were adaptations of Menander, remain.  Cotta 
refers to the same play at III.72-3. 
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comically calls this slight “a capital crime being committed in the city” (I.13).  Cicero 
insists that he mentions this in order to show that the dialogue’s theme is more important 
than the matter at issue in the play (I.14).  If the undermining of piety destroys justice in 
the political community, then the skeptics are guilty of the crime pointed to by the 
speaker.  But Cicero has also gone out of his way to show us that he has just associated 
the goal of his own investigation with a ridiculous comedy.  By calling attention to the 
speaker’s comic exaggeration, Cicero seems to point to the problematic fact that he has 
just set out as the purpose of this work a task that is impossible for human beings.  For if, 
as Cicero writes, we are able only to know what is “probable,” then the project to tell 
which of the philosophers’ opinions about the gods is true is beyond the limits of human 
knowledge.  Perhaps this is why Cicero must call on divine support for an inquiry that is 
skeptical of the gods themselves.  We are left wondering, then, how Academic 
philosophy, as Cicero understands it, can address the gulf between the knowledge of the 
truth that Cicero says is the aim of the dialogue and also suggests is politically necessary, 
and the limited knowledge he claims is possible.   
Cicero’s introduction thus leaves his reader with a set of questions.  He praises the 
philosophical prudence of Academic skepticism while at the same time suggesting that 
the Academy lacks the necessary political prudence.  He emphasizes the political 
necessity of belief in divine providence while openly advocating a philosophical outlook 
that refuses to accept that belief.  To add to these puzzles, Cicero’s conclusion of the 
dialogue appears to contradict his introduction.  Although he begins the work explicitly 
defending and praising the Academy, Cicero ends the dialogue by saying that, of the 
arguments made during the conversation, “it seemed to me that Balbus’ is closer to a 
semblance (similitudinem) of the truth” (III.95).  Readers of the dialogue have tended to 
understand Cicero’s conclusion as a prudential, but highly superficial, attempt to appear 
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pious in order to mask his true agreement with Cotta’s impious refutations.79  There is 
something to this reading.  Because Cicero does not pronounce Balbus to have presented 
a view that offers “a semblance of the truth,” but states only that the Stoic arrived at 
something “closer” to one, we see that in Cicero’s judgment Balbus’ account falls short 
of attaining the wisdom that is available to human beings.80  But the seriousness with 
which Cicero treats the dialogue’s theme in the introduction belies the shallowness that 
the standard interpretation would require.  If Cicero truly thought it necessary to hide the 
appearance of impiety, then De Natura Deorum must be judged a failure, for all three of 
the dialogue’s main interlocutors openly critique (to varying degrees) the ancestral gods 
of Rome.  Cicero’s presentation of the dialogue suggests instead that he did not fear great 
political repercussions for himself from accusations of impiety (Pease 1913, 29).  If his 
verdict is prudential, then, this prudence must have some source other than fear of 
persecution.    
Fott offers as an alternative interpretation the view that Cicero’s verdict in favor 
of Balbus results from Cotta’s inability to maintain the true skeptical method of 
philosophical investigation on account of his “dogmatic naturalism” (2012, 167; see also 
168, 174-6).  But Fott himself acknowledges that however badly Cotta falls short of the 
requirements of serious philosophical skepticism, Balbus—and Stoicism as a whole—
reject skepticism altogether (2012, 175; see DND II.2).  Cotta’s failures as a skeptic 
cannot fully account, then, for Cicero’s conclusion.  Instead, if Cicero’s introduction is to 
                                                
79 Among Cicero’s historical readers, Lactantius (Divine Institutes, 2.3.2) and Augustine (1998, 5.9) read 
Cicero’s conclusion this way and take Cotta as Cicero’s true spokesman.  Rosenblitt also suggests that 
Sallust read Cicero in this way (2011, 420ff).  For contemporary readers who argue for this view, see 
Burriss (1926), and Levine (1957), and against it, see Pease (1913), Wilhelmsen and Kendall (1968-69), 
Heibges (1969), and Fott (2012).  Heibges goes the farthest in attributing to Cicero a “perfect agreement 
with the Stoic teaching” (1969, 308).  Fott’s “Review of Secondary Sources” (2012 155-158) also provides 
a helpful overview of the scholarly reception of Cicero’s work.   
80 Fott notes as well the qualified nature of Cicero’s approval of Balbus (2012, 155). 
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act as our guide through dialogue, it shows that we must understand the conclusion 
according to Cicero’s two-fold concern for politics and philosophy.  Fott adds that Cotta 
“fails politically because his speeches have the effect, and maybe the purpose, of 
undermining support for religion” (2012 175), but he does not take up Cicero’s intimation 
that this may be a failure also of Academic skepticism as a school or address what it is 
about Balbus’ account that leads Cicero to give it his qualified approval.  This chapter 
will attempt to show that Balbus’ remarks over the course of the conversation suggest 
that he is the only interlocutor who both shares Cicero’s concern for the cultivation of 
civic virtue and fellowship and attempts to articulate a theology to support them.  It is, 
moreover, only when Balbus’ speech is considered alongside Cotta’s attempt to refute 
him that Cicero’s philosophical reasons for favoring Balbus’ speech in spite of the Stoic’s 
dogmatism begin to come to light.  For what Fott points to as Cotta’s deficiency as a 
skeptic is only one part of his failure to fully appreciate piety’s place in the political 
sphere.  Whereas Fott separates Cotta’s political failure from his philosophical failure, 
Cicero ultimately suggests that they are closely connected. 
THE SETTING OF THE DIALOGUE 
Cicero offers a certain amount of biographical information about his interlocutors.  
It is noted during the conversation that Cotta is a pontifex, one of the highest offices of 
the religion of the Roman republic (II.2, 168).  In addition to his priesthood, Cotta served 
as Consul in 75 BC and was well-known as an orator.81  Little is known, however, of 
Balbus and Velleius beyond what is said of them in De Natura Deorum.  Cicero notes 
that Velleius was a senator and the leading Epicurean in Rome (I.15).  Of Balbus, he says 
only that his “studies among the Stoics were so advanced that he bore comparison with 
                                                
81 One of Cotta’s speeches remains in fragment 2.44 of Sallust’s Historiae.   
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the outstanding Greeks of the School” (I.15).  Cicero also relates that he was present at 
the conversation, but as an interlocutor he is largely silent.  Balbus is thus given the 
highest rank among the interlocutors for his intellectual achievements, but he is the only 
interlocutor who is not shown in the dialogue to be involved in Roman politics.  The 
differences between Balbus and Cicero are only emphasized by the similarity in the lives 
of Cicero and Cotta.  If Cicero’s ultimate verdict in favor of Balbus implies a critique of 
Cotta, it is perhaps then also a quiet critique of the effects that the Academic school can 
have on people like Cicero himself, or of the risks of the philosophical education that 
Cicero received as a young man. 
The dialogue itself consists of four long speeches: Velleius and Balbus each 
present accounts of the nature of the gods and Cotta responds to each in turn.  About the 
date and setting of the conversation Cicero gives few details.  He relates only that he and 
the others gathered at his friend Cotta’s house during the Latin Festival (I.15).82  The 
occasion of the Latin Festival calls our attention to the conversation in Cicero’s De 
Republica, which was said to take place during the same festival approximately fifty 
years before this conversation takes place (DR I.14). As Levine notes, this celebration of 
the ancient alliance between the Latin and Roman peoples affords the interlocutors in 
both dialogues the opportunity to take the leisure necessary for their conversation without 
appearing to abandon their public business (1957, 8).  But by connecting the settings of 
the two dialogues Cicero also suggests a more important thematic connection between 
them.  In De Republica, Cicero’s Scipio discusses with his interlocutors the “nature of 
each political thing” through observation of the “paths and bends” of the republic from 
the time of its founding (DR II.45).  On the basis of these observations, Scipio teaches 
                                                
82 The drama of the dialogue can, however, be dated to 76 BC, before Cotta’s consulship in 75 BC and 
between Cicero’s travels to Greece from 79-77 BC and his service as questor in Sicily.  See Walsh’s 
introduction to his translation of the work (1997, xxxviii).  
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that “the nature of political things often defies reason” (DR II.57).  De Natura Deorum 
begins from this lesson and addresses directly the question of whether piety is the only 
corrective to the weakness of reason in political things. 
Before the conversation begins in earnest with Velleius’ account of the Epicurean 
teaching about the gods, Cicero presents a brief preliminary exchange between the 
interlocutors.  He recalls that Cotta had invited Velleius, Balbus, and the young Cicero to 
his house specifically so that Cotta could dispute about the gods with representatives of 
the Epicurean and Stoic schools (I.15-16).  Velleius interprets the addition of Cicero to 
the conversation as an attempt by Cotta to rig the conversation in his favor by bringing in 
a like-minded ally (I.17).  The young Cicero makes his final remark of the entire 
conversation to insist that “you should not at all judge me to have come as his second, but 
as a listener, and an impartial one, with independent judgment” (I.17).83   Cicero thus 
states emphatically what he indicates more gently in the introduction, that his interest lies 
not in defending the teaching of a particular school as such, but in evaluating for himself 
the merits of the different arguments about the gods, and therefore, by extension, helping 
us to do the same.  Moreover, by distancing himself not only from the Academy as a 
school, but also from Cotta in particular, Cicero also indicates that readers of the dialogue 
ought not to accept Cotta too quickly as a spokesman or mouthpiece for the older 
Cicero’s views.  Nevertheless, the dialogue’s conclusion in favor of Balbus demonstrates 
that Cicero agrees at least with Cotta’s claim that Balbus’ account of the Stoic view of the 
gods is more serious than the Epicurean account, which “does not put up a great fight 
about the immortal gods” (III.3).  It will be helpful, then, to turn to Balbus’ speech in 
order to understand what this seriousness consists in. 
                                                
83 Cicero’s first remark notes that if a Peripatetic had been invited, “no school of thought—at least of the 
respectable ones—would go unrepresented” (I.16). 
 89 
 
BALBUS’ POLITICAL PRUDENCE AND NATURALISTIC PIETY 
The significance of Balbus’ speech can best be seen if we first consider the short 
exchanges that take place immediately preceding and following it.  Balbus takes over the 
conversation from Cotta in Book II.  He begins not by delving immediately into the Stoic 
account of the gods, but by reminding Cotta of his civic obligations as a priest.  Cotta 
declares, at the beginning of his response to Velleius, that “my mind more easily 
apprehends why something is false rather than why it is true,” and asserts that “if you 
were to ask me my view of the nature of the gods, I should perhaps have nothing to 
reply” (I.57; see also I.91, II.2-3).  Balbus, however, cautions Cotta that, as “both a 
philosopher and priest,” he “should not have erroneous and unsettled opinions about the 
immortal gods like the Academics, but steady and certain ones, like us” (II.2).  When he 
concludes his speech, Balbus offers a second appeal to caution.  He describes his own 
speech as an account of what “must be said,” directed especially to Cotta as “a leading 
citizen and pontiff” (II.168).  He now warns Cotta in his capacity as powerful citizen 
rather than as a philosopher and contrasts the account of what “must be said” with what 
Balbus calls Cotta’s own habit of “rhetorical exercises” (II.168).  Taken together, Balbus’ 
warnings suggest that he attempts to convey a lesson that is as much about the practice of 
political prudence as it is about the nature of divine rule of the universe.  Indeed, Balbus 
adds that “being accustomed to argue for and against the gods is bad and impious, 
whether sincerely (ex animo), or as a pretense” (II.168).  But rather than take Balbus’ 
advice, Cotta repeats his assertion that he “is able to say more easily what [he] does not 
think than what [he] does,” and notes now that this is true “especially about such things” 
as the gods (II.2-3).  Whereas Cicero claims that Academic skepticism is the most 
difficult teaching to live by and to understand (I.11-12), Cotta adheres to it because it 
seems easier to him to refute than to offer a positive explanation for things, and he does 
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so especially where such an approach, according to Cicero and, it seems, to Balbus, is 
civically dangerous.  By offering an account in his speech not simply of what he thinks 
about the nature of the gods, but of what he “think[s] must be said,” Balbus thus presents 
to Cotta—and to Cicero—one model of the political prudence that he attempts to 
convince them is necessary.      
The opening stages of Balbus’ speech further indicate his agreement with 
Cicero’s assertion that piety plays a central role in healthy politics.  But whereas Cicero 
appeals in the introduction to piety’s role in inculcating virtue, Balbus draws our attention 
first to the way religion serves the practical advantage or interests of the regime. 
Although Balbus dismisses the stories “of Mopsus, Teiresias, Amphiaraus, Calchas, and 
Helenus” as “baseless fictions of fables,” he presents seven episodes from Roman history 
when divine beings are said to have presented themselves to men, which he claims offer 
evidence that “the gods often make their effective presence felt” in our lives (II.7, 6).  He 
draws from the recollections and reports of statesmen, generals, and armies during the 
wars and upheavals that accompanied Rome’s attempts to establish the dominance of the 
republic over the rest of Italy and later to expand the empire.  Balbus concludes that 
Roman history shows decisively that “the republic was enlarged by the command of 
those who obeyed [the dictates] of religion” (II.8).  But to show that the regime benefits 
when it is guided by pious rulers is not to prove that the gods do, in fact, reveal their 
presence to human beings.  Indeed, Balbus’ recounting of these reports about the gods are 
no less hearsay than the fables of the tradition that he dismisses as fictions.  As such, they 
cannot act as the proof of divine presence that Balbus takes them to be.  But taken 
together, they nevertheless seem to suggest that in politics and war the hopes and fears 
about the gods have a particularly powerful influence on the soul and that it is therefore 
by observing political life that piety can be most clearly understood.  At this stage in 
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Balbus’ speech, Cicero goes only so far as to present this observation for our reflection, 
but he has already indicated in the introduction that he believes politics to be the arena in 
which human nature can best be understood (I.6).   
At any rate, Balbus praises the strength of Roman piety, which he declares grows 
“greater and better in our day” (II.5).  In spite of this declaration, however, Balbus admits 
that piety in Rome is not nearly as strong as he initially suggests.  He notes first that not 
even old wives are now “so senseless as to be greatly afraid of those monsters below that 
were formerly believed in” (II.5).  Although Balbus insists at first that this is an 
advantageous development, he soon laments that “the most important activities of the 
state, including the wars that ensure its safety, are conducted without taking the auspices” 
because of the “carelessness of the nobility” (II.9).  It was only in “the times of our 
forebears” that Roman rulers were guided by the dictates of religion.  Yet Balbus, who 
alone among the interlocutors is concerned by this weakening of religious observance, 
does not attempt to defend or resurrect the ancestral religion of Rome.  If Cicero does not, 
through Balbus, seek to show how one might refortify the old religion, he seems, then, to 
leave only two possible resolutions.  Either the popular philosophical theologies of the 
schools, of which Stoicism is the most serious alternative, can take the place of the old 
beliefs, or some other ground for the cultivation of virtue must be sought.84   
Indeed, Cicero points to the benefits of piety in political affairs when Balbus turns 
next to relate the story of Tiberius Gracchus’ cancellation of an election during the 
consulship of Publius Scipio and Gaius Figulus.  A death during the election indicated 
that the auguries had been taken improperly (II.10-11).  As Balbus tells it, Gracchus’ 
                                                
84 This other ground could, of course, be a new religion.  It is perhaps striking that Cicero does not 
explicitly entertain that possibility in this work.  We may perhaps attribute this to the fact that the dialogue 
focuses on what happens to piety when it is filtered through popular philosophy and whether philosophy or 
some form of rational enlightenment can ultimately perform the civic function of religion. 
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decision to cancel the election when he could have concealed the impropriety reflects the 
deep piety of the previous generation of rulers and their devotion to the good of the 
republic.  But Cicero intimates that a different conclusion is possible.  Balbus mentions in 
passing that Gracchus’ first thought was to complete the election in spite of the death, but 
he then changed his mind, perceiving that he had disturbed the religious scruples of the 
people (II.10).  It is only after Gracchus came to this realization that he admitted to 
having taken the auguries improperly and cancelled the election.  Balbus thus professes a 
pious interpretation of the story of Tiberius Gracchus, but shows, perhaps unwittingly,  
that Gracchus ultimately feared the anger of the people more than that of the gods (cf. 
Cicero’s discussion of the same episode in DD, I.33 with II.74-75).  Although Balbus 
does not reveal what Gracchus would have gained had the election stood, his account 
suggests that the piety of the people restrained Gracchus’ pursuit of his own advantage 
over the good of the republic.  But, as Balbus has claimed, the force of popular piety has 
dwindled and with it, as a result, the restraints which directed citizens and statesmen to 
act justly, even if only for prudential reasons.   He thus goes on to present in its place a 
version of the Stoic cosmology and theology which, he claims, gives rise to “piety, to 
which is joined justice and the rest of the virtues” (II.153).       
Balbus divides his account into four sections, addressing the existence of the 
gods, the nature of the gods, their ordering of the world, and their concern for human 
beings (II.3). But the central claims of all four stages rest on two separate kinds of 
arguments that Balbus makes in various forms throughout his speech.  He makes, on one 
hand, what he presents as rational inferences from the order of the cosmos to a 
conception of nature itself as divine, rational, and wise.  On this basis, he elaborates a 
version of Stoic theology that synthesizes aspects of the traditional religion with a more 
rationalistic natural science.  But Balbus also appeals, on the other hand, to a feeling of 
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awe and reverence which, he asserts, necessarily accompanies the contemplation of the 
order of the cosmos.  Ultimately, it is the appeal to this feeling that acts as the foundation 
of both sets of Balbus’ arguments.  As will be shown in what follows, Balbus argues for 
the existence of perfectly rational gods governing a perfectly rational universe largely on 
the basis of non-rational evidence.     
Balbus explains that the Stoic Cleanthes85 taught that there are four separate 
causes that lead to “notions of the gods [being] formed in the minds of men” (II.13).  
These, he states, are the recognition of the gods’ foreknowledge of the future, inferences 
from the advantages of our natural climate and resources, fear of threatening or 
inexplicable natural phenomena, and, finally, the order and beauty of the objects in the 
heavens (II.14-15).  Balbus purports to prove that the gods have knowledge of the future 
which they communicate to us through auguries.  He states that “if there are interpreters 
of certain beings, it is necessary that those beings must themselves exist; but there are 
interpreters of the gods; therefore we must acknowledge that the gods exist” (II.12).  To 
support this claim, he compares the art of augury to the art of medicine and reminds his 
interlocutors that just as we do not reject the truth of medical science because sick 
patients are not always cured, so must we refrain from rejecting the art of prophecy even 
though predictions are not always born out by events (II.12).  The account of Tiberius 
Gracchus has already shown, however, that the use of the art of augury is no sure 
evidence of intervention by the gods.  Moreover, Cotta’s eventual reply to this claim 
points to a fundamental difference between arts of medicine and prophecy that Balbus 
fails to address: whereas the art of medicine is potentially available to all who wish to 
pursue it, the art of divination cannot be wholly grasped or practiced except by those 
                                                
85 Cleanthes was head of the Stoic School in the third Century, B.C.E 
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select human beings who possess a peculiar connection to or favor of the gods (III.14-
15).  Balbus offers no evidence that divination by augurs ought to be trusted except their 
“great authority” (II.12). We may wonder whether Balbus himself accepts the sufficiency 
of that authority, but if we attend to the guidance that Cicero offers in his own name 
about the weight of authority to those who wish to learn, then the weakness of Balbus’ 
argument becomes clear (I.10).  Indeed, Balbus’ speech to this point has done far less to 
demonstrate that the gods have a presence in our lives than it has to show the belief in the 
gods’ presence has, in Rome’s past, helped to cultivate a devotion in rulers to the good of 
the regime and, failing this, to restrain them from acting in ways that harm it.  
Balbus’ account of Cleanthes’ argument that ideas about the gods are rooted in 
fear of natural phenomena is similarly weak.  He reminds his interlocutors that in Rome 
the appearance of “twin suns” in the year of Publius Africanus’ death “terrified the 
people,” and led them “to suspect the existence of some heavenly and divine power” 
(II.14-15; cf. DR I.15), but, as Cotta later notes, Balbus gives no argument to suggest that 
the people were correct in their assumption (III.16-17).   
Much of Balbus’ speech follows from the advantages of our natural surroundings 
and the ordering of the cosmos, the second and fourth causes of piety identified by 
Cleanthes.  Balbus again treats these causes as though they prove that gods exist.  The 
beauty and order of the cosmos that one comes to recognize through the contemplation of 
nature is, according to Balbus, the “greatest” of the causes of belief identified by 
Cleanthes (II.15).  Balbus argues that observation of the uniform and continual motion of 
the stars and planets proves decisively that “the movements of nature are governed by 
some mind,” because order, he asserts, cannot be the result of chance (II.15).  But, 
claiming to follow Chrysippus, Balbus adds that anything that accomplishes what the 
reason and power of human beings are unable to accomplish is superior to human beings.  
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And, since the heavenly things could not have been created by human beings, that which 
created them is superior to us (II.16).  About this creator Balbus asks, 
What better could you call this than god? For if the gods do not exist, what can 
there be in the nature of things better than man?... But that a man should think that 
there is nothing in all the world (mundo)86 better than himself is an insane 
arrogance. (II.16)  
At stake, then, is not only an inference about the character of the universe, but the 
question of the support that the universe gives to our moral commitments. The arrogance 
that Balbus identifies is a false sense of superiority, or a kind of injustice.  An arrogant 
person takes or believes he deserves to take more of the good things than he truly 
deserves.  Balbus’ concern is, therefore, a moral one above all.  He senses, or fears, that 
without something more powerful protecting and watching over us, the restraints that 
hold us back from seeking what is not rightfully ours would inevitably weaken.87  To 
defend against this possibility, he presents an apparently simple logical conclusion: 
“therefore,” he claims, “there is something better,” and these are the gods (II.16).  He 
does not take up the implication that it would not be arrogance for human beings to think 
that we are the best things in the cosmos if there are no gods.  Balbus concludes that the 
gods exist because the alternative would be morally problematic.  In this way, Cicero 
shows Balbus falling into the same error as is made by Cato in De Finibus.  Just as Cato 
shapes his account of human nature to fit his commitment to virtue as the only good 
(rather than to fit a rational observation of human beings), Balbus constructs an account 
of nature to fit or satisfy his moral hopes (DF III.11, 17).  But the desire for or even 
necessity of something does not make it fact.  Balbus does not seem to recognize that his 
                                                
86 Mundo is translated as “world,” but also carries the connotation of the cosmos as a whole. 
87 Compare the moralism of Balbus’ statement with Aristotle’s reflection on the meaning of wisdom and 
prudence in the Nicomachean Ethics: “it is strange if someone supposes the political art or prudence to be 
most serious, if a human being is not the best of things in the cosmos” (2011, 1141a20-22). What Balbus 
calls an “insane arrogance” Aristotle invites his reader to consider as a serious possibility.   
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fear of the injustice to which atheism may lead points only to the potential moral, and 
perhaps political, benefit of piety, rather than the truth that such a superior divine power 
as Balbus describes exists.   
Nevertheless, Balbus attempts to locate this power in nature itself.  He describes a 
rational intelligence that “holds together the whole world and preserves it” but also 
attributes to the whole of nature and to many of its constituent parts certain 
anthropomorphic characteristics which together support a belief in divine providence 
(II.29).  He claims that the “ruling principle” (principatus) of nature both has and “is 
owed supremacy” over the whole, for it is “the most worthy of power and rule” (II.29).  
Balbus thus emphatically ascribes to the god of nature the moral authority to rule over all 
things.  Indeed, he seems to draw the fact of its rule from the assertion that it is most 
deserving.   
Balbus then winds his way through a picture of the character of this ruling 
principle.  From the moral authority to rule, he goes on to infer that that which rules over 
nature necessarily possesses the perfection of all the excellences characteristic of the 
beings within nature and especially of human beings (II.30, 32, 37).  As a result, he 
attributes to the ruling principle also sensation, perfect reason, wisdom, and virtue (II.30, 
39).  Initially “the ruling principle of the world” is said to belong to the world itself as a 
whole, the “god” whose “divine nature contains all the force of the world” (II.30).  
Balbus adds, however, that “once we have recognized that the world possesses this 
divinity, we must assign that same divinity to the stars” (II.39).  He argues, moreover, 
that the heat contained by the stars proves that they are living beings, and that their living 
“in the aether” shows that “it is fitting that they have sense and intelligence, from which 
it follows that the stars must be numbered among the gods” (II.42, 43).  Thus, not only is 
the world as a whole divine, but so are some of its parts.  Indeed, Balbus claims that the 
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regular motion of all the things in cosmos shows that they must all be gods as well, 
“possessing intelligence, mind, and reason” and also prudence (II.54-55; see also 50-53).   
But Balbus does not stop at attributing divinity to “those beings whose notable 
power and distinguished appearance we behold, namely, the sun, moon, planets and fixed 
stars, and the heavens and the world itself” (II.80).  He adds surprisingly that “all things 
that are contained in the entire world for the great use and benefit of the human race are 
gods” (II.80).  Balbus goes to such great lengths to prove the gods' concern for human 
beings that he attributes divinity to anything that serves to benefit them.  The intention of 
this surprising attribution of divinity to everything that benefits human beings is indicated 
by a brief digression he makes near the middle of his speech comparing the accounts of 
the gods presented by “the wisest men of Greece and our ancestors” and that of the poets 
(II.60-72).  According to Balbus, both the Roman fathers and the wisest of the Greeks 
“established and named” many “divine natures” because of their “great benefits for us” 
(II.60).  These men did not merely describe things that are divine, but rather, as Balbus 
suggests by noting that they established (constitutae) the divine natures, made a 
deliberate decision to give the name of gods to things, such as food and wine, that are not 
divine (II.60).  They also assigned divine status to beneficial qualities, such as faith, 
mind, virtue, and honor (II.61).  But Balbus criticizes the ancient men for lacking real 
understanding of the good for human beings in their project of deifying the beneficial 
things, that is, for deifying false goods, as well as for deifying bad things.  For not only 
were the virtues called gods, but also “wealth, safety, concord, freedom, and victory,” 
whose “force was so great that they were not able to be ruled without a god” (II.61).  
These Balbus likens to the vices “desire (cupidinis), pleasure, and Venus Lubentina,” 
which owe their deification more to the lack of control which human beings have over 
them than to any benefit they offer us (II.61).  Yet Balbus continues to maintain that all 
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“these gods owe their divine status to the great benefits which they bestowed” (II.62).  He 
thus begins, in what follows, to elaborate on the crucial error made by the ancestors and 
wise men and to show how his own account of the gods corrects that error while 
maintaining their original intention.   
Indeed, Balbus drops for a time the claim that the wisest men of Greece had 
anything to do with the ancestral account of the gods which he describes.  He explains 
instead that “human life and common custom” deify the excellent men who benefit 
human beings (II.62).  That he attributes this practice to custom rather than wisdom 
suggests that Balbus views this practice with less than enthusiastic approval.  He 
confirms this when next he criticizes the poets for “pouring from natural science 
(physica) a multitude of gods…clothed in human form…cramming our lives with every 
kind of superstition as a result” (II.63).  The poets, according to Balbus, corrupt our 
understanding of nature, the object of true religion, by impiously adorning it with human 
appearance and emotion.  But what Balbus calls superstition—the depiction of the gods 
in Homer and Hesiod—is the ancestral religion of Greece and Rome.  Balbus attacks the 
poets for manipulating natural science such that “the good and useful discoveries from 
natural science have resulted in the creation of false and fictitious deities” (II.70).  He 
attacks especially their presentation of the gods with all the vices and frailties 
characteristic of human beings.  They cultivate “false opinions, troublesome errors and 
superstitions” by foolishly portraying the gods as wildly passionate, often disturbed and 
angry, lustful, and petty, (II.70).  Balbus relates that it took Zeno and his successors to 
expose the lies of the poets by revealing the natural phenomena that lay under the poets’ 
adornments.  Thus, according to Zeno, Hesiod’s depiction of the mutilation of Caelus 
(Ouranos) by Saturn (Kronos) and Saturn’s imprisonment by Jupiter each describe 
particular astronomical phenomena (II.63-65, 66-69).     
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Balbus’ denial that goods of fortune such as freedom and security are true goods 
insofar as they are beyond our control calls to mind Cicero’s argument in De Finibus that 
this part of the Stoic teaching contains a crucial philosophical and political error.  Had 
Cicero conversed with Balbus as he shows himself doing later in his life with Cato, he 
might have pointed, for example, to the necessity of freedom for the honor which Balbus 
claims was rightly identified by the ancestors as a good (II.61). Balbus’ own 
acknowledgment that these objects, many of which are obtained and cultivated primarily 
in political life, were so deeply sought after as to be given divine status shows that he 
ought to reconsider whether the desire for them can ever be jettisoned on a wide scale.  
Nevertheless, Balbus, who exhorts Cotta to reflect more cautiously about his political 
activity—both for the sake of his civic obligations and for the sake of his philosophical 
understanding—does not see that his advice and his own evidence point away from the 
teaching he professes.  Balbus’ critique of the poets reveals a scorn for the piety of his 
ancestors which seems to contradict his insistence to Cotta that it is necessary to support 
the ancestral religion (II.71).   
Balbus uses the exposure of the great stupidity of the old myths, however, to 
support a transformed naturalistic piety that he defends in its place.  His account re-
ascends from what is sanctioned by “human life and common custom” to that which “not 
only the philosophers, but also our ancestors” approve (II.72).  They return now to lend 
weight to Balbus’ distinction “between superstition and religion” (II.72).  According to 
Balbus, they understood the distinction as one between piety that was “deficient” because 
it was aroused by their fear of death and piety that was “praiseworthy” because rooted in 
careful attention to worship and understanding (II.72).  Balbus himself, however, 
reformulates the distinction between superstition and religion so that it depends on the 
extent to which one is able to worship the gods with “mind and voice” uncorrupted by 
 100 
“the names which custom has imposed on them” (II.71).  Zeno’s method of applying the 
ancestral names to nature thus seems to be something of a middle ground that points, for 
Balbus, toward the peak of piety, understood as the contemplation of the cosmos 
unencumbered by the residues of custom. 
But Balbus’ presentation of the contemplation of the stars as the peak of piety also 
contains a criticism of what he takes to be the philosophic understanding of natural 
science.  He relates the story of a shepherd in Accius’ Medea who, having never before 
seen a ship, catches sight of Jason’s Argo on the sea. The shepherd “at first sight 
imagines that he sees something lifeless and lacking sense, but later, when the signs are 
clearer, he begins to suspect” that the ship is “divine and new” (II.89-90).  But whereas 
the shepherd came to see the divine hand responsible for the Argo, the philosophers, says 
Balbus, “seem to harbor not even a suspicion of the immense marvels of sky and earth” 
(II.90).  The philosophers, according to Balbus, do not accept the premise that observable 
order necessarily indicates a divine source.  Their mistake, in his view, is that, although 
they study astronomy, they do not let “the first sight of the world confuse them,” and thus 
have never admired “the wonderful adornment of the sky” (II.90, 94).  Balbus argues that 
when we look at the heavens we should allow ourselves to be filled with the feeling of 
wonder and amazement that would come immediately to people who set eyes upon the 
universe and its workings for the first time (II.94-9; II.17).  Against the philosophers’ 
refusal to be enchanted by the contemplation of the heavens, Balbus quotes a passage of 
Aristotle at length to describe this feeling and to show that, having encountered for the 
first time “the power and beauty” of the earth and “beheld the risings and settings of all 
those heavenly bodies, and their prescribed, unchangeable courses through all eternity,” 
people “would certainly believe that gods existed and that these great manifestations were 
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the works of gods” (II.95).88  According to Balbus, Aristotle corrects the mistake of the 
philosophers because he understands the feeling of wonderment Balbus appeals to. Yet 
Balbus’ quotation leaves as an open question whether Aristotle accepts this feeling as a 
trustworthy or definitive guide to the character of the universe.  Indeed, Cicero may 
quietly hint to us that Aristotle’s understanding differs from Balbus’, for Balbus stops 
short of presenting Aristotle’s evaluation of that belief.  After relating Aristotle’s 
description of the people who see the sky for the first time, Balbus says only “thus far 
Aristotle” (II.96).  It is only once Balbus describes a second hypothetical scenario of his 
own in which people come to be impressed by the order of the universe that he concludes 
that we cannot fail to see that “this is achieved not merely by reason, but by reason which 
is preeminent and divine” (II.97).  For their part, according to Balbus, “the philosophers” 
to whom he refers but never names, are not attuned to this feeling at all.  And Aristotle, 
insofar as he suggests an alternative to their disenchanted rationalism, is not called a 
philosopher by Balbus.  Against the philosophic attitude, Balbus wishes us to embrace 
the feeling of awe at the beauty of the ordered cosmos as indicative of and evidence for 
the goodness and wisdom at its core.  He encourages us to “investigate the causes of the 
universe” (II.97).  Yet what Balbus calls the knowledge of the universe that comes from 
this investigation not only embraces, but is founded upon, what Balbus himself calls a 
confusion, one which he believes we should seek to maintain rather than attempt to 
resolve.   
Cicero brings to the fore the tension in this argument when Balbus next attempts 
to demonstrate the manifestly intelligent design of the universe.  According to Balbus, the 
capacity to deduce the rationality at work in the universe from observation of its order is 
                                                
88 Balbus quotes from Aristotle’s dialogue On Philosophy, now lost. 
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peculiarly human, and we make this deduction in the same way that we deduce skilled 
craftsmanship from observation of a beautiful clock (II.97).  Balbus notes, however, that 
when we behold the cosmos we also feel that it was “created with such a degree of 
intelligence (consilio) as our own intelligence fails totally to comprehend” (II.97).  
Balbus’ argument thus rests on a contradiction.  He claims, on one hand, that because of 
the fundamental similarity between human and divine nature, perfect understanding is 
available to all human beings of the universe and the divine power that controls it.  But, 
on the other, he also claims that the excellences of this divine power so far surpass our 
own that it is impossible for human nature to grasp it.  The order of the cosmos remains, 
in a crucial way, a mystery to human beings. This mystery is perhaps as much, if not 
more, the source of the feeling of awe to which Balbus appeals than is our comprehension 
of the universe.  As if to emphasize this contradiction, Cicero relates that just as Balbus 
turns to an account of the kinds of observations of nature he claims act as the proof of 
divine rationality and beneficence (II.98-134), he declares that “we may now abandon the 
refinements of argument,” gently underscoring Balbus’ departure from the standards of 
the rationality he purports to revere. 
As proof of the “providence and care of nature,”  Balbus extends Cleanthes’ claim 
to find evidence of divine beneficence in our natural resources to the many benefits that 
“the gods” have given human beings in the form of our body and the faculties of our 
mind (II.134-153).  Balbus begins and ends this account by reminding us of the special 
place that human beings have in the cosmos.  Chief among the gifts of nature is that “she 
has raised men from the ground and made them stand tall and erect, so that by gazing on 
the sky they could acquire knowledge of the gods” (II.140). We are born on the earth, 
but, according to Balbus, we are not truly “natives and dwellers there” (II.140). Balbus 
seems to suggest by implication that our natural home is with the gods in the heavens.  
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Like Cato, Balbus articulates an understanding of the human nature that “forget[s] the 
body and plac[es] the highest good not in the whole but in a part of itself” (DF IV.34).  
Cicero thus reveals in Balbus the same hope for immortality that Balbus himself says led 
“human life and custom” to deify great men and that led people troubled by 
“superstition” to pray continuously that their children would outlive them (II.62, 72).  
Balbus’ account encourages us to find our greatest fulfillment in the lofty permanence 
and order of nature rather than in our own activity or in the pursuit of objects of our 
desire, both of which are inevitably tied to this-worldly concerns that change with and 
depend upon circumstances outside of our control.  We ought to recognize, says Balbus, 
that “human reason…has penetrated the sky,” and that by observing and contemplating 
the cosmos, “the mind arrives at knowledge of the gods, from which arises piety, to 
which is joined justice and the rest of the virtues” (II.153, see also II.147-148).  And 
while Balbus defends the Stoic view that “immortality…has no relevance to the good 
life,” his explanation of the goods attained by contemplation suggest that he is not able to 
hold strictly to this doctrine (II.153).89 
On the basis of this contemplation, says Balbus, we come to recognize not only 
that human beings alone can contemplate the heavens, but also that we alone share with 
the gods the world as a common home made for our mutual benefit (II.154).  Earlier in 
his speech Balbus explains that the gods have “the same reason, the same truth…and the 
same law which enjoins right and rejects wrong” to human beings (II.79).  He thus gives 
the impression that our good accords with and is secured by the workings of the divine 
order which he has praised throughout his speech.  However, Cicero quietly shows the 
difficulty Balbus has defending this belief as he takes up the task of describing the many 
                                                
89 Thus, while Pangle correctly notes that Balbus does not appeal in his account of the gods to an afterlife, 
Cicero shows a certain hope for immortality lurking under the surface of Balbus’ claims (1998, 249n.53).  
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ways we can see that the universe is made for our benefit (II.155-163).  Although Balbus 
continues to maintain that human beings and gods “alone use reason and live by justice 
and law,” he also admits that the world is only “almost” (quasi) the common home of 
gods and men (II.153-4, c. 79).  Balbus does not explain why, if human beings and gods 
share virtue and reason and live according to the same law, they do not share the universe 
also as a common home without qualification.  Moreover, though Balbus concedes early 
in his speech that human nature, while capable of reason and virtue, is not perfect, but 
only a “small part” of perfection, he does not here draw the simple conclusion that the 
gods have a greater share of rule because of their greater, or complete, perfection of 
virtue (II.38,3 9; c. II.16, 97).  Instead, Balbus deepens the ambiguity when he points to 
the relationship of Athens and Sparta as emblematic of the relationship of gods and men 
(II.154).  He claims that “just as Athens and Sparta were founded for the Athenians and 
Spartans, and that everything in those cities is rightly said to belong to those peoples, so 
all that exists…must be regarded as the possession of gods and men” (II.154).  Balbus’ 
surprising analogy helps to obscure, rather than emphasize, the gulf that separates human 
beings from the gods insofar as he likens them to two human regimes.  But in doing so, 
Balbus introduces a more deeply problematic view of the relationship.  Athens and Sparta 
are most famous to us, as they were known in Rome, either as uneasy and suspicious 
allies in the ancient war against the Persians or as enemies in the Peloponnesian war.  
Their initial cooperation depended upon a powerful external threat and began to fall apart 
almost as soon as that threat was even temporarily removed.  The territories and 
possessions Balbus alludes to were, moreover, contested by empire-building and 
colonizing armies.  The Athenians and Spartans fought not only over their own 
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possessions, but also over opposing conceptions of what justice and the law require.90  If 
the gods relate to human beings as the Athenians did to the Spartans, that is, as 
adversaries, then it can no longer be clear whether or to what extent the gods care about 
the human good or enforce human justice.  
The problematic character of Balbus’ presentation of divine providence persists as 
he attempts to prove that the gods care for individuals just as much as they do for 
mankind (II.164).  We must not reject the belief in the gods’ care for individuals, Balbus 
claims, “just because a storm has damaged someone’s cornfields” (II.167).  He argues 
instead that the “gods attend to important issues and disregard minor things” (II.167).  
And yet the kind of event that Balbus describes as minor is precisely the sort of 
misfortune that human beings pray that the gods will prevent.  Balbus concedes this when 
he notes that victims of misfortune are usually regarded as the objects of “divine hatred 
or neglect” (I.167).  But by this admission Balbus greatly reduces the greatness and 
splendor of divine power to which he has appealed throughout his speech.  He gives no 
reason at all why the gods should not or cannot attend to all individuals rather than only 
the great ones.  But Cicero indicates that Balbus is perhaps cognizant of this difficulty by 
the evidence Balbus gives to affirm the gods’ care for great men.  To prove that the great 
men of Roman and Greek history were always attended by “divine aid,” Balbus appeals 
to Homer (II.165-166).  Appearing to forget his critique of the false opinions and 
superstitions cultivated by the poets, Balbus points to Homer’s portrayal of the heroes 
and the gods who acted as their companions as authoritative proof of the gods’ active 
concern for human beings (II.166).  In this way, Cicero shows that even if Balbus is 
unaware of the tension in his speech, Cicero himself recognizes that the truth about 
                                                
90 See, for example, the speech of the Athenian visitors to Sparta in defense of the Athenian empire and the 
Spartan king Archidamus’ speech concerning whether to go to war in Thucydides’ History (I.73-1.85). 
 106 
divine providence is at least not as obvious as Balbus here asserts.  Nevertheless, Cicero’s 
ultimate approval of Balbus’ account at the end of the dialogue indicates that in some 
way he agrees with or learned from it. Balbus attempts to formulate a kind of piety that 
supports virtue through a teaching about nature somewhat more rational than the 
ancestral religion and, therefore, somewhat closer to the rational pursuit of knowledge 
which Balbus believes is the highest human good.  Cicero’s subsequent presentation of 
Cotta’s refutation of Balbus suggests, however, that Cicero is not satisfied that Balbus’ 
account of the gods is successful in either its political or philosophical aims; perhaps 
Balbus fails in both.  To understand Cicero’s appreciation of Balbus’ successes and his 
failures, it is necessary, then, to examine Cotta’s reply. 
COTTA’S REBUTTALS 
Cotta, who has already admitted to his guests that he is attracted to Academic 
skepticism because he finds it easier than defending any positive claims, comes to sight  
as intellectually lazy, on one hand, and potentially civically irresponsible, on the other.  
Moreover, in the short interlude after Balbus’ speech, Cicero shows that Cotta is not 
interested in learning from his conversation with Balbus, in spite of his repeated 
protestations that his “intention is not so much to refute…as to seek guidance about 
points [he] did not understand” (III.1, 4).  Whereas Cicero himself attends the 
conversation in order to listen and evaluate what he hears, Cotta spends the time in which 
Balbus is speaking “pondering what arguments I might say against [him]” (III.1, cf. I.17).  
In other words, Cotta is less concerned with understanding Balbus’ presentation of Stoic 
theology and philosophy than he is in devising refutations of it.  Cotta is also not 
bothered by the possibility that even refutations require understanding of one’s opponent.  
Thus, as he does in De Finibus, Cicero again seems to indicate to his readers a certain 
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deficiency in the conversation that he describes in this work.  Cotta raises the possibility 
of continuing the conversation in a dialectical manner, asking Balbus whether he 
“prefer[s] to answer my queries individually…or to hear out my whole discourse” (III.4).  
Balbus, however, suspects that Cotta’s Socratic-sounding declaration of his own 
ignorance and desire to learn is insincere.  Although Balbus claims to “prefer to respond” 
to questions in turn if Cotta “truly wishes” to hear explanations, he leaves the choice to 
his counterpart (III.4).  Cotta decides to “proceed as the speech (oratio) leads us” and 
ultimately delivers an oration, rather than taking up Balbus’ offer to respond to his 
questions point by point (III.5).  Whereas Balbus’ long speech is consistent with his 
admonition to Cotta that one should profess opinions that are “steady and certain” (II.2), 
Cotta’s lack of interest in or refusal for the most part to hear Balbus’ potential responses 
to his questions contradicts his own claim that he seeks above all clarity about what he 
does not understand (c. III.19).   
At the same time as he reintroduces these doubts about Cotta’s philosophic 
seriousness, Cicero also uses this interlude in the conversation to bring back to the fore 
the political import of the discussion.  Cotta follows his insistence on his desire to learn 
from Balbus with a response to Balbus’ disapproval of the cavalier attitude with which 
Cotta seems to approach the questions about the gods (II.168). To this objection Cotta 
claims to understand that “I am not just Cotta, but also a priest” and 
that I should defend the beliefs about the immortal gods which we have inherited 
from our ancestors … I shall indeed defend them, and I have always done so; no 
words from any person, whether learned or unlearned will ever budge me from 
the views which I have inherited from our ancestors. (III.5) 
Cotta’s response seems at first to best Balbus’ own civic concern by repeatedly 
emphasizing the ancestral authority above all, and explicitly above the authority of  “any 
eminent Stoic” (III.5).  Whereas Balbus attacked the superstitions encouraged by 
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ancestral custom, Cotta says that he has “never regarded…our religion with contempt” 
(III.6).  Cotta appeals first to Romulus and Numa, who, by their establishment of the 
auspices and religious ritual “laid the foundations of our state,” and then to “the supreme 
benevolence of the immortal gods,” without whose favor Rome would “never have 
achieved such greatness” (III.6).  He thus seems to echo Cicero’s claim in the 
introduction that devotion to providential gods is the necessary foundation of the success 
of a political community.  But in the same breath that Cotta seems to offer a satisfactory 
reply to Balbus’ objection, he begins to undermine his own declaration of piety and 
fidelity to his civic obligations.  He adds, to Balbus, “since you are a philosopher, I must 
exact from you a rationale of religion, whereas I am to lend assent to our forebears even 
when no rationale is offered” (III.6).  Piety and philosophy, according to Cotta, view the 
world through different lenses.  Whereas piety takes as its guide divine and ancestral 
authority, philosophy, as Cicero also writes in the introduction, rejects authority of any 
kind (I.10, III.9-10).  But Cicero indicates a problem with Cotta’s claim to hold this 
position.  Since Cotta has already established that no one can alter or move him from his 
belief, Balbus justly wonders how or in what way Cotta could “wish to be instructed by 
him” (III.7).  Cotta responds that he approaches “this discussion as if I have never heard a 
word about the immortal gods, or given a thought to them” (III.7).  But this reply should 
not satisfy us.  Cotta seems here to suggest that he can maintain both the philosophic 
rejection of authority and the pious deference to authority in his soul at the same time.  
For himself he accepts the weight of ancestral authority, but when confronted by a 
purportedly rational account of the gods, he counters it on the basis of reason without any 
regard to that authority (III.10).  But Cotta fails to explain why a truly pious person 
would wish to engage in such an activity, or what, as a political man, he would expect to 
gain from it.  Indeed, the same ancestral authority Cotta claims to uphold would regard as 
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impious the ignorance about the gods from which Cotta claims to begin.91   Since one 
who has never heard of the gods cannot have heard of the traditional religion, so far from 
confirming his reverence for the gods, Cotta’s claim to speak as one who has never heard 
of them relieves him of the necessity to be mindful of the religious institutions that he, 
only moments before, claimed always to respect.  
Cotta also fails, however, to give a reason why a person who is sincerely devoted 
not (or not only) to the religion of his political community but to the pursuit of 
knowledge would engage in the activity of conversing about the gods.  Whereas Cicero 
claims that reflection about the nature of the gods is of paramount importance both to the 
statesman and to the philosopher, Cotta remains silent with respect to Balbus’ desire to 
know why he wishes to learn from the conversation.92  This silence belies Cotta’s claims 
to be concerned with upholding the religion that he declares is the foundation of the 
regime.  In Cotta, then, Cicero presents to the reader someone who seems at first to be 
very much like himself—an active political man, a well-reputed orator, a priest, and a 
student of Academic philosophy—but who, unlike Cicero, fails to reflect sufficiently on 
the dialogue’s opening premise that it is necessary for political men to support piety for 
the sake of preserving justice in the regime, or on the overall purpose of the inquiry about 
the nature of the gods.  By entrusting the critique of the theologies of the schools to 
Cotta, then, Cicero reflects on the possibility that piety might not be as politically 
necessary as he initially suggests.  A crucial part of this reflection is the light that Cicero 
sheds on the effects of popular enlightenment by putting on display the influence of an 
                                                
91 Both Voegelin (2000, 159-160) and Wilhelmsen and Kendall (1968-69, 94-95) nevertheless take Cotta’s 
professed commitment to the ancestral religion as straightforwardly sincere. 
92 Fott glosses over this difficulty by addressing only Balbus’ subsequent question to Cotta about “what he 
wishes to be taught” (2012, 164 emphasis added; DND III.8).  The question of why Cotta wishes to 
converse with Balbus would require Cotta to address the purpose or end of the questions he proceeds to ask 
in Book III. 
 110 
education in skeptical philosophy undertaken with only a half-hearted seriousness on 
Cotta himself. 
When Cotta begins his cross-examination of Balbus he immediately drops the 
posture of total ignorance about the gods.  Against Balbus’ claim that “when we raise our 
eyes to heaven, we at once realize that there is a divine power controlling the realm 
above,” Cotta appeals to what he says is the common consensus to assert that no one 
“among us truly gives the name of Jove” to the heavens rather than to “Jove of the 
Capitol” (III.10,11; II.4, 95).  When Cotta must ultimately concede to Balbus that human 
beings do often see evidence of the divine in nature, he quickly rejects common opinion 
as the standard by which such evidence should be judged.  At stake, he claims, is “not 
whether some people think that gods exist, but whether they do exist or not” (III.16).  
Although he accuses Balbus, perhaps justly, of harboring some contempt for the 
“opinions of the foolish” (III.11), Cotta’s own line of argument suggests that his own 
contempt surpasses that of his interlocutor.  Whereas Balbus softens his critique of the 
religious tradition by veiling it in a critique of superstition (II.9, 70-72), Cotta openly 
attacks Balbus for lending credence to the tenets of the ancestral religion.  He is 
astounded that Balbus claims truly to believe in “fables” (III.12). He further dismisses as 
“rumors” the stories that Balbus now reminds him are written “in the shrine in the forum” 
and honored in the Roman senate by public decrees (III.13).  Balbus does not, however, 
say that he believes the authority of the inscriptions in the shrines or decrees of the 
senate, nor does he do more than state that Cotta should “see” them (III.13).  Having been 
pressed by Cotta to admit the absurdity of the tradition, Balbus replies that Cotta “should 
be moved by authorities like these” (III.13).  By picking out elements of the religion that 
are particularly public—that occur in the forum and in the Senate—and by pointing to 
Cotta’s failure to see them, Balbus suggests that Cotta makes a political miscalculation in 
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showing such obvious disdain for the religion of his regime.  But perhaps there is also a 
failure of understanding.  Indeed, when Cotta dismisses the question of “whether some 
people think that gods exist” he rejects something central to their discussion.  A short 
lacuna in the text cuts off the conclusion of this exchange but what remains suffices to 
emphasize Cotta’s departure from the gentleness Balbus employs when treating what 
they both regard as the superstitions of the many.93   
Given Cicero’s critique of the apolitical character of Stoicism in De Finibus and 
the lack of any indication in De Natura Deorum that Balbus was himself involved in 
politics, it is surprising that it is Balbus who urges Cotta to be cautious when critiquing 
the tradition and to observe more keenly the way that piety manifests itself in political 
life.  Cicero thus invites his reader to wonder about the source of Cotta’s boldness, or, to 
put it another way, to ask why Cotta does not seem to hold with Balbus—and Cicero—
that such careful attention to piety in politics is necessary. 
Cicero begins to address this question in the text that immediately follows the 
lacuna at III.13.  Here we find Cotta discussing Balbus’ argument that the success of 
pious men and the ruin of the impious demonstrate a divine presence our lives (II.6-12).  
Cotta seizes on the story of the Decii, to whom Balbus had referred as those “certain 
commanders” who “devoted their own lives on behalf of the state” because “the impulse 
(vis) of religion was so strong” with them (II.10).  The Decii were a family famous in 
Rome for the father and son who, in separate wars, sacrificed themselves to the gods by 
charging into the enemy in order to spur on their own armies when victory was uncertain 
(Rosenblitt 2011, 402).  Cotta responds to Balbus’ reference to the Decii by questioning 
                                                
93 Wilhelmsen and Kendall’s view that Cotta’s piety is sincere leads them to misconstrue the disagreement 
between the Academic and Stoic interlocutors: in spite of Balbus’ deference here to the authority of the 
republic and his repeated exhortations to Cotta be more attentive to his civic obligations, Wilhelmsen and 
Kendall attribute to Balbus concern only for “a reason that pretends to by-pass the exigencies and demands 
of society” (1968-69, 96).   
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both his description of the events and the implications that he draws from it about the 
gods’ presence in our lives.  About the Decii, Cotta asserts that they were, in fact, only 
“employing a technique of generalship, which the Greeks call a ‘strategy’” on account of 
which they “did not spare their lives for their country” since “the army would rally 
behind a general who spurred his horse and launched himself against the enemy” 
(III.15).94  Cotta thus reduces the actions of the Decii to a calculation of what action 
would be most likely to induce their armies to regroup and defeat the enemy (Rosenblitt 
2011, 422).  To be sure, Cotta does not go so far as to say that the Decii acted out of a 
narrow consideration of self-interest, but he nevertheless presents their patriotic self-
sacrifice as little more than the tactic of generalship that was required in that moment.   
We can contrast Cotta’s interpretation of the Decii’s actions with the explanation 
of the same events that Cicero offers to Torquatus in De Finibus.  According to Cicero, 
had the father’s “action not been worthy of the praise it garnered, his son would not have 
imitated it…nor his son in turn…He too fell in battle, a third generation in succession to 
have made the supreme sacrifice for their country” (DF II.61).  Cicero thus points to the 
decisive influence that the belief in the praiseworthiness of self-sacrifice had in leading 
each man to give up his life.  But he also notes that each “knew he was to die at any 
moment, and he sought death” (DF II.61).  This addition suggests that the Decii were not 
only willing to die, but, in some sense, wished it as well.  Now, before Cotta discusses the 
Decii, he does acknowledge, with no small amount of condescension, that some believe 
that “the souls of outstanding men…are divine an eternal,” but he does not consider 
whether such an opinion played a part in the Decii’s self-sacrifices (III.12, 39).  Instead, 
                                                
94 When Livy describes the episodes at 8.9.4-12 and 10.28.1-18 of his History, he puts great emphasis on 
the role that piety played in both the father’s and the son’s actions.  Machiavelli also mentions the Decii in 
his Discourses, but, like Cotta, strips their actions of any pious concern and attributes to father and son 
instead “such reputation and so much example that good men desire to imitate them and the wicked are 
ashamed to hold to a life contrary to them” (1996, III.1.3). 
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he attacks Balbus’ account by calling into question the justice of the gods to whom they 
offered themselves for the sake of the success of their armies.  He asks, “how could gods 
have been so unjust that reconciliation with the Roman people could be attained only if 
such splendid men perished?” (III.15).  Insofar as both the Stoic gods and the gods of 
Rome are said to be just, Cotta’s question applies as much to the latter as it does to the 
former.  But his own question, which recalls the difficulty that Balbus had in arguing for 
the concordance of divine justice and human justice, can nevertheless be addressed only 
by reflecting on the pious hope, which Cotta ignores in the case of the Decii, that the 
gods protect and reward the just.  Perhaps Cotta ignores it in his own case too, for the 
question itself seems rooted in a disappointment in the failure of the gods’ justice.  He 
also does not examine any further the tensions in both the Stoic theology and the 
traditional religion to which his own observations point: the praiseworthiness of the 
Decii’s actions seems to consist in the belief that they gave up something truly good for 
the sake of the regime and for the gods themselves; yet, on one hand, gods who require 
such a sacrifice and offer nothing in return seem unjust; and on the other hand, if we 
expect great rewards from the gods for our actions, we cannot truly think of those actions 
as sacrificial and they begin to appear, as a result, less praiseworthy.   
Both Cicero’s and Balbus’ accounts suggest that Cotta misses something crucial 
by ignoring the strength of the Decii’s piety.  Cicero’s account, however, both goes 
farther in helping us to understand their actions and reveals, more than Cotta is able, the 
problem at the heart of the account that Balbus gives.  In the discussion with Torquatus, 
Cicero claims that the Decii “sought death with a more ardent zeal than Epicurus would 
have us seek pleasure” (DF II.61).  Whereas Epicurus teaches that pleasure is the good 
for human beings, the Decii sought death for the sake of praise.  But the claim that they 
did so with a “more ardent zeal” than Epicurus believes we ought to seek the good 
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suggests that Cicero wishes to call attention to the power of the desire that drove the 
Decii.  Their eagerness for death cannot be adequately accounted for by Epicureanism’s 
psychology.  We cannot explain each man’s sacrifice on the basis of a desire for pleasure 
because, as Cicero asks, “where and when would he enjoy it?” (II.61).  Through the 
comparison with Epicurus, Cicero emphasizes that the Decii were seeking a good for 
themselves through their deaths.  But on this basis the question that Cicero directs to the 
Epicurean applies just as much to praise as it does to pleasure.  He thus encourages us to 
ask not only when and where the Decii could enjoy the praise they believed was their 
due, but also what might account for the eagerness with which the Decii gave up their 
lives.  For if, as Cotta’s account would have it, the Decii were moved to sacrifice 
themselves solely out of a patriotic concern for the survival of their armies, we can 
explain their actions, but not the zeal with which, according to Cicero, they acted. 
Cicero’s account seems to suggest that their desire for praise was accompanied by, or 
rooted in, a hope that because of their great deeds they would somehow be able to enjoy 
that praise after death.  Balbus, however, is silent about the possibility of an afterlife 
(Pangle 1998, 249n.53; DND II.153).  Thus he also rejects the goods of fortune—
“wealth, safety, concord, freedom, and victory”—and the objects of the passions as false 
goods that human beings worship superstitiously (II.61).  But Balbus’ claim that victory 
is among the things not to be counted as a true good for human beings makes his own 
praise of the Decii’s actions unintelligible.  Indeed, it requires us to believe that they 
committed suicide for a trifle.            
Cicero’s account also suggests that Balbus errs when he implicitly criticizes the 
belief that “men who conferred great benefits were translated to heaven through their 
fame and our gratitude” by associating that hope with “human life and custom” rather 
than wisdom (II.62).  Balbus’ account of true piety as the contemplation of the cosmos 
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seems to be rooted in the desire for human beings to shed to a large extent the old 
superstitions in favor of a theology that approaches reason more closely.  But if it was 
this hope for some kind of life after death that directed the Decii as servants of the 
republic to act in a way that was simultaneously necessary for the good of the regime and 
fatal to themselves, then ultimately both Balbus’ and Cotta’s accounts of the Decii are 
deeply problematic.  Balbus’ own suggestion that “human life” encourages the belief in 
an afterlife suggests not only that human beings are powerfully, perhaps naturally, drawn 
to this belief, but also that it is particularly tied up with the motivations that lie behind the 
activities we tend to regard as noble and worthy of praise.  Cotta, by neglecting these 
hopes or not taking them seriously, makes precisely the error that Cicero warns we ought 
to avoid if we seek to understand human nature and to guide the regime with respect to 
religion.  And while Balbus’ exhortations to Cotta to take his political responsibilities 
more seriously suggest that he shares something like Cicero’s statesmanlike concerns, his 
confidence that the belief in an afterlife can be discarded suggests that, like Cotta, Balbus 
has not undertaken a serious investigation of piety’s central role in cultivating civic 
virtue. 
Cotta’s belief that piety can or should be overthrown in favor of the rule of reason 
becomes a central theme of his speech.  It begins to come to the surface in Cotta’s 
critique of the Stoic defense of augury as evidence of divine concern for human beings.  
This critique is accompanied by an accusation against the Stoics for lying about the gods.  
Cotta seeks, he says, “to learn from philosophers, especially since your diviners lie about 
so many things” (III.15, emphasis added).  Cotta now indicates that he seeks in 
philosophy the means to expose the lie that augury perpetrates.95  The accusation also 
                                                
95 It is possible, however, to identify something as a lie only if one also has an opinion about what is true.  
Thus, Cotta’s accusation against the diviners confirms again that he carries out his refutation neither in his 
capacity as a religious magistrate who defends his religion nor as one who knows nothing about the gods. 
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places Stoicism on the side of the diviners who lie, rather than the philosophers who can 
expose that lie.  Cotta shows a particular frustration or anger with Stoicism for 
encouraging, rather than debunking, the belief in gods who take an active concern and 
participate in human affairs.  He shows that what he wants from philosophy is an 
argument, not only against the existence of the gods, but also against those who, perhaps 
like Balbus, encourage public piety when, in Cotta’s eyes, they should know better.  
Cicero suggests, then, that Cotta is ambivalent about the goodness of philosophy.  
On one hand, he sees it as the means by which the existence of the gods can be refuted.  
But, on the other, he is also upset by philosophical teachings that refrain from decisively 
or publically demonstrating the incoherence of piety.96  This ambivalence seems to 
obscure from Cotta the weaknesses of his own arguments.  This is clearest when Cotta 
turns to consider the syllogisms the Stoics marshal in their defense.  He first addresses the 
simple syllogism with which Balbus, following Zeno, claims to prove not only that the 
gods exist but also that they possess in perfect form all the excellences of human nature 
(II.21-22).   According to Cotta, so far from proving that there is a rational divine power 
that rules the universe, Balbus has only revealed what he “wishes to assume,” or wants to 
be true (III.21).  Cotta rebuts Balbus’ argument that the universe must be living and wise 
because it is better than human beings, who are themselves living and rational, by 
pointing to the absurdity of the syllogism.  By this argument, he quips, it would be 
necessary to grant that the universe is literate, since “a thing which is literate is better 
than a thing which is not” (II.23).  Cotta jokes that we must then also grant that the 
universe is “a mathematician, and a musician as well,” but closes this line of argument 
                                                
96 Wilhelmsen and Kendall also recognize Cotta’s ambivalence about philosophy, but they go too far when 
they claim that “Cotta is the assembly against Socrates” (1968-69, 96).  As will be shown in what follows, 
Cotta is public-spirited, as they suggest, but does not share the Athenian jury’s desire to protect the 
ancestral piety from philosophy.   
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with the assertion that, by Balbus’ logic, “the universe will finally be a philosopher!” 
(III.23).  In a way, Cotta hits the mark here exactly, for this seems to be precisely Balbus’ 
intention.  Balbus attempts to show that the pursuit of wisdom is best understood as 
reverential awe for the cosmos that is living, wise, beneficent, and deserving of rule.  The 
universe therefore seems to possess the attributes of a philosopher.  For human beings, 
Balbus believes, the pursuit of wisdom conducive to a truer kind of virtue and grounded 
on a loftier conception of the good than the traditional piety allowed.  But in his reply 
Cotta also claims to demonstrate that “the universe is not god” and that “neither are the 
heavenly bodies” (II.23, 24-25).  In truth, Cotta has only shown that the Stoics make a 
poor argument.  Indeed, in this section Cicero shows Cotta committing the same error as 
his Stoic counterpart, drawing conclusions about what he wishes to be the case, rather 
than what he proves (Pangle 1998, 249).    
Cotta then turns from Balbus’ attribution of reason to the universe to the claim 
that it possesses virtue.  Whereas Cicero’s conversation with Cato shows us the errors 
and tensions at the heart of the Stoic claim that human beings are capable of a perfect, 
unchanging, and god-like happiness in spite of our mortality, Cotta brings out the 
difficulty in the Stoic attempt to assign human virtues to divine beings (II.79, 147).  Cotta 
is here at his most thoughtful, returning briefly in his speech to consider opinions about 
the meaning of virtue and, in so doing, asking seriously whether Balbus’ theology 
understands virtue as well as he believes (cf. III.16).  Cotta begins by asking whether we 
“can conceive of any sort of god which is endowed with no virtue” (III.38).  Cotta’s 
question indicates that he means to address not only the Stoic conception of virtue and 
piety, but also virtue and piety as such.  He grants to Balbus that belief in the divine goes 
hand in hand with belief in divine goodness or excellence and that piety will always 
contain the belief that gods are virtuous.  But as Cotta shows, once we try to make sense 
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of what it means that the gods are virtuous, this opinion starts to unravel.  There is a 
necessary tension at the core of the belief in divine virtue because the goodness or 
nobility of the virtues—the reason we call them moral excellences—is rooted in the 
imperfections of human nature.  Thus, we praise the human being who possesses 
“prudence, which consists in the knowledge of good things, bad things, and things neither 
good nor bad,” because through it, together with reason and intelligence, he is able to 
“advance from what is clear to what is obscure” (III.38).  Prudence is a virtue, according 
to Cotta, because human beings are not born with clear knowledge of what is good and 
bad but must pursue it through effort and work.  But, as Cotta points out, to attribute the 
virtue of prudence to the gods contradicts the same opinion that attributes to them 
perfection, because prudence is the instrument we use to clarify what is good for us, 
whereas “nothing can be hidden from god” (III.38).   
So too, Cotta says, for temperance and courage, “which [consist] in forgoing 
pleasures of the body” and overcoming “pain or grief or danger” (III.38-39).  These are 
regarded as virtues only because, as Balbus himself acknowledges, the vices they 
overcome exert such a powerful force over us (II.61-62).   But when Cotta applies this 
thought to justice, he misconstrues Balbus’ argument, which explains the justice which 
pertains to both human beings and the gods in two potentially different ways.  In the first 
case, Balbus argues, though not without difficulty, that the gods govern themselves 
according to the same laws of right as we do (II.78-79, 154).  Balbus also claims, 
however, that justice arises out of the pious observation and contemplation of the ordered 
universe, through which we discover that the best human life, or the perfectly just life, “is 
equivalent and analogous to that enjoyed by the gods” (II.153). In the first instance, 
justice originates in laws and consists obedience to them.  In the second, justice is a 
perfect orderliness of the soul that is attained through the use of our unique capacity for 
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reason which “has penetrated the sky” (II.153).  Balbus thus posits two sources of justice, 
one political and the other psychological or intellectual, each cultivating the virtue from 
different roots.  But while his account as a whole seems to suggest that he views the 
latter, intellectual, root as more truly conducive to virtue, he nevertheless attempts to 
argue that the gods are just in both the political and the contemplative sense.  In response 
to this claim, Cotta asks “what has justice, which distributes to each his own, to do with 
the gods? For the society and community of human beings created justice, as you say” 
(III.38).  He thus incorrectly attributes to Balbus an argument about the origins of justice 
that leaves out the gods entirely.  But Cotta’s reply also indicates that he agrees with that 
argument.  For Cotta, justice primarily means giving to each human being what he 
deserves.  If, in addition, justice follows the pattern of prudence, temperance, and courage 
as he describes them in this passage, then justice, according to Cotta, is a virtue because 
human beings most often do not get what they deserve.  This failure of justice is 
especially manifest, and perhaps most disappointing, in politics because, as Cotta 
suggests, the political community is where we look and hope most for the securing of 
what we are owed.  It is for this reason, perhaps, that Cotta is now compelled to admit 
that “when I consider what is said by the Stoics, I cannot despise the stupidity of the 
vulgar and ignorant” who believe that great men “have been received as newly enrolled 
citizens in heaven” (III.39, see also III.12, 50).  Seen in this light, the vulgar opinion 
seems to Cotta more understandable than the Stoics,’ whose teaching he now 
sarcastically calls “remarkable” (III.39).  The hope that human beings can become 
immortal on account of great deeds suggests a recognition, on some level, that too often 
good people fail to get what they deserve in this life.  To Cotta, it seems, the Stoics’ 
denial or unawareness of this disappointment is a frustrating sign of their naiveté, on 
account of which they are lead to multiply, rather than weaken, superstition (III.52).     
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Thus Cicero shows that Cotta is somewhat aware of the problematic character of 
the teaching about virtue in Balbus’ account of the gods.  But this awareness, Cicero also 
implies, comes less from serious inquiry than it does from dissatisfaction with the 
pervasiveness of injustice.  For this reason, in spite of Cotta’s concession that the 
opinions of the vulgar are, in a certain way, justified, he soon declares to Balbus that “it is 
necessary that we speak against those who, not from fact but opinion, say that these gods 
whom all worship with reverence and holiness have been carried over from the human 
race into heaven” (III.53, emphasis added).  Cotta wishes to wage a public battle against 
those who propagate the opinion that just rewards are given to excellent human beings.  
He follows this declaration by describing the kinds of false opinions to which he refers: 
…the so-called theologians enumerate three Jupiters. They say that the first two 
were born in Acadia, that the father of the first was Aether, who sired also 
Proserpina and Liber, and that the father of the second was Caelus; this Jupiter is 
said to have begotten Minerva…The third…was Saturn’s son from Crete… 
(III.53) 
Indeed, the first opinion that Cotta wishes to expose as superstition is the belief in Jupiter 
as the king of the gods, the centerpiece of the official Roman religion.  He offers a similar 
account of the Muses, Vulcan, Mercury, Apollo, Diana, Cupid, Dionysus, and Venus, 
among others (III.53-60).  In each case he presents multiple stories of the origins and 
births of the gods, allowing their contradictions to sow doubt in the minds of his listeners.  
But he closes this enumeration with a surprising remark that seems at first to retract the 
boldness with which he has just spoken: 
these and other fables of the same kind have been gathered from ancient Greek 
traditions. You realize that we must rebut them, so that religion may not be 
disturbed. Yet your [school] does not merely refrain from rejecting them; they 
positively approve of them by interpreting the message derived from each. (III.60) 
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Cotta clothes his debunking in a conservative public-spirited concern for the native 
religion, but his own use of the Roman names of these gods belies his accusation that 
they are foreign intrusions.  Yet, in this passage and in the sequel, he attacks the Stoics 
again for lending coherence to opinions which are manifestly incoherent (III.63; cf. II.63-
65, 66-69).  Cotta thus openly raises doubts about the coherence of the ancestral customs 
and, at the same time, criticizes the Stoics for making those customs appear to be more 
coherent than they actually are.  He claims, moreover, that he wishes to “banish from 
philosophy entirely the error of making assertions in discussing the immortal gods that 
are unworthy” (III.64).  But if we follow the example of Cotta’s own speech, both the 
traditional stories about the gods and the attempts to rationalize them by the Stoics are to 
be rejected.  To truly speak in a way worthy of the gods seems to be, then, to reveal that 
they are imaginary.   Perhaps Cotta hopes that without the philosophic rationalizations of 
the ancient fables, their absurdity will be clearer for all to see.  Not just the Stoics, then, 
but also all of philosophy errs, in Cotta’s view, insofar as it encourages pious belief. 
Nevertheless, Cotta’s public-spiritedness may be sincere.  His wish to remove this error 
intimates a desire for philosophy to take a more active and public enlightening role, to 
free people of the misconceptions and superstitions of piety to a greater degree than even 
the rationalistic theologies of the schools undertake.  But Cotta does not exempt the 
Academy, his own school, from this charge when he points to the error of philosophy.  
Perhaps he senses that the same thing that attracts him to the Academy—the tools it gives 
him to use in arguing against the beliefs of others—makes it an obstacle to his wish to see 
piety disposed of.  When he now asserts that “I have in mind what I myself think about 
[the gods],” it is clear that he does not mean to express a pious obedience to the ancestral 
tradition, but a conviction of its falsehood (III.64).  But the skeptical teaching of the 
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Academy denies him certainty in this conviction and therefore makes impossible a 
decisive conclusion in his favor.    
 But Cotta’s desire to expose the incoherence of piety is not accompanied by the 
unambiguous confidence or hope that reason could rule in its place.  A lacuna cuts off the 
conclusion of this section and Cotta’s transition to addressing directly the belief in divine 
providence.  When the text picks up again, however, we find Cotta contesting Balbus’ 
claim that the human capacity for reason is evidence of divine beneficence.   Cotta cites 
the examples of Medea and Atreus and bemoans the cold rationality both employed to 
plot monstrous murders and cannibalistic feasts (III.66-68).  Against the claim that the 
cultivation of reason leads to justice, Cotta paints it as more often the instrument which 
makes injustice possible (III.71).  He adds, moreover, that both our private and public 
lives are “studded with examples almost as outrageous” as the notorious crimes presented 
in tragic poetry: “right conduct is practiced rarely and by the few, whereas [wrong-doing] 
is constantly performed by many” (III.69).  Cotta goes so far as to conclude that “it would 
have been better if the immortal gods had granted us no use of reason whatever,” but he 
vacillates when he considers who is harmed the most by this so-called gift of the gods 
(III.69, 66).  He begins with a democratic argument, which claims that reason’s unequal 
distribution is fundamentally unfair, “harmful to the many and beneficial only to the few” 
(III.69).  He allows for a distinction between using reason well and using it badly but 
denies that this distinction saves the view that reason is a benevolent gift from heaven 
(III.71, 75).  From god, says Cotta, “we have only reason, if indeed we have it, but 
whether it is good or not good [comes] from us” (III.71).  On this basis, he claims, the 
gods could not have given us a more dangerous or harmful gift had they tried, for reason 
is as much the source of vice as it is of virtue.   
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Cotta also laments, however, that even those who “use reason well…are often 
crushed by those who use it badly” (III.75).  Seen in this light, reason is worse for the 
good, who become the unjust victims of people who use reason for vicious ends.  Cicero 
thus shows that Cotta’s ambivalence about philosophy and his disillusionment about the 
fulfillment of justice are intimately connected.  In Cotta’s eyes, the rational life not only 
fails to gain its just rewards but also seems to make men more vulnerable to suffering 
injustice.  Why then should “we wish,” as Cotta still maintains, “to be philosophers, 
authors of facts, not fables” (III.77)?  Cotta never explicitly rejects the opinion that the 
pursuit of wisdom—or the prudence he earlier identifies as the virtue which distinguishes 
the good things from bad—is good for those who can live by it, but neither does he seem 
fully to accept it.  Indeed, he now both praises and blames the Academic teaching in 
particular.  He compares the Academy approvingly to a young man in the comedy The 
Fellow Youths, who “like the Academics does not hesitate to fight against common 
opinion with reason” (III.72).  But Cotta also laments the youth’s “ruses, contrivances, 
deceits, and tricks” which are possible only through the use of reason (III.73).  Cotta thus 
makes us wonder whether he means to implicate the Academy with this accusation as 
well.  Indeed, he shows in what follows that he is troubled by the possibility that the 
school deserves blame for causing injustice.  When he turns to contemplate whether 
“philosophers harm those pupils who interpret badly their good teachings” (III.77), he 
revisits the democratic perspective from which he begins his reflection on the goodness 
of reason.  But he immediately drops the thought that the teachings of the philosophers 
are “good,” and describes them only as “disputations” (III.77).  He concedes, in addition, 
that if philosophy can make people who misinterpret it vicious (vitiosi), then “it would 
certainly be preferable for the philosophers to say nothing” (III.77).  He compares the 
philosophers now to the gods who ought to have seen that “similarly, if men abuse the 
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reason” which they “bestowed with good intentions, and exploit it for deceit and malice, 
it would have been better for such reason to be withheld” (III.78).97  Cotta’s comparison 
suggests, then, that reason and philosophy are good only if they can be used well by most 
human beings.  If the majority of men cannot be wise, then it is not good for anyone to 
be.  He thus implies that just as the gods have harmed humanity as a whole if they are the 
source of reason, so too have the philosophers, insofar as they encourage its cultivation.  
In this way, Cotta is at odds with himself.  He critiques philosophy both because of its 
lack of boldness in brushing away the superstitions about the gods and because it 
encourages injustice among the many who cannot reason well.  At the same time, he is 
deeply disappointed by the injustices committed against the few good people who can 
reason well.  Perhaps more than Balbus, he evidently wishes that reason carried with it a 
clear moral imperative (III.85), and, on this basis, wishes he could engage philosophy in 
the project of political enlightenment that would make the world more hospitable to good 
men.  But having been confronted with evidence against that possibility, he turns to some 
extent against philosophy.  This perhaps goes some way to explain Cotta’s attraction to 
Academic skepticism, which acknowledges a limit in what human reason can prove, but 
nevertheless engages in refutations against all claims to certainty.    
Cicero emphasizes Cotta’s disappointment when the latter recalls that “all 
philosophers agree that if folly (stultitia) is a greater evil (malus) than all evils of fortune 
and of the body…but no one gains wisdom, then we are all in the depth of misfortune 
(summis malis)” (III.79).  Cotta claims to accept the philosophers’ view, but he believes 
that this proves only the benighted state of human affairs.  He rejects the possibility of a 
distinction between the two claims “no one is wise” and “no one can be wise” and 
                                                
97 Cotta makes the claim that the gods ought to have refrained from bestowing reason on human beings 
four times (twice at III.68, and again at 75 and 78). 
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proceeds as though he has shown that no one can escape the state of foolishness (III.79; 
see also I.60).  But the goodness of reason for human beings hinges on the possibility or 
impossibility of wisdom and Cotta has in no way proven that wisdom is impossible for 
individuals or that “no one can be wise.”  Indeed, against Cotta, Cicero suggests (though 
he does not claim to prove in this work) that in spite of the limits to human knowledge, 
wisdom, and with it, knowledge about how we ought to live, is indeed possible (I.12).   
Cotta turns immediately from his rejection of the possibility of wisdom to an 
enumeration of the multitude of stories of virtuous men suffering and vicious men 
reaping rewards, which he presents as evidence against divine providence (III.79, 80-82).  
The transition is so abrupt, however, as to suggest that there is a connection between the 
two considerations.  This is confirmed when Cotta soon offers Socrates’ trial and 
execution by the Athenian jury as an example of the virtuous who suffer: “need I mention 
Socrates,” he says, “whose death when I read Plato’s account moves me to tears? So you 
surely see that the judgment of the gods, if they see the human things, has destroyed the 
distinction [between men]?” (III.82).  The death of Socrates reaffirms to Cotta that the 
good do not get the rewards they deserve.  It may also remind him of the tension that 
exists between philosophy and politics, which Cicero intimates in his introduction.  
Cotta’s intense sadness bespeaks the disappointment of his hope that it could be 
otherwise.  Perhaps Cotta is sincere, then, when he ultimately concludes his speech by 
saying to Balbus that he “wish[es] to be refuted” (III.95).  Most importantly, Cotta’s tears 
suggest that he does not understand or truly accept the philosophic claim that folly is the 
worst evil, for if he did, his sadness might be tempered by the recognition that Socrates 
led a good life in spite of suffering injustice. 
As Cicero shows, then, Cotta harbors a disappointed hope that philosophy might 
enlighten political life and secure just rewards for those who deserve them.  But that 
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disappointment, rather than suggesting to Cotta the undesirability of such an 
enlightenment, leads him to doubt the goodness of reason altogether.  Through Cotta, 
Cicero shows us someone quite like himself who failed, however, to examine the 
bitterness about the absence of divine support for justice that seems to have led him to 
philosophy or his bitterness toward philosophy for being unable to remedy that defect.  
Cicero’s introduction shows how he avoided this failure in his own case.  He explains 
that he was moved to philosophic writing in part by a “dejection of the soul induced by 
the great and heavy blow inflicted by fortune” (I.9).98  Whereas Cotta turns to Academic 
refutations to absolve himself of the need to learn or to subject his own opinions to 
critical scrutiny, Cicero claims that he sought consolation by attempting to “[grapple] 
with the whole of philosophy” (I.9). He presents De Natura Deorum and his 
understanding of the necessity of both theoretical and political prudence as one result of 
that attempt.  In spite of his recognition of the difficulty of guiding one’s life according to 
reason alone, Cicero does not accept, with Cotta, that wisdom is impossible for human 
beings (I.12).  Because Cicero’s depiction (brief though it is in De Natura Deorum) of the 
wisdom available to human beings does not hold out the promise of certitude or of 
invulnerability to injustice—for which both Balbus and Cotta seem to hope—he helps us 
avoid Cotta’s disappointment if we come to see that this hope cannot be fulfilled (I.3-4).  
De Natura Deorum is a critical step, then, in Cicero’s attempt to discover whether piety is 
the sole foundation of these virtues or whether they can be cultivated from some other 
                                                
98 Cicero does not, however, mention what caused his grief.  In a letter to his friend Atticus, he describes 
his grief over the death of his daughter Tullia and his attempt to use writing as a consolation (ATT Vol 3, 
251).  Many of Cicero’s readers take him therefore to refer to Tullia’s death in De Natura Deorum, but, as 
Baraz notes, he may also refer here to the political turmoil then engulfing Rome, which also troubled him 
deeply (Baraz 2012, 86-87; Dyck 2003, 2 and White 1995, 223-225, both cited in Baraz 2012; see also 
Walsh 1997, 148n.9, Rackham 1933, 10n.a).  That Cicero leaves the source of his grief ambiguous in the 
introduction suggests that he regards it, for the purpose of his argument, to be less crucial than the depiction 
of his response to it.    
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source.  Cicero’s approval of Balbus’ speech at the end of the work seems to be the result 
especially of Balbus’ concern for supporting civic virtue (III.94).  But through his 
depiction of Cotta’s critiques and the tensions in Balbus’ speech, Cicero shows that even 
Balbus’ Stoicism has not thought seriously enough about what this virtue requires.  
Indeed, he indicates that Balbus’ account of the gods suffers from a lack of attention to 
the hope for an afterlife that surfaces in his own speech in spite of his claim that human 
happiness consists in virtue alone.  Like Cotta’s refutations,  Balbus’s Stoicism is unable 
to hold consistently to the central doctrine of its school.  Both in order for it to perform a 
civic role and to better understand human nature, then, Stoicism requires an education in 
politics.  
If we return to the beginning of the conversation portrayed in the dialogue, we see 
that Cicero offers a hint about his understanding of how we ought to proceed.  Upon his 
arrival to Cotta’s house, the young Cicero remarks that only the Peripatetic school 
seemed to lack a representative in their group (I.16).  Cotta denies the need for a 
Peripatetic because the “Stoics are at one with Peripatetics in substance, and they differ 
merely in the terms they use” (I.16).  Balbus’ rejection of this claim and his insistence 
that the difference between the two schools “is no trivial one of words, but of the greatest 
things” anticipates the same disagreement that Cicero himself and Cato have years later 
in De Finibus (DND I.16-17, DF III.10-11).  But here, conversation about this 
disagreement is put off in favor of the discussion about the gods (I.17).  The ultimate 
failure of the discussion to address satisfactorily the problems set out in the work’s 
introduction suggests that Cicero wishes to direct our attention back to the conversation 
about moral opinion that never took place between Balbus and Cotta.  Cicero’s own 
critique of the moral teaching of the schools in De Finibus and the doubts he raises about 
the possibility of a rational enlightenment in De Natura Deorum thus points us to his own 
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attempt to offer a better account of how virtue arises and how it can be cultivated not 
among the wise, but among the many, in De Officiis (DO III.14). 
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Chapter 4: Cicero’s Political Science  
If De Finibus and De Natura Deorum together contain the core of Cicero’s 
critique of popular philosophy, De Officiis is its culmination, in which Cicero presents a 
moral and civic teaching in his own name.  Having evaluated the misunderstanding of 
human nature reflected, on one hand, in the schools’ teachings about human happiness, 
and, on the other, in their hopes for rational political enlightenment, Cicero turns in De 
Officiis to show how a more truly adequate political science might address on a popular 
scale both the very great excellence of which human beings are at times capable and the 
much lower level on which individuals and political communities more often operate.  It 
is perhaps strange, then, that having offered his critiques of the schools, Cicero chooses 
to present this account by taking up the Stoic moral teaching. Nicgorski attempts to 
resolve this dilemma by arguing that “insofar as [Cicero] is attracted to Stoicism, it is the 
less formalized stoicism of Roman public men and heroes of the past…a Stoicism 
moderated by a commitment to active public service” (1984, 569).  According to 
Nicgorski, then, Cicero turns to Stoicism because the Roman Stoics maintained a 
connection to the healthy moral outlook of a serious statesman even though the Stoicism 
they professed claims to rise above what it sees as the morally compromised world of 
political life.  But, with the notable exception of Cato the younger, the majority of “the 
public men and heroes of the past” to whom De Officiis often directs our attention were 
not themselves Stoics (or allied with any other of the philosophical schools).99  Indeed, 
Cicero’s dialogues show that the connection between the school and the virtues of public 
                                                
99 See, for example, Cicero’s emphatic praise of Aratus of Sicyon, “a wise and outstanding man” who 
“thought that he should consult the common good…and…showed the wisdom and highest reasonableness 
that befits a good citizen” (II.83).  All citations are to De Officiis (1991) unless otherwise noted. 
Translations have been modified on occasion. 
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life is maintained unwittingly, not as a deliberate Stoic teaching but in spite of the Stoic 
teaching.  In De Finibus, Cicero suggests that the prevalence of philosophical schools 
that claim to transcend the messiness of every day life with systems of thought that 
promise perfect happiness both threaten to weaken the desire to participate in public life 
and badly misunderstand human nature.  Although in De Natura Deorum he rejects the 
enlightening projects of the theologies of the schools, Cicero also raises the possibility of 
harnessing the wide appeal of popular philosophy in order to shore up morality in the 
absence of a strong civil religion.  By choosing to present his teaching as a reformulation 
and correction of Stoicism in light of the practical political considerations of a good 
statesman (I.6-7)—rather than by discarding popular philosophy altogether—Cicero 
attempts to rectify the defects of Stoicism in order to make beneficial use of its wide 
appeal.100  
 As this chapter will attempt to show, De Officiis accords with Cicero’s critique of 
Stoicism and popular philosophy in De Finibus and De Natura Deorum, more than with 
Stoicism itself.  The reformulation of the Stoic teaching consists first in the argument that 
the aim of virtue is not a god-like wisdom, but the solidification of fellowship among 
citizens and their concern for the common good.  To this end, Cicero maintains 
Stoicism’s cosmopolitanism, but redirects it to a teaching about virtue that buttresses 
particular political regimes.  His most crucial revision, however, is found in his argument 
that the source of the virtue that bonds citizens to one another is less reason than an 
                                                
100 Cicero also playfully makes clear the importance of the two earlier works in an imagined dialogue 
between the Stoic thinkers Diogenes and Antipater about the requirements of virtue in commerce.  
Antipater, who argues that in all transactions one must always “ be considering the interests of men and 
serving human society,” accuses Diogenes, of “conceal[ing] from men the advantages and resources that 
are available to them” by granting that a seller may, to the extent that the law allows, withhold information 
about his goods (III.52).  To this Diogenes replies: “I am not at the present moment concealing from you 
the nature of the gods or the end of good things;…yet to learn that would benefit you far more than to learn 
the cheap price of wheat” (III.52).   
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education in shame and self-restraint that shapes our judgments about good and bad 
according to how we are seen by others.  The teaching about virtue, he shows, is 
necessary not in order to cultivate reason, but to act as a corrective for the deficiencies of 
reason’s power in political things.  But De Officiis does not stop at the presentation of a 
popular education in civic virtue.  Cicero also offers a serious theoretical teaching that 
quietly takes as its basis the account of the limits of human knowledge presented in De 
Natura Deorum.  In so doing, Cicero attempts to correct the misconception about the 
character of human wisdom that Stoicism encourages.  As Kries puts it, the teaching of 
De Officiis “should be understood…even as anti-Stoicism” (2003, 392).101   In order to 
show the double education presented De Officiis, it will be helpful to examine the 
foundation of Cicero’s account of honorableness in Book I.  For it is here that Cicero 
clarifies why the civic teaching in virtue is both necessary as an instrument to address the 
problems posed by the weakness of reason in political life and truly beneficial for citizens 
who live in regimes that cultivate it.     
THE STRUCTURE OF DE OFFICIIS 
  Cicero’s turn to the popular part of his project is emphasized by his presentation 
of De Officiis not as a dialogue, but as a letter to his son (I.1, II.8, III.5-6).  It has as its 
                                                
101 Kries similarly finds that “Cicero’s intention in De Officiis…is that he wants to communicate two 
different messages to two different readerships.” (2003, 387).  He argues, however, that Cicero’s “subtle 
message…to the more philosophically sophisticated readers” is “a morality that seems more adequate to 
himself…which, while holding moral virtue to be the highest good for man, recognizes the exigencies of 
political life that render man a problem or tension to himself”  (2003, 393).  On this view, the subtle 
teaching of De Officiis is the explicit teaching of De Finibus.  According to Kries, Cicero in De Officiis 
buries the teaching of De Finibus under a Stoic veneer in order to show that “the young who are 
unphilosophical…should not learn of the ineptitude of the Porch, or at least they should learn of it only in a 
circumspect manner” (2003, 391).  But Kries’ view that Cicero thought it necessary to hide the critique of 
Stoicism as such is belied, for example, by the openness with which Cicero criticizes Stoicism in De 
Finibus in spite of the concern for the education of the young that he professes in conversation with Cato 
(DF III.8-9).  As will be argued below, De Officiis begins from the critique in De Finibus, but also extends 
and deepens it.  
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purpose not the explicit interrogation of views of the schools, but the exhortation and 
advice that a father offers to a child who is expected to take up a life of public service 
(III.103).102  A letter is, nevertheless, a kind of conversation, or at least a partial one.  It is 
a substitute in writing for a conversation that cannot take place in person.  De Officiis 
occupies, then, something of a middle ground between a dialogue and a treatise.  The 
dramatic structure of De Officiis allows Cicero to supply an imagined interlocutor, or set 
of interlocutors, in place of his absent son.  These interlocutors, Cicero suggests 
throughout the work, are not philosophers or wise men, but rather ordinary people and 
their opinions about what is good for us as human beings and what virtue requires (for the 
clearest indication of this, see III.15-16).  By turning the Stoics back to a sustained 
dialogue with common opinion Cicero therefore does for Stoicism in De Officiis what he 
claims Socrates did for philosophy as a whole.  Like Socrates, Cicero sets Stoicism “in 
the cities and bring[s] her also into homes and compel[s] her to ask questions about life 
and morality and the good and bad things” (TD V.4; c. DO I.2; Nicgorski 1984, 570).   
Cicero’s selection of his son and, by extension, the future political men and 
statesmen of Rome, as his direct addressee nevertheless shows that De Officiis is first and 
foremost an exposition of a political education.  In keeping with this, Cicero reminds 
Marcus, who is currently receiving philosophical instruction in Athens, that he expects 
him to take to heart “the great authority of both teacher and city” rather than undertake 
the kind of rational investigation which recognizes the influence of authority as an 
obstacle (I.2; cf. DND I.10).  Cicero expects the instruction by Cratippus, “the leading 
philosopher of our present generation,” to complement the education provided by the 
                                                
102 In an attempt to defend the seriousness of the work against the view that it is no more than a letter, Hunt 
takes the extreme view that the structure and dedication of De Officiis have no bearing on the arguments 
contained within it (1954, 186-187).  The marked difference between the form of De Officiis and the 
presentation of the majority of Cicero’s other theoretical works as dialogues suffices, however, to suggest 
that Cicero’s intention in De Officiis is in some way different from them.  
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study of the “examples” found in the political history of Athens (I.2, I.1).   Moreover, 
Cicero claims to write to his son in his capacity as an additional authority, not only as the 
father, but also as a master of the political oratory that has its home in the forum, 
speaking to crowds in courts and assemblies, and as a great statesman (I.2-4).  Thus, 
whereas he claims in De Natura Deorum never to have ceased philosophizing since his 
youth, Cicero begins De Officiis by deprecating the significance of his own philosophic 
activity: “many others surpass my knowledge of philosophy; and if, when I have devoted 
the best part of my life to oratory, I then claim for myself what is proper to an orator, I 
seem to claim it justly” (I.2).  But he soon retreats somewhat from this claim, and 
distinguishes his own combination of philosophic study and political practice from the 
great philosophers and orators of the past—Plato and Aristotle, on one hand, and 
Demosthenes and Isocrates, on the other—who all appear to have shunned the alternative 
life because each “so enjoyed his own pursuit” (I.4).  And although he writes that “there 
is no doubt that I have pursued them both,” Cicero does not say that he himself derived 
pleasure from either, nor does he offer another explanation for why he combined them in 
his own life (I.3).103  Cicero thus presents himself at the beginning of De Officiis as a 
model statesman by which his son and those like him might measure themselves, but 
leaves the extent and purpose of his own philosophizing ambiguous.  Whereas the 
interlocutors in De Natura Deorum explicitly accept the primacy of the philosophical life 
(DND I.23, 2.140, 3.78), Cicero begins his letter to young Marcus by elevating the 
political life and presenting the education in philosophy as the best lesson in a “calm and 
temperate style” through which his son might polish his oratorical skills (I.3).               
                                                
103 Cicero does, however, allude to the pleasure of philosophizing in De Finibus (DF I.2-3). 
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Cicero’s presentation of this political education is however, complicated by the 
civil strife and upheaval in Roman politics during his own lifetime.  Cicero does not 
refrain from calling our attention repeatedly to the inescapable fact that Rome, as a 
republic, is dead.  He laments that “if I had been followed…we would still have some 
republican government (if perhaps not the very best) whereas now we have none” (I.35, 
emphasis added; see also I.57, II.2-3, 29).  According to Kries, these and other references 
to contemporary political events throughout the work are meant to emphasize that “the 
intended audience of De Officiis is primarily the young republican aristocrats” that 
Cicero’s son represents (2003, 379-80).104  This seems true, as far as it goes.  But 
Cicero’s explanation of the political circumstances in which he writes also highlights a 
problem with what appears at first to be De Officiis’ otherwise straightforward political 
purpose.   If the republic is dead, Cicero’s attempt to teach republican virtue to future 
republican statesmen seems rather futile or, at best, nostalgic.105  Perhaps, however, it is 
desirable even in a corrupt and defective city to salvage the lingering remnants of healthy 
civic life wherever possible.  To this end, Cicero indicates that part of his purpose in 
writing is to show what virtue and the common good require in a regime that does not 
support virtue itself (II.22). 
Cicero also indicates, however, that this is not his only intention.  He argues that 
all philosophers who deserve the name concern themselves with the question of the 
meaning and substance of duties (I.4-5).  The reason for this, he suggests, is that “no part 
of life, neither public affairs nor private,…neither when acting on your own nor in 
                                                
104 Long takes a similar view of the relation of Cicero’s references to Roman politics and his addressee 
(2006, 308). 
105 Thus Finley follows Mommsen in the view that “whatever genuinely philosophical meaning [Stoic] 
terms may have had for the Stoics themselves, Cicero turned them into mere rhetoric” to recommend “the 
Roman constitution of the god old days” (1983, 128) and Mommsen (1908), cited by Finley. 
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dealings with another, can be free from duty” (I.4).  Questions about duty must be 
addressed in order to discern how we ought to live.  Moreover, simple observation of 
everyday life shows that the normal tendency of human beings is to care about the 
fulfillment of duty rather than to dismiss it.  According to Cicero, it is difficult to live 
consistently according to the view that “defines the highest good in such a way that it has 
no connection with virtue” (I.5).  One who purports to accept that view is more likely to 
be “occasionally overcome by the goodness of his own nature” than he is to be “in 
agreement with himself” (I.5).   Because the potential conflict between words and deeds 
is most likely to manifest itself in “friendship or justice or liberality” (I.5), Cicero points 
to the need to examine the virtues especially insofar as they inform our relationships with 
other human beings; he points to the necessity of studying political life.  For this reason, 
Cicero’s political advice—the teaching he presents about how a citizen and statesman of 
a republic ought to make judgments and act—also serves a second purpose.  By showing 
us how the good citizen of a good republic lives, Cicero preserves in writing the way of 
life that most reflects and cultivates what he suggests is a natural concern for virtue in its 
most beneficial form.  He thus helps his reader to understand and reflect on such a life, 
even if we never live in circumstances that make that life possible.  
Cicero’s explanation of his intentions in De Officiis also suggests that he has 
learned, as it were, from Balbus’ exhortation to Cotta in De Natura Deorum, that he 
ought to take better account of his civic responsibility when making refutations.  Just as 
Balbus urges Cotta to profess “steady and certain” opinions as the Stoics do, Cicero now 
writes that “[no] advice on duty that is steady, stable, and joined to nature [can] be 
handed down except by those who believe that what it sought for its own sake is 
honorableness alone (as some say) or honorableness above all (as others say)” (DND II.2, 
DO I.6).  He concludes on this basis that the “Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics” are 
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the authorities to which one ought to turn on the subject of duty and that he will, 
therefore, “follow the Stoics above all” (DO I.6).  Yet Cicero’s choice of the Stoics over 
the Peripatetics is surprising.  Indeed, he gives no reason for it.  He has, moreover, 
associated his own writings with both the Peripatetics and Plato and Socrates in an earlier 
passage (I.2).106  He notes that there is disagreement among the authorities on virtue 
about whether the honorable ought to be sought exclusively or first among a number of 
goods.  But he neglects to mention that this disagreement forms the core of his dispute 
with Cato, shown in De Finibus, about the gulf between the Stoics and the Peripatetics 
with respect to their understanding of the good.  In conversation with Cato, Cicero had 
argued that the Stoic view of virtue as the only good not only mistakenly rejects the 
goodness of objects that human beings naturally associate with their happiness but also 
obscures the fact that this rejection is founded on a hope for perfect self-sufficiency that 
is not possible for human beings.   This mistake, Cicero now implies, is of little import 
with respect to the practical advice he will expound (cf. DF III.11). When in the 
immediate sequel Cicero notes that he will make use of the Stoic teaching through the 
work of Panaetius, however, he implicitly reintroduces the question he seems so quickly 
to brush aside (I.7, 8-10).  At the close of his conversation with Cato in De Finibus, 
Cicero praises Panaetius, for among the Stoics his “doctrines were gentler, and his style 
more lucid…Plato and Aristotle were always on his lips; Xenocrates, Theophrastus and 
Dicaearchus too” (DF IV.79).  By filtering his discussion of Stoicism through the 
teaching of Panaetius, then, Cicero addresses in De Finibus a version of Stoicism that is 
                                                
106 See Degraff 1940 for a catalogue of references to the Platonic corpus in Cicero’s writings. 
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already friendly to the thought of Plato and Aristotle and therefore quietly paves the way 
for the transformation of Stoicism that Cicero undertakes in De Officiis.107  
THE DEFINITION OF MIDDLE DUTIES AS A CLASS 
Cicero underscores the freedom with which he will make use of the Stoic teaching 
when he adds that he “follows the Stoics” insofar as their teaching is consistent with or 
helpful for the illumination of the education he wishes to present, “drawing from their 
fountains when and as it seems best, using my own judgment and discretion” (I.6). 
Having made clear this intention, Cicero turns to begin his investigation: “since the whole 
discussion is going to be about duty, I propose first to define what duty is” (I.7).  But 
Cicero qualifies even further his claim to “follow the Stoics above all” when his first step 
in this discussion is to note that he must correct two critical errors made in Panaetius’ 
writings.  It is necessary, Cicero argues, to begin the inquiry about duty by defining it, 
“for every piece of rational instruction upon any matter ought to begin with a definition, 
so that everyone understands what the subject of discussion is” (I.7).  He reveals, 
however, that “Panaetius omitted to do this” (I.7).  Thus the first lesson that Cicero gives 
about the Stoic authority—whom he praises in De Finibus for his superiority to the other 
Stoic writers—is that his treatment of duty fails to truly teach its readers.  Because 
Panaetius never attempts to define duty, he cannot know what he is talking about even as 
he claims to instruct.  He allows neither himself nor his reader to gain clarity about what 
duty is or what it requires.   
Cicero remedies Panaetius’ first mistake by offering his own definition.  He first 
describes the kinds of questions that relate to duty and divides them into two categories.  
Cicero places in the first category “the kind of question that relates to the end of good 
                                                
107 Panaetius’s work, however, is no longer extant, making impossible attempts to ascertain the Stoic’s own 
teaching or distinguish between Cicero’s and Panaetius’ claims.    
 138 
things” and offers two examples to illustrate his meaning: “are all duties ‘perfect’? Is one 
duty more important than another?” (I.7).  Questions of this kind appear, then, to be the 
sort of theoretical inquiry into what is good for human beings that Cicero attempts in De 
Finibus.  In the second category Cicero places “advice by which one ought to be fortified 
for all areas of life” (I.7).  He notes that this advice comes to sight as “instructions for 
common life” and that “it is these that I must expound in these books (I.7, c. III.5).  De 
Officiis, Cicero seems to suggest, will treat only that part of duty concerned with what is 
“common,” or with our ordinary experiences of life as it is shared with other human 
beings.  But Cicero’s declaration that he will discuss only this latter part of duty obscures 
the fact that he has not yet made it clear exactly how the two parts differ.  Indeed, he 
gives no examples to illustrate the second category of questions, and further blurs the 
distinction by adding that “the duties for which advice has been offered do indeed relate 
to the ends of good things, but here it is less obvious” (I.7).  It seems, then, that the two 
categories, the theoretical and the practical, differ primarily in how dimly or clearly they 
approach the same concerns.  Seen in this light, Cicero’s silence about the questions 
asked with respect to the second category intimates the distinction he seems to have in 
mind.  Whereas the first kind of investigation asks questions and thus seeks clarity about 
duty, the second kind offers advice or precepts, perhaps rules, that one ought to follow.  
By stating that he will address that part of the investigation about duty concerned with the 
precepts rather than the questions, Cicero seems to indicate that De Officiis sets out only 
a practical teaching that will approach the theoretical questions insofar as they are 
necessary for guidance about active political life.  
But this is not Cicero’s last word.  He turns next to “another division…concerning 
duty” and proceeds to set down the definition that was missing in Panaetius’ text (I.8).  A 
duty, he writes, “is said to be either ‘middle’ or ‘perfect’… Perfect duty we may, I think, 
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call ‘right,’ as the Greeks call ‘κατορθωμα;’ while the common duty they call 
‘καθηκον,’” which “they say is that for which a probable (probabilis) reason can be 
given about why it was done” (I.8).  While Cicero cannot be accused of making the same 
error as Panaetius, we may nevertheless note that the definition he supplies is ambiguous.  
He does not make clear whether the distinction he attributes to “the Greeks” between 
middle and perfect duties corresponds with the distinction he draws in his own name in 
the preceding passage.  Indeed, although he seems at first to give the impression that the 
divisions are parallel, there are a number of indications that the correspondence is not as 
neat as it appears.108  To begin with, Cicero’s description of this definition is quite 
hesitant and qualified.  Not only does he put the definition in the mouth of “the Greeks,” 
but he also refrains from identifying which of the Greeks define duty in this way.  
Moreover, he speaks only of what can be said about duty, or what we may call it, rather 
than what it is.109  He offers also only a qualified judgment about even what is said, for he 
adds that he “thinks” (opinor) that duty can be described as the Greeks describe it.  
Cicero thus presents his reader with a definition of unknown origin, of whose accuracy, it 
seems, he is not altogether certain.   
Cicero does, however, make one explicit connection between the two sets of 
divisions.  In his own name, he writes that the precepts about duty are concerned with 
“common life,” and, when describing the definition set down by the Greeks, he notes that 
“the common duty they call καθηκον” (I.7, 8).  Thus both Cicero and the Greeks divide 
the subject of duty into one set of high and one set of low considerations.  The division 
                                                
108 Dyck notes that certain editors of and commentators on the manuscripts of De Officiis have taken the 
presentation of the two divisions of duty in I.7-8 as so muddled as to propose to “cut the Gordian knot by 
athetizing” I.8 (1996, 78-79). 
109 In the three sentences that make up I.8, Cicero uses a form of either dicere or vocare (‘to say’ and ‘to 
call,’ respectively) four times.  He also twice writes of the act of defining (definire), but he never includes 
himself in the activity: in both instances the verb is in the third person plural. 
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made by the Greeks suggests that they and Cicero agree at least provisionally that the 
lower set concerns duties that are common, that require neither extraordinary talents nor 
extraordinary circumstances.  With respect to the higher class of duties, however, Cicero 
and the Greeks seem to diverge.  While Cicero speaks of questions about duty, the 
Greeks assert only that perfect duties are “what is right” (I.8).  Whereas Cicero gives the 
higher rank to the clarity gained by asking what duties are, the Greeks seem to give 
primacy to the certainty about the perfection of right or justice. 
But the nature and extent of Cicero’s agreement with the Greeks remains opaque 
even with respect to the lower order of duties, for Cicero does not clarify what the  
Greeks mean when they say that these are the duties for which “a probable reason can be 
given” (I.8).  On one hand, the definition closely resembles the distinction drawn by Cato 
between middle and perfect duties in De Finibus (DF III.58-59).  On the other, the 
reference to justification by “a probable reason” recalls Cicero’s defense in his own name 
of Academic skepticism in De Natura Deorum.  And yet, in both works, the speaker 
makes a claim about what is probable.  According to Cato, 
although we say that what is honorable is the only good, it is still consistent to 
perform duties, despite the fact that we regard duty as neither good nor bad. For 
there is something probable in this area, such that a reason can be returned for 
it…Hence one can see that a duty is something intermediate (medium). (DF 
III.58) 
Whereas for Cicero, the common or middle duties “relate to the end of good things”  (DO 
I.7), Cato makes the surprising claim that this class is morally neutral.  If, with Cato and 
the Stoics, we accept that virtue is the only good for human beings, then action taken for 
the sake of any goal other than virtue cannot be called good.  Certain actions are 
nevertheless appropriate when they accord with the requirements of virtue, even if they 
are not undertaken for the sake of virtue.  For Cato, then, “if returning a deposit justly is a 
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right action, returning a deposit is regarded as a duty; the addition of ‘justly’ makes it 
right (DF III.59).  According to the Stoics, as Cicero shows in De Finibus, perfect 
wisdom is the precondition of virtue.  The wise man’s virtue is both perfectly noble, for it 
“makes light of all human vicissitudes and regards them as insignificant,” and perfectly 
good, for “nothing bad can befall the wise” for whom “what is moral is the only good” 
(DF III.29).  Therefore only the sage, “whose judgment is never mistaken” can discern 
what justice requires (DF III.59).  Moreover, virtuous action is possible only for the wise 
man because he alone understands that the good for human beings is unattached to 
personal benefit or external circumstance.  Because the unwise are unable to grasp this, 
even their claims and desires to act honorably are mixed with concern for the things the 
wise man knows to be insignificant.  According to Cato, the account that the unwise give 
of their actions can be no more than probable because they lack the certainty in the 
goodness of virtue that would lead them to pursue it alone.   
Cato thus attributes far less dignity to the middle duties than does Cicero, who 
presents them from the outset in De Officiis as the fitting theme of a good moral 
education.  And while Cato presents wisdom as certain knowledge of virtue’s goodness 
and the probable as the sphere of the unwise, Cicero claims in De Natura Deorum that 
wisdom consists especially in the understanding that human knowledge at its fullest is 
limited to what is probable (DND I.12).  When Cato speaks of giving a probable reason, 
he refers to the level at which most human beings are able to live and justify their actions, 
insofar as they fall short of wisdom.  Against this view, Cicero speaks of the probable as 
the upper limit of our capacity for knowledge.  If, as Cicero suggests in De Natura 
Deorum, the probable is all that is available to human beings, then the wise man’s 
skepticism with respect to virtue seems to consist especially in the uncertainty of the 
possibility of setting aside all concern for one’s own benefit, as Cato requires.  But 
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Cicero also admits that only the wise can guide their lives by the light of the probable, 
while in order to live well the unwise require the opinion that certainty—the perfect grasp 
of virtue that is noble and good—is possible.  By leaving the meaning of “the probable” 
ambiguous at the beginning of De Officiis, then, Cicero encourages his reader to keep 
both the Stoic and the skeptical alternatives in mind without undermining the civic virtue 
that De Officiis professes to teach.   
It is not surprising, then, that although Cicero states that this work will not pursue 
the higher theoretical questions about duty, these same questions quietly return when he 
addresses the second of Panaetius’ errors.  Panaetius, according to Cicero, divides the 
discussion of duty into three parts: deliberation about what is honorable, deliberation 
about what is useful, and deliberation about how to act when what is honorable seems to 
conflict with what is useful (I.9).  But, says Cicero, “although it is a very great fault to 
omit anything when categorizing, this division leaves out two things: for one often 
deliberates…also [about] which of two proposed courses that are honorable is the more 
honorable, or of two that are beneficial the more beneficial” (I.10).  On this basis, he 
proposes to consider in addition these two questions, dividing his own writing into five 
parts as opposed to Panaetius’ three.  But in doing so, Cicero reintroduces the very 
questions he claims earlier to set aside, speaking now of deliberation between two 
honorable courses in spite of the fact that he initially places the question of whether “one 
duty [is] more important than another” among the higher class of things this work will 
not address (I.7).  Cicero therefore seems quietly to suggest that De Officiis is more 
theoretically serious than he initially lets on.   
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OUR RATIONAL NATURE 
Cicero derives his account of the duties we ought to pursue from a brief depiction 
of human nature that moves from what we share with other animals to what is 
distinctively human.  Animals and human beings alike feel not only a desire to preserve 
themselves and procure “the necessities of life, such as nourishment, shelter, and so on,” 
but also maintain “a certain concern” for our offspring (I.11).  What distinguishes a 
human being from the other animals, Cicero writes, is that he “is a sharer in reason” 
(I.11).  Whereas an animal is limited by its senses to an awareness only of the immediate 
present, with the aid of reason a human being “perceives consequences, sees the causes of 
things, is not ignorant of their precursors and their antecedents, so to speak, compares 
similarities, and joins and combines the future with present events” (I.11).  This ability to 
form conceptions about causal relations, classify similar objects, and reflect on the future 
shapes our nature in three decisive ways, described by Cicero in ascending order of rank.  
At the first, most basic, level, reason allows us “to see with ease the whole course of life” 
so that we are able “to prepare whatever is necessary for living it” (I.11).  Reason is a tool 
we use for the sake of a non-rational goal, for we share with all other animals the desire 
to acquire the things necessary for living.  With respect to this desire, we differ from the 
animals only insofar as our foresight allows us to achieve its fulfillment more easily.   
At the second level, reason serves a social and political end. Through the “power 
of reason,” nature “unites one man to another for the society (societatem) both of speech 
and of life, and it creates above all a certain particular love for his offspring” (I.12).  
According to this account, the associations made possible by reason strengthen and 
transform for human beings the care that all animals have for their offspring into a love.  
Cicero, however, offers no explanation of the nature of the connection between human 
reason and love; he only asserts that such a connection exists.  Reason’s most powerful 
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social influence, however, is in its compulsion to form associations beyond the family: it 
“impels [man] to wish that men should meet together and congregate and that he should 
join them himself” (I.12).  Reason thus conceived compels us toward the fellowship 
found in the exercise of speech and formed in the company of citizens in assembly and 
friends in conversation.  It acknowledges, in addition, that life and all the things 
necessary for it are not attainable except with the help of others.  In this way, reason 
points us by nature toward participation in political communities.  Cicero adds, moreover, 
that “for the same reason” man is driven “to devote himself to providing whatever may 
contribute to the comfort and sustenance not only of himself, but also of his wife, his 
children, and others whom he holds dear and ought to protect” (I.12).  Even in its 
political aspect, then, reason serves ends which we share to a degree with other animals, 
for the goal we seek is nothing more than comfortable self-preservation.  Nature teaches 
us, on this view, that it is rational to provide these necessities not only for ourselves, but 
also for those whom we love.  But Cicero has introduced two new groups to the set of 
people for whom we seek this goal: neither wives nor those whom a man “ought to 
protect” are included among the people for whom reason inspires a natural care.  He thus 
prompts us to ask what the source is of the feeling of love and obligation to these others.  
He states that reason leads us to wish to fulfill the obligations we feel, but he does not 
attribute to reason the thought or consideration—which necessarily precedes that wish—
that forms the obligations in the first place.  This puzzle emphasizes the strange character 
of Cicero’s preliminary account of reason’s place in human nature up to this point.  As it 
first comes to sight in our most basic relationships, the role of reason is hazy and ill 
defined.  And while he makes clear that our ability to reason makes political society 
possible, Cicero begins his presentation of reason’s place within the political order in a 
strikingly modest way.  Reason, he suggests, naturally plays a role in the formation of 
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familial affections and the bonds between citizens.  But the pieces that are missing from 
this account suggest also that this role is only partial, and that our attachments to the 
family and to our fellows depend as much on other unidentified forces that move the soul 
as much if not more than on reason.   
 For this reason, the splendid tone that Cicero takes when he turns to discuss the 
third and highest role that reason plays in our nature is all the more notable.  He now 
writes that not only are “the search for truth and its investigation…above all, peculiar to 
man,” but also that we believe that “the discovery of obscure or admirable things is 
necessary for a blessed life (I.13).  Human nature is most distinguished from that of other 
animals by the desire and ability to search for and discover truth.  This desire is the only 
activity that Cicero so far explicitly links to the attainment of happiness.  That he 
mentions this connection now only makes more glaring the fact that he does not similarly 
associate with our happiness either the desire to associate with others or the fellowship 
and communities that grow out of it (see also II.73, but cf. I.158).  Seen in the splendid 
light of the investigation of “obscure or admirable things,” those relationships are 
reduced to “necessary business and other concerns” (I.13).  For while we “wish (velit) 
that men should meet together,” we have a more powerful “longing (cupiditati) for seeing 
the truth” (I.12, 13).  But if the activity of contemplation is, in fact, “above all” necessary 
for our happiness and what makes us unique among the animals, it is strange that we 
should engage in it only “when we are free” from business (I.13).  There is a tension, to 
which Cicero quietly alludes, between the activity that leads to our truest happiness and 
the concerns that lead to and arise out of our familial and political associations. It is only 
through inquiry, he maintains, that we can understand what “is most fitted to the nature of 
man” (I.13).  Philosophical activity is therefore both higher in its own right and essential 
 146 
for the correct conduct of practical life.  Yet it remains, Cicero insists, separate from and 
subordinate to “necessary business.”  
 It is only after Cicero intimates the tension between life’s necessary business and 
the activity conducive to human happiness that he begins to address what moves the 
human soul in addition to our capacity for reason.  Reason, he now claims, is not the only 
thing that distinguishes us from other animals.  We alone sense “what order there is, what 
is proper, and what measure to words and deeds” and “therefore…the beauty, the 
loveliness, and the congruence of the parts of all the things that sight perceives” (I.14).   
Because reason allows us to make comparisons and to classify similar things, we are able, 
unlike the other animals, to perceive order.  But in our perceptions of beauty, propriety, 
and order reason plays only a “not insignificant” role, which is to say, it is subordinate or 
secondary to something else (I.14).  Indeed, this concern for beauty, propriety, and order 
points to a desire to pursue what is noble.  In addition to (but separately from) reason, this 
desire powerfully shapes our judgments and opinions, for we think “that beauty, 
constancy, and order should be preserved” (I.14).  The human capacity to reason and our 
desire for the noble together, Cicero explains, form the foundation of what we call 
honorable.   
But when he finally makes a clear reference to the desire for nobility, it is only to 
introduce an additional problem.  Virtue, even the ordinary virtues of civic life that make 
up “the honorableness that we seek,” is not always recognized for what it is (I.14).  But 
“even if it is not accorded acclaim (nobilitatem), it is still honorable, and, as we truly 
claim, even if it is praised by no one, it is by nature worthy of praise” (I.14).  As Cicero 
later explains, most people lack the circumstances that allow both for the education that 
cultivates virtue and for the fulfillment of the obligations to which that virtue points (I.46, 
117-118, 150-151).  We cannot expect, then, that virtuous people will always receive the 
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praise they deserve.  This is perhaps most problematic, however, for the potential 
statesman who wishes to guide citizens in a free republic according to virtue, the good of 
which they will not always understand (II.20).  Part of the education about duties that 
Cicero offers thus soberly addresses “the methods by which we can acquire the ability to 
embrace and retain the support of other men” (II.19).  Only if “virtue make[s] its own the 
hearts of other men” can it lead and be recognized by those who lack it (II.19).  As will 
be shown, Cicero’s attention to this problem permeates his account of the honorable itself 
in Book I. 
WISDOM  
 To be sure, Cicero also means that we should seek the honorable because it is 
praiseworthy regardless of whether it actually receives praise.  He thus presents it as 
something grand and beautiful in its own right: “you are seeing, my son, the very face 
and form, so to speak, of the honorable; if it could be seen with the eyes, as Plato says, it 
would inspire an amazing love of wisdom” (I.15).110  But Cicero also quietly intimates 
that there is a confusion at the heart of the perception of virtue’s dazzling nobility.  As he 
reminds us, we do not perceive the honorable with the same precision with which we see 
physical objects.  If we could see the honorable clearly we would not love the honorable 
as such, he claims, but instead would fall in love with wisdom.  Cicero seems to suggest, 
then, that we pursue virtue as we ordinarily think of it—and as it is presented in this 
work—because our understanding of it is hazy or incomplete.  While wisdom is 
connected to all parts of the honorable as it is usually conceived (I.15, cf. II.35), greater 
                                                
110  In the Phaedrus Socrates states that “by [sight] prudence is not seen—for it would produce terrible 
(δεινους) loves” (1998, 250d).  Cicero thus alters Plato’s text to elevate the object under consideration 
(from prudence to wisdom) and remove the sense of danger Socrates associates with the possibility of 
perceiving it with our eyes. 
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clarity would lead us to pursue wisdom alone.  Nevertheless, this wisdom, if we can 
possess it, cannot be obtained except by reflection on the honorable.  
Cicero therefore begins this reflection by dividing the honorable into four parts. 
Wisdom and prudence form the first part, which consists in “the investigation and 
discovery of what is true”  (I.15, cf. I.153).  Because the pursuit of truth “touches human 
nature most closely,” it ranks highest among the virtues (I.18, I.13).  By nature, Cicero 
claims, “we feel the pull that leads to a longing (cupiditatem) to learn and to know; we 
think it beautiful to excel in this, while considering it base and bad…to be ignorant, to be 
deceived” (I.18).  But having asserted the nobility of this virtue which addresses a potent 
natural desire, Cicero cuts off the discussion.  He explains neither what it is about 
learning and knowledge that we find beautiful, nor what about ignorance is shameful.  He 
devotes most of his discussion about wisdom not to how we attain it, but to an 
explanation of its proper limits and the vices associated with the neglect of those limits.  
Indeed the whole discussion of wisdom, the virtue most suited to human nature, takes up 
less than one tenth of Cicero’s discussion of the honorable in Book I.  Perhaps this ought 
to be expected.  Cicero begins De Officiis by noting his intention to treat the rules that 
govern middle duties rather than the questions that deal directly with knowledge of the 
good for human beings that wisdom requires (I.7).  But just as he gives us reason to 
question the seriousness of his claim that he is unconcerned in this work with the higher-
order questions, he now offers a subtle discussion of wisdom as a virtue underneath the 
description of its proper limits.   
By presenting the pursuit of truth to the reader through the lens of its moral limits 
and associated vices, Cicero gives the impression that he is interested in the virtue of 
wisdom only as long it does not draw us “away from carrying things out,” for “all the 
praise of virtue consists in action” (I.19).  Although the pursuit of truth “is both natural 
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and honorable,” the virtues that contribute to and consist in activity have a higher rank 
than wisdom (1.18, but cf. I.153-156).  For this reason, Cicero focuses on the two vices 
closely linked with it that “one must avoid” rather than what one must do to acquire the 
virtue itself (I.18): “first, we should not take things that have not been ascertained for 
things that have, and rashly assent to them. Anyone who wants to avoid that vice (as 
everyone indeed should) will take time and care when he ponders any matter” (I.18-19). 
Nevertheless, by explaining to us the vices that are opposed to wisdom Cicero tells us at 
the same time about wisdom itself.  And what he says strongly echoes his moralistic 
defense of Academic skepticism in De Natura Deorum (DND I.1). As in that work, 
Cicero now appeals to the shamefulness of rashness and imbues careful deliberation with 
moral seriousness.  But, according to De Natura Deorum, if followed through, the 
prohibition against assenting to what has not been proved to be true leads especially to an 
acknowledgment of the limits of human knowledge and the ultimate impossibility of 
certitude (DND I.11-12).  By recalling his introduction to De Natura Deorum, Cicero 
quietly gives the first hint that, in spite of his claim now to follow the Stoics, he has not 
jettisoned the skeptical understanding of knowledge and wisdom that he elsewhere 
defends.  But whereas Cicero openly acknowledges in the earlier work that withholding 
assent from unproven claims appears to undermine civic morality (and then tacitly 
concedes the truth of that appearance), here he glosses over the difficulty.  Instead he 
merely plants the question of the relation of the skepticism he professes elsewhere to the 
Stoic virtue he claims to take up here.111   He gives no indication of the direction in which 
reflections undertaken with “time and care” might point. 
                                                
111 Cicero makes his continued commitment to the skepticism of the Academy explicit in Book II.  He 
there claims to do no more than circumscribe the scope of the Stoic teaching to a small degree by accepting 
it as probable rather than certain (II.7-8).  Certain commentators take the apparent fusion of Stoicism and 
Academic skepticism as unproblematic (see, for example, Annas 1989, 172; Long 2006, 289), but, as will 
be shown, Cicero indicates throughout Book I that the moral education that cultivates the nobility—valued 
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 The depiction of the second vice associated with wisdom is similarly double-
sided.  Cicero argues that “some men bestow excessive devotion and effort upon matters 
that are both obscure and difficult, and unnecessary,” but he does not explain how one 
steers clear of this particular vice (I.19).  He says only that when both vices are avoided, 
“the amount of…care…given to things honorable and worth learning will justly be 
praised” (I.19).   But holding out the promise of praise serves only to deepen the desire to 
discover what it is that is worth learning.  To entice us further, Cicero recalls that “Gaius 
Sulpicius in astronomy and…Sextus Pompeius in geometry” received praise for their 
studies as did “many in dialectics, and yet more in civil law (iure)” (I.19).  He thus draws 
his audience toward the study of the moral and political and away from natural science 
with the suggestion that those who are knowledgeable about politics are more likely to 
gain praise.  Nevertheless he does not rescind his claim that Sulpicius and Pompeius were 
justly praised for their studies of astronomy and geometry.  He maintains that all four 
“arts are…associated with the investigation of what is true” (I.19).  He has therefore not 
yet resolved the question of how we decide what is “worth learning” and what things “are 
both (obscuras) and difficult (difficiles), and unnecessary (non necessarias).”  But here 
too Cicero recalls De Natura Deorum, which opens by reminding the audience that taking 
up the question of the nature of the gods is not only “particularly difficult (perdifficiles) 
and obscure (perobscura),” but also “necessary (necessaria)” (DO I.19, DND I.1).  Thus, 
not all obscure matters are unnecessary.  Indeed Sulpicius, both an astronomer, a consul, 
and a military officer, was known for predicting a lunar eclipse on the eve of battle, by 
which he prevented the Roman soldiers from panic from fear of divine omens.112  But 
unlike Sulpicius, Pompeius was not a political man and did not use his knowledge of 
                                                                                                                                            
by the Stoics—in the pursuit of the honorable requires the subordination of the rational pursuit of truth that 
is the highest good for human beings.   
112 The episode is described by Livy in his History of Rome, 37.44. 
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geometry in the service of the republic.  Yet Cicero refrains from mentioning that 
Pompeius also studied law, though he did not practice it.113  Pompeius thus appears in De 
Officiis less concerned with politics than he was in fact.  Cicero therefore indicates by 
these silences that the necessity and propriety of an inquiry is not governed by its direct 
political usefulness.   
Cicero concludes this brief discussion of wisdom by conceding that, though we 
should not allow contemplation to distract us from activity, there are nevertheless “many 
opportunities to return to our studies” (I.19).  But he adds to this conclusion that “all 
thinking and motions of the mind occur in one of two ways: either when taking counsel 
about honorable matters that pertain to living well and blessedly, or in the eager pursuit 
of knowledge and learning” (I.19).  On the surface, Cicero maintains the distinction 
between activity and contemplation, but the distinction takes on a different meaning in 
light of his claim that by nature we believe that it “is necessary for a blessed life” to 
pursue learning about strange and difficult things (I.13).  If it is true that this pursuit is 
necessary for our happiness, then the distinction between the activity that guides us to 
“living well and blessedly” and the pursuit of learning begins to dissolve (I.19).  Cicero 
therefore seems to suggest that no subject is truly out of bounds in the pursuit of the truth, 
or that there is no limit to what or when we should try to learn.114  But as we have seen, 
he also maintains that we should focus on, or at least begin with, the study of the “civil 
law.”  Cicero thus directs those in his audience eager for wisdom back towards the study 
of political life by beginning his discussion of virtue with a beautiful picture of 
knowledge that fulfills our “longing to learn and to know” and inspires an “amazing 
                                                
113 Cicero describes Pompeius’ study of law in his Brutus, 175. 
114 Cicero therefore hints from the beginning of De Officiis that he does not share the view attributed to 
him by Nicgorski, that “as a way of life within the usual condition, such philosophizing is contrary to the 
duties imposed on men” (1984, 566). 
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love” but which operates, at least on the surface, within rather than beyond the 
requirements of civic obligation and propriety.  On this basis, he turns next to examine 
these requirements as they manifest themselves in the virtues central to political life.   
THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE 
But just as Cicero’s initial discussion of human nature contains a certain 
ambiguity about the motivation for forming associations, his first explanation of the 
virtues linked with our lives in common is surprisingly unadorned.  For whereas wisdom  
“handles and treats…truth,” the goal of “the other three virtues…is necessities” (I.16-17).  
They are concerned with the acquisition and conservation of “whatever is required for the 
activities of life” (I.17).  These requirements include human fellowship and “excellence 
and greatness of soul,” but both are devoted to the rather prosaic ends of “increasing 
resources and…acquiring useful things for oneself and those dear to one” (I.17).  Yet 
without retracting the claim that these virtues consist in the pursuit of necessities, Cicero 
adds that they “also, and much more” consist “in disdaining the very same things” (I.17).  
His discussion of political life thus begins by pointing emphatically to a contradiction at 
its heart.  We form communities both because we believe it to be good to live safely and 
comfortably and because we believe it to be good to unleash ourselves from concerns of 
safety and comfort and to pursue more noble ends.   
When Cicero turns to discuss the virtues directly connected with political life, he 
therefore begins to speak of them in more florid prose.  He states that the core of his 
examination concerns the “most wide-reaching” of the virtues, “by which the society of 
men with one another and the common life, so to speak, are held together” (I.20).  He 
now divides this virtue into two parts: “justice, the most illustrious of the virtues…and 
the beneficence connected with it, which may be called either kindness or liberality” 
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(I.20).  Justice therefore comes to sight both as a virtue in its own right and as a part of a 
broader virtue that pertains to communal life. 
But having described justice in this glowing way, Cicero establishes it on 
unspectacular and pragmatic foundations.  Its first considerations are nothing more than 
safety and the preservation of property.  Justice first requires that we refrain from 
harming others (I.21).  This injunction, Cicero writes, is “the first service (munus) of 
justice,” but he offers no explanation of it; it appears instead to be a simple and self-
evident truth (I.20).  This aspect of justice is nevertheless distinct from those he will soon 
discuss.  Cicero does not associate it with the appropriate actions, or duties (officia), that 
we derive from the virtues, but rather seems to suggest that it is a function or service of 
the virtue itself.  The avoidance of harm is a key benefit that justice provides to the 
community that observes it.  It is the foundation that makes possible all appropriate 
action.  For although human beings naturally associate and form cities with their fellows, 
it is nevertheless also the case that they do not live together without difficulty.  Cicero 
concedes therefore that “it is difficult to be concerned about another’s affairs” since “we 
do tend to notice and feel our own good and bad fortune more than that of others;” as a 
result “we do not make the same judgments about them and about ourselves” (I.30; 
III.22).  If justice is the most illustrious of the virtues concerned with preserving society, 
it must do so in a way that acknowledges that self-interest is naturally stronger than our 
social inclinations and colors the way we think about other human beings.  Virtue must 
not only support the ways in which human beings are political by nature, but also restrain 
those aspects of human nature that threaten political association.  For this reason, Cicero 
explains that while “no property is private by nature,” anyone who desires another man’s 
property “for himself…will be violating the law of human society” (I.21).  He admits that 
all private ownership is rooted in convention, but denies that even property acquired 
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through conquest is unjustly claimed (I.21).  Because we form associations at least in part 
for the sake of increasing our own resources and advantage, these associations must leave 
adequate room for us to set aside things as our own (I.17).  The abolition of the 
conventions of private property, though conforming to nature, would lead not to the 
sharing of all things in common, but to unleashing the desire for acquisition at the 
expense of the community.115        
But in order to cultivate a commitment to the requirement that “one should use 
common things for the common and private things for one’s own,” it is necessary to 
extend the ties of citizens and the concern for what is common beyond consideration of 
one’s own advantage (I.20).  Cicero thus moves from speaking of justice as the guardian 
of private property to justice as devotion to the political community.  He emphatically 
praises Plato who “splendidly wrote” that “we are not born for ourselves alone…but our 
fatherland claims for itself one part of us, and our friends another” and also recalls the 
Stoics, who hold that “everything produced on earth is created for the use of mankind, 
and men are born for the sake of men, so that they may be able to assist one another” 
(I.22).  Cicero singles out Plato’s claim as splendid; indeed it is more demanding than the 
Stoic view to which he now appeals (but cf. I.28-9).  Plato argues that we give up a part 
of ourselves to the regime and he offers no promise of compensation or reward in return.  
Cicero does not mention, however, whether Plato claims that we are nevertheless happy 
to make this sacrifice or whether it is a burden.116  The Stoics’ teaching, by contrast, 
makes human beings more radically social by nature than Cicero does in his own name, 
                                                
115 Cicero therefore does not, as Hunt claims, accept uncritically the “conception of man as a social animal 
with private rights and universal obligations” (1954, 191). 
116 Cicero quotes from Plato’s Ninth Letter, 358a (see also DF II.45).  In a passage preceding Cicero’s 
reference, Plato writes that “it is plain to almost everyone that the most pleasant thing in life is to attend to 
one’s own business” (1926, 357e).  
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but claims that we derive benefits from living together.  Cicero charts something of a 
middle path between these two extremes.  He claims that nature leads us to cooperation 
and society, but that this natural tendency alone is not sufficient to maintain an 
association in which all “contribute to the common stock the things that benefit everyone 
together” (I.22).  It is necessary to “bind fast the society of men with each other,” 
thoroughly entwining our interests “by the exchange of duties, by giving and receiving 
arts and effort and means” (I.22; see also I.53).117  The exchange not only of goods, but 
also of obligations among citizens forms an important part of the civic education that 
cultivates the desire to perform our duties.  Our devotion to the common good, Cicero 
suggests, will always include the opinion that we derive benefits for ourselves from the 
regime.  Because we cannot do away with self-interest, Cicero suggests, civic education 
must seek to support the opinion that self-interest is served by participation in political 
life.  On this basis a healthy political order is possible, for these bonds inculcate a 
concern with the common good that moderates the extent to which we would otherwise 
pursue our own advantage at the expense of others.  Cicero underscores the necessity of 
this education throughout De Officiis by making it the centerpiece of the laws. Indeed, 
“the mores and civic institutions…themselves…are pieces of advice” about the 
relationship of citizens to one another and to the regime (I.148).  Moreover, the “laws 
have as their object and desire that the bonds between citizens should be unharmed” 
(III.23).  All the laws and customs of the regime must tend toward the goal of cultivating 
                                                
117  Vivenza sees in Cicero’s view “an effective synthesis of life in society as a paragon of mutual 
advantage obtainable through the organization of various kinds of exchange – of labor, of money, and of 
services” (2004, 508).  While she offers a helpful review of the ways that the economic implications of 
Cicero’s view were interpreted and misinterpreted by humanist thinkers of the renaissance, Vivenza 
overstates the utilitarian economic nature of Cicero’s claim because she interprets officia as services we 
perform without the moral connotation of appropriateness or duty.  Cicero’s inclusion of duties among the 
things we exchange suggests, rather, that citizens view their relationship with each other—perhaps 
unclearly—not only as beneficial but also as noble. 
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the concern for the common good.  For while wisdom can teach us “to a far greater 
extent” to live justly, for those who are not wise the law must rely on the fellowship 
created by a concern for duty towards the community to teach each citizen “never…to 
seek what is another’s, nor to appropriate for himself something that he has taken from 
someone else” (III.23, 68).  Cicero thus presents the concern for the common good as the 
core of justice in the political order, but maintains as its primary goal not the flourishing 
or excellence of its citizens, but the more modest aim of moderating potentially 
dangerous acquisitiveness. 
Even this modest goal is nevertheless difficult to achieve, as Cicero’s turn to a 
discussion of injustice shows.  Moreover, the psychological sources of injustice that most 
threaten society among citizens defy total control.  Injustice arises most often, Cicero 
claims, out of human beings’ desire “to secure something for which they long 
(concupio)” (I.24).  Avarice, the vulgar version of this vice, is particularly pervasive 
(I.24).  In such cases “riches are sought both for the things that are necessary to life and 
in order to enjoy the pleasures” (I.25).  To some extent, then, a prosperous regime in 
which citizens live securely and comfortably may be able mitigate injustices to which 
human beings are tempted by the desire for material well-being.  But among “men of 
greater soul,” wealth is sought as a means to “power and the opportunity to gratify 
others” (I.25).  Unlike the desire for money simply, this desire is neither materialistic nor 
simply self-interested.  Such men are attracted to “magnificent accouterments and a life 
cultivated with elegance and plenty” but above all wish “to be ruler in the republic” 
(I.25).  We must therefore be suspicious not only of the greedy, but also of those who 
display the desire to make grand contributions to the regime.  Men of great ambition 
become blind to and “overwhelmed by forgetfulness of justice” though motivated 
initially by the desire to be benefactors, and do not stop at overturning the laws “for the 
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sake of pre-eminence (principatus)” (I.26).118  Because in politics “it is impossible for 
many to be outstanding, there will generally be such competition that it is extremely 
difficult to maintain a ‘sacred society’” (I.26).  Cicero thus brings in for the first time in 
De Officiis a consideration of the restraint on injustice that piety ought to play, but he 
does so in order to show that in the most pressing cases it is not clear that the restraint is 
sufficient.  For although “it is a great thing to have the same ancestral memorials, to 
practice the same sacred rites, and to share common ancestral tombs,” the recent example 
of Caesar, who “overturned the laws of gods and men” in his quest for power shows the 
weakness of the restraint of piety in his case (I.55, 26).  But Cicero does not attempt to 
escape this difficulty by denying that men like Caesar are, in fact, great-souled or that 
ruling requires amassing a great amount of wealth.  Indeed, he concedes that in spite of 
the fact that the desire for wealth feeds dangerous ambition the “expansion of one’s 
personal wealth as harms no one is not, of course, to be disparaged” (I.25).  And he 
compounds the difficulty with the suggestion that the problem of unjust ambition plagues 
not only the greatest individuals but also “the great majority” of men (I.26).  Most people 
are vulnerable to being enticed by the competition for “positions of command or honor or 
glory” at the expense of the common good (I.26).  Thus, while Cicero’s account 
emphasizes the risk that individual “men of the greatest spirit and most brilliant talent” 
can pose to the regime, he also intimates a larger problem (I.26). If, as Cicero claims, 
“the great majority” of people are susceptible to the longing for command and honor, 
then neither material prosperity nor a moral support for the preservation of private 
                                                
118  Cicero also describes a second kind of injustice, in which men witness injury “being inflicted upon 
others” but “fail to deflect it, even though they could” (I.23).  This is the particular vice of philosophers and 
misanthropes who think “that they should not even go near the republic unless they are forced to do so” 
(I.28). Book I culminates, however, in a rehabilitation of the philosophers in which Cicero denies the 
accusation he makes at I.28.  Those, he writes “who have devoted their entire life to learning things 
have…managed to contribute to the utility and advantages of mankind,” since “they have educated many to 
be better citizens and more useful to their republics” (I.155).  
 158 
property will be sufficient to prevent potentially destructive competition among 
citizens.119   
A further injustice reveals itself in “trickery, by an extremely shrewd but ill 
intentioned interpretation of the law” (I.33).  This is the injustice characteristic not of the 
ambitious who wish to be recognized for great deeds, but of the clever who act through 
fraud.  These citizens exploit the law by making use of the letter in order to achieve ends 
contrary to its spirit.  Cicero warns that “cleverness of such a kind ought in every case to 
be avoided” (I.33). And he denounces as the greatest injustice “that of men who just at 
the time that they are most betraying trust, act in such a way that they might appear to be 
good” (I.41).  He does not explain how their calumny can be prevented, but implies that 
law which attempts only to restrict behavior and which fails to reach the soul of its 
citizens will have at best weak defenses against the vices most dangerous to the regime.  
Protection against these injustices requires a moral teaching that acts as a restraint by 
inculcating a view of one’s own good aligned with the spirit of the law.  But justice is 
only one part of the social virtue that Cicero initially states is “the most wide reaching” 
with respect to communal life (I.20).  It must be seen, then, whether the cultivation of 
liberality, the other half of this virtue to which Cicero next turns, resolves the difficulties 
pointed to in his account of justice. 
THE LIBERAL REVISION OF THE ACCOUNT OF HUMAN NATURE 
Cicero initially claims that honorableness in society among men requires 
“assigning to each his own” (I.15).  It is striking, then, that this consideration is absent 
from the discussion of justice where we would expect to find it (cf. DND III.38).  Cicero 
does not argue that justice gives to each as he deserves, but rather that justice is satisfied 
                                                
119 For a thoughtful account of Machiavelli’s critique of Cicero’s appreciation of and response to the 
problem of ambition, see Duff 2011. 
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by refraining from taking away what has come to belong to another and helping others 
defend themselves against harm when one is able (I.23, 28).  The desire to give to each 
according to his due reappears, however, as part of the discussion of liberality, reminding 
us of the rather circumscribed aim that Cicero has assigned to justice in the regime. 
Liberality “bestows upon each person according to his worth,” the concern for which, 
Cicero now repeats, is “fundamental to justice” (I.42).  Liberality purports to be a 
corrective for this deficiency of justice in political life.  But the relation of justice and 
liberality is unclear.   Cicero argues that the liberality that deserves its name is only 
possible on the basis of the requirements of justice, for “nothing is liberal if it is not also 
just” (I.43).  In this way it must be subordinate to justice.  Nevertheless, Cicero also 
claims that “nothing is more suited to human nature” than liberality, trumping his earlier 
claim that justice is the virtue “on account of which men are called ‘good,’”  (I.42, 20).  
Liberality therefore comes to sight as a second candidate, following wisdom, for the core 
of what we most consider to be honorable, but it does so in an imprecise way (c. I.13, 
18).  Understanding what is beneficial first requires considerable “caution” (I.42, 44).  
Generosity towards one at the expense of another cannot truly be counted as beneficence 
because of the harm it inflicts, regardless of whether that harm is intentional (I.42).  
Liberality therefore requires the clarity of judgment that can distinguish between those 
actions that truly harm others while appearing to benefit them and those that confer real 
benefits (I.42).    
A second danger arises, however, because “most men are not so much liberal by 
nature as drawn by a kind of glory” and wish, above all, “to be seen to be beneficent” 
(I.44).  Cicero’s discussion of liberality thus begins from the psychological roots of 
injustice that he presents in his previous discussion.  We are easily enflamed by the desire 
for praise, which incites in human beings a “longing (cupiditas) to plunder” in order to 
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make possible the ostentatious beneficence which usually receives recognition (I.44).  By 
contrast, Cicero seems to suggest that natural liberality has a narrow scope.  But when he 
turns to that part of liberality which “makes choices according to worth,” this scope 
begins to widen (I.45).  We should not be liberal only towards our own, he writes, but 
ought to direct our generosity toward those who deserve it most.  This noble aim is, 
however, deflated somewhat when Cicero notes that that deliberation about who deserves 
to receive liberal generosity must “look at the mores of the man…and at the spirit in 
which he views us, at the community and society of our lives together, and at the duties 
that he has previously carried out for our utility” (I.45).  The liberality that accords with 
justice is emphatically political.  Although it seeks to reward excellence, such excellence 
alone is not usually sufficient to warrant beneficence; it must instead be considered 
alongside the individual’s usefulness to oneself and to the society of which both are a 
part.  It is, however, not always the case that the same person is most excellent and most 
beneficial to oneself.  When these qualities do not coincide in one person, “the more 
numerous and more important grounds will carry more weight” (I.45).  The result of this 
consideration, Cicero admits, is the necessary lowering of the standards according to 
which the liberal man will act.  Because “we do not live with men who are perfect and 
clearly wise, but with those who are doing splendidly if they have in them images of 
virtue,” liberality must aim to “foster…the gentler virtues, modesty, temperance, 
and…justice” that preserve the community (I.46).  But since Cicero’s moral teaching as a 
whole is meant not for the wise, but for ordinary citizens, the lowered standards must 
apply as much to the liberal man himself as it does to the objects of his liberality.  Cicero 
seems to suspect not only that there will be few people to reward who truly excel in 
virtue, but also that, to the extent that most will fall short of wisdom, it will be difficult 
for them to recognize true virtue in others (c. III. 16).  Moreover, Cicero suggests that 
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most people would not direct their generosity to the truly virtuous even if they were 
clearly apparent, for “people generally…defer above all to him from whom they expect 
the most” in return (I.49).  These reflections form the basis of Cicero’s sobriety about the 
kind of liberality that can be cultivated among citizens.  As the discussion of liberality 
continues, the significance of determining the mores of others recedes and Cicero 
increasingly presents desert in terms of gratitude for kindnesses received rather than 
merit.  Political liberality consists in inspiring gratitude among “those who we hope will 
assist us in the future” and especially in returning it “to those who have already assisted 
us” (I.48).  The liberal man, he writes, is above all the one who repays his debts, “for no 
duty is more necessary than that of requiting gratitude” (I.47, 48).  Cicero’s teaching 
presents, however, a modest refinement of the way we conceive of the exchange of 
benefits.  We ought, he writes, to evaluate those who benefit us not simply according to 
the size or grandeur of their favor, but rather according to its “firmness and constancy” 
(I.47, 49).  Cicero thus reintroduces considerations of mores, but makes propriety or 
decency, rather than excellence, the standard according to which they are judged and 
restricts them to the narrower field of those who have benefited us and those who might 
do so in the future.  In this limited way, his conception of liberality fulfills its promise to 
give to each what he is owed among those who neither possess nor understand true 
virtue.120    
                                                
120 Cicero adds that “the most important function of duty (if all else is equal) is to enrich above all the 
person who is most in need of riches,” only to admit that it is almost never done (I.49).  As Dyck notes, 
“given the unconditional requirement of returning favors and the restriction si cetera paria sunt [if all else 
is equal], in practice little scope would ordinarily remain for helping the needy” (1996, 164; see also DO 
I.59).  Dyck thus brings out the way that Cicero points to the difficulty even a morally serious man would 
have in fulfilling the obligations he acknowledges, “since...the resources of individuals are small, but the 
mass of those who are in need is infinitely great” (I.52).  Dyck also argues, however, that Cicero seems to 
retreat from this position in order to “[inveigh] at length” against those who refrain from helping the needy 
at II.69-70 (1996, 165).  While it is true that Cicero makes a stronger case for assisting “an excellent but 
needy person” in Book II, he does not do so the basis of a duty to enrich the needy, but in the guise of 
advice about how to accrue gratitude to oneself (II.69-70).   
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Cicero indicates clearly at the end of his explanation of liberality that the purpose 
of understanding it in this way is to ensure that “the society between men and their 
common bonds will best be preserved” (I.50).  It is in this context that he announces that 
“it seems we should re-examine (repetendum) more thoroughly…the natural principles of 
human society and community” (I.50, cf. I.11-14).  While he does not explain why this 
inquiry is necessary (Dyck 1996, 165), its placement suggests that the discussion of 
liberality requires, or at least makes possible, a revision of the initial discussion of human 
nature.  Prompted by the reminder that “we do not live with men who are perfect and 
clearly wise” (I.46), Cicero sets out an account of human nature that can buttress the 
bonds that hold together the civic community.   But what Cicero calls a re-examination 
differs both in starting point and in scope from its predecessor.  In the initial account of 
the goods we seek by nature, Cicero claims that the formation of communities and 
associations ranks among the more important goods sought by human beings, but he 
places it below the search for truth as the most human activity (I.12-13).  Following his 
discussion of liberality, however, Cicero examines not human nature as whole, but only 
that part of it which directs us to society with our fellows.  This second account of human 
nature is therefore necessarily a partial one.    
The discussion of the “natural principles” of society begins from our largest 
“unlimited” relationship with the human race as a whole and works its way inwards to 
our associations with particular individuals (I.53).  Although Cicero again argues that we 
are differentiated from other animals most by reason and speech, these qualities are now 
said to direct us to learning and the pursuit of truth only in a diluted form (I.50).  In this 
account “teaching, learning communicating, debating, and making judgments” are 
portrayed as the instruments by which “reason and speech…reconcile men to one 
another” (I.50).  In this way, reason and speech, according to Cicero, are the bases of the 
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society of each human being with “the entire human race,” the widest and perhaps 
weakest of human fellowships (I.50).  Our natural cosmopolitanism nevertheless directs 
us to two kinds of duties.  We ought first to ensure “that whatever is assigned by statutes 
and civil law should remain in such possession as those laws may have laid down” (I.51).  
In this respect, the society “of all with all others” reinforces but adds nothing to the duties 
imposed by political association (I.51). The allocation of property by the law, Cicero has 
already admitted, has few roots in nature (I.21).  Indeed, by pointing specifically to the 
laws governing property, Cicero quietly reminds us of the gulf between what is natural 
and what the law commands.  But reason, insofar as it forms the basis of this association, 
teaches the necessity of upholding the convention. As a result, our natural 
cosmopolitanism does not draw us outside or beyond the boundaries of our own political 
community, but places us more firmly within them.   
Cicero does not, however, explain what rational reflection leads to the continuity 
between the duty imposed by the natural society of all human beings and the political 
society of the regime.  He adds to the ambiguity with the argument that although the 
society of all human beings obligates us to share everything not covered by the law as 
“common to all men” (I.51), this includes only what “can be provided without detriment 
to oneself,” such as “fresh water…fire…[and] trustworthy counsel” (I.51, 52).121  
Because of the fundamental scarcity of most resources we must not hope that the virtuous 
desire to give to each his due can be fulfilled in every case (I.52).  Our obligations to the 
human race as a whole cannot, therefore, take precedence over our duties to our own.  At 
the same time, however, Cicero makes a more far-reaching and radical claim that this 
prudential restraint of liberality seems to gloss over.  Nature, he writes, directs us to 
                                                
121 Nussbaum criticizes Cicero for the “pernicious” narrowness of his cosmopolitanism that limits “our 
duties to those that seem not to demand any sacrifice of the resources and time we devote to our loved 
ones” (1998, 279-280; see also Nussbaum 2000, 185-187).   
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contribute to “the common utility,” but not to sacrifice for the sake of the common good: 
what one contributes should “cause no trouble to the giver” (I.52).122  Ultimately, then, 
the requirements of the fellowship of the entire human race diverge from those of the 
political order, which require us “occasionally to concede a little of one’s right (ius)” 
(II.64, I.22).  We must wonder, then, what accounts for the greater demand placed on us 
by our other associations. 
But when Cicero turns to examine these “more intimate” associations, the 
neatness of his account’s apparent progression from the wider and weaker relationships to 
the narrower and stronger ones immediately begins to fall apart (I.53).  Cicero first moves 
from the broadest society of all human beings to consider the bonds one step nearer to us 
of “nations [and] peoples” (I.53).  But he implicitly questions the moral significance of 
the ties of ethnicity and language, for although he claims that by these “men are bound 
strongly to one another,” he nevertheless identifies no duties or obligations that arise 
from them (I.53).  And rather than present a clear hierarchy among the more intimate 
associations of citizens, families, and friends, Cicero’s account shows that each of these 
relationships competes over the claim to form our most powerful attachments (I.58).  The 
roots of the bonds of citizenship appear first in those aspects of the regime that are 
“common to citizens” (I.53).  The substance of citizenship, Cicero suggests, is drawn not 
only from participation in those things that shape the regime’s structure—it’s “forum, 
temples…laws and legal rights, law-courts and suffrage”—but also from the presence and 
use for the sake of business of such ordinary necessities as roads (I.53).  Yet it is odd that 
Cicero appeals neither to nature nor to reason in this depiction of civic life.  Moreover, he 
seems to attribute as much significance to the presence of roads as he does to laws.  In 
                                                
122 Cicero’s initial assertion here is therefore more selfish than Nussbaum suggests, for he claims that on 
the basis of our common humanity alone, there is no duty to sacrifice for anyone’s sake.   
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this part of the account, political activity is shared among citizens, but it is not presented 
as the result of any uniquely noble characteristic of human nature.  Indeed, Cicero now 
remains silent about the natural desire to join in political society which he establishes at 
the beginning of Book I (I.12).  He makes this omission conspicuous when he turns to the 
family by reminding us that “it is by nature common to all animals that they have a drive 
to procreate” (I.54).  Cicero thus gives priority to the family over the city by explicitly 
rooting it in nature and calling marriage, on this basis, “the first society” (I.54).  As the 
source of “propagation and increase” and the foundation of the “household, in which 
everything is common,” the family is the “principle of the city and the seed-bed, as it 
were (quasi), of the republic” (I.54).  The bonds of civic association, Cicero writes, 
extend from and are solidified by the “goodwill and affection” of family life that arises 
from pious devotion to one’s ancestors (I.54-55).   
In spite of this praise of familial life, Cicero hesitates to accept fully the family’s 
claim to primacy.  The family is the “seed-bed of the republic” in only a qualified way.  
He emphasizes moreover that our attachment to the family stems not from our 
distinctively human nature, but from the lower parts of our nature that we share with all 
living things.  Thus far, little in familial life or political life as Cicero describes them 
pertains to what is honorable.  This deficiency is remedied only in the society of “good 
men of similar mores…bound by familiarity” (I.55).  Indeed, Cicero now claims that 
“nothing is more lovable and nothing more tightly binding than similarity in mores that 
are good” (I.56).  Whereas the discussion of justice laments that it is difficult to maintain 
fellowship among the most virtuous because they must compete for the greatest honors, 
the account of liberality on which this discussion of human nature is based allows Cicero 
to paint a rosier picture: “honorableness…moves us” and “all virtue…lures us to itself” 
so that we come to love those in whom we perceive it (I.56).  More powerful than the 
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sharing of institutions and commerce and, according to this account, surpassing also the 
ties of familial piety is the similarity of “pursuits and wishes” on account of which “it 
comes about that each one is as much delighted with the other as he is with himself” 
(I.56).   Cicero has shown that the conception of justice as the prohibition of harm does 
little on its own to soften the self-love that places an obstacle against concerning 
ourselves with the common good (I.29-30).  He now invites the hope that the mores 
cultivated by the regime can lead citizens to see each other in the manner of the 
friendships of virtuous men.  For virtue draws human beings together, according to 
Cicero, when it cultivates a common understanding of the good we ought to pursue.  This 
common understanding cannot, however, fully jettison self-interest.  Although Cicero 
refers approvingly to “what Pythagoras wanted in friendship, that several be united into 
one,” he also maintains that friendship becomes “unshakeable” on the basis of 
“kindnesses reciprocally given” (I.56).123  The relationship that Cicero describes rests 
simultaneously on the opinion that self-interest dissolves entirely through devotion to 
one’s friends and that one’s interest is served by the relation of virtuous friends.  There is 
therefore a tension at the heart of this kind of friendship, but Cicero leaves unexamined it.  
Such an examination would undermine the strength of this friendship by attempting to 
untangle the confusion on which it is based.  But the account of human nature of which 
this depiction of friendship is a part does not acknowledge Cicero’s earlier claim that the 
rational pursuit of truth is necessary for human happiness.  The principles of human 
society, and not reason, are the standards of this account.  Insofar as the friendship now 
                                                
123 Cicero thus revises Cato’s version of the Stoic view of friendship, according to which “there can be no 
justice or friendship at all except where sought for their own sake” (DF III.70).  But when he returns briefly 
to the subject of friendship in Book III, Cicero reverts to Cato’s view, obscuring the concern with one’s 
own good (or even the good of one’s friend) and claiming that “there can be neither goodness nor liberality 
nor courteousness, no more than friendship, if these are not sought for their own sakes, but are directed 
towards pleasure or benefit” (DO III.118).  
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described arises out of and helps to support these principles, it is good for human beings.  
As a result, Cicero does not attempt to unravel the confusion and he leaves his reader to 
wonder whether its maintenance is necessary for the moral outlook of the citizen as well. 
In the passage that immediately follows the account of friendship, Cicero 
contradicts his claim that no fellowship is stronger than that of virtuous friends with the 
assertion that “none is more serious, and none dearer, than that of each of us with the 
republic” (I.57).  This becomes clear, he writes, “when you have surveyed everything 
with reason and spirit” (I.57).  But whereas reason teaches that we ought to contribute to 
the human race as a whole only what we can give up without sacrificing our own benefit, 
“the good man” knows that we must be willing “to face death” for the republic (I.57).  
The “good men” who form friendships based on the pursuit of virtue are thus 
reintroduced as citizens who care for the republic.124  This care for the republic rises 
above their other associations: “parents are dear, and children, relatives and 
acquaintances are dear, but our fatherland has on its own embraced the affections of all of 
us” (I.57).  Yet Cicero curiously neglects to mention friendship in this list.  Political 
society seems to take on the role of friendship in this account as the fellowship that 
pursues honorableness.  But we may wonder, then, whether reason supports the view of 
the good man in is willingness to sacrifice his life for the benefit of the republic.  Cicero 
quietly indicates otherwise by continuing to suggest throughout this discussion that the 
                                                
124 According to Manent, “Cicero indeed celebrates the merits of friendship between virtuous people as he 
should, but he says nothing about the complex relation that obtains between friendship and the diversity of 
political regimes” (2013, 134).  He is rightly dissatisfied with this account, for, as he claims, it does very 
little to explain the intricacies of friendship and does not address at all the relation between the best 
friendships and the regimes in which they are formed.  In De Officiis, however, it seems that Cicero means 
not to shed light on true friendship, but on the hope and aspiration—that must be cultivated by the 
regime—for citizens to treat each other as friends, or part of a fellowship.  In the mind of the citizen, this 
aspiration, Cicero shows, is maintained alongside and perhaps in competition with the devotion to one’s 
family.  As Manent describes, “the landscape” upon which this account is presented “becomes flat and at 
the same time confused” (2013, 134), but this landscape is Cicero’s illustration of the citizen’s grasp of his 
various associations. 
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ties of the citizen to the republic draw their strength from, rather than transcend, the same 
non-rational part of our nature that acts as the basis of familial association.  He states that 
reason has a part in showing that the political association of each citizen with “the 
republic” is most important, but the association itself is described always with reference 
to “the fatherland” (I.57-58).  The bond of political association is strongest, Cicero 
implies, when it is felt as an expansion of the familial bond, when it draws on the natural 
power of the love of one’s own rather than seeking to overcome it entirely with concern 
for the common good. Cicero suggests, moreover, that a complete overcoming of 
devotion to the family by civic fellowship is not to be expected or hoped for.  For if there 
were “a comparison, or competition, as to who ought to receive our dutiful services, our 
fatherland and our parents would be foremost” (I.58).  The family and the republic sit in 
an uneasy tension.  Both claim to deserve our utmost devotion, but neither can transcend 
the care the other inspires.  At the same time Cicero suggests that civic fellowship in its 
best form contains both the love of one’s own characteristic of the family and the love of 
those with whom one shares “similar pursuits and wishes.”  Or, to put it another way, 
citizens must think of themselves and each other partially as family members and 
partially as friends: they will therefore be linked to their fellow citizens on the basis both 
of a non-rational familial love and a shared admiration for the pursuit of virtue.  
As if to emphasize this, Cicero argues that the ability to see what duty requires is 
a matter more of “use and practice” than of having “perceived advice (praecepta)” about 
virtue (I.60).  The view of human nature that attempts to make citizenship imitate 
virtuous friendship is rooted in habituation rather than learning.  The discussion of our 
natural associations thus locates what is most important for human beings in the 
honorable as it is cultivated by the regime, but it does so only by setting aside the natural 
desire to learn and discover the truth.  Cicero quietly reminds us of this by concluding 
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that “whatever is necessary to support life is most owed” to the family and the fatherland 
(I.58).  When he now distinguishes giving what is “necessary to support life” to those to 
whom it is owed from the “common living, counsel, and conversation” in the friendship 
that is “most pleasing,” Cicero points to the possibility of a second kind of friendship 
(I.58), for neither “counsel” nor “conversation” are mentioned in his initial depiction of 
the friendship shared by good men.  According to Cicero’s earlier account of human 
nature, wisdom is the sole virtue unconcerned with necessities (I.16-17).  He offers a 
glimpse, then, of friendship among those who pursue wisdom together and are perhaps 
clear-sighted about their pursuit of their own happiness.   But his account emphasizes that 
we come to value political society and to mitigate the all too common agitations of the 
soul that cause injustice through habituation that builds on the confusion he identifies 
rather than rational inquiry that attempts to resolve it.  Nevertheless, for those human 
beings who cannot attain wisdom this habituation is truly beneficial.  For this reason, 
Cicero nowhere retracts his statement that reason shows the seriousness of civic 
fellowship.  Reason confirms the necessity and goodness of inculcating the habits 
conducive to care for the regime, and, as Cicero soon shows, indicates that the core of 
this habituation lies especially in the virtue of propriety.     
THE EDUCATION IN PROPRIETY  
The successful rule of a republic requires that those “equipped by nature to 
administer affairs” acquire the “tranquility of mind and freedom from care” that enables 
one to “live without anxiety, with seriousness, and with constancy” (I.72).  This is less 
difficult for philosophers than it is for political men, according to Cicero, because “there 
is less” for philosophers “which is vulnerable to the blows of fortune, and their needs are 
fewer” (I.73).  Conversely, participation in politics multiplies our needs by making us 
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more dependent upon other people and forces outside of our control.  The education of 
citizens, and especially of those citizens who will rule, must therefore seek to approach 
the seriousness and constancy attributed to the philosophers without leading the citizens 
to follow them in “abandoning public business” (I.69).  According to Cicero, this is 
accomplished above all by cultivating propriety (decorum).  Propriety consists in “a sense 
of shame, a certain ordered beauty of life, temperance and modesty, a calming of the 
perturbations of the soul, and due measure in all things” (I.93).  But Cicero seems to run 
into difficulty in the attempt to explain the status of propriety in relation to the other 
virtues.  Although he claims that propriety is not simply equivalent to the honorable, he 
must admit that “it is easier to grasp than to explain what the difference is…whatever it 
may be” (I.93-94, 95).  We distinguish and understand it not, he argues, by “hidden 
(recondita) reasoning,” but by attending to what “springs ready to view” (I.95).  It is 
inseparable from and gives substance to the other virtues (I.94).  Yet while propriety “is 
indeed completely blended with virtue,” it is nevertheless “distinguished by thought and 
reflection” (I.95).  As Kapust puts it, “ethical decorum…is evident to non-experts” (2011, 
101).  But Cicero’s account of the “non-expert” view of propriety is more complicated 
than Kapust suggests.  As Cicero presents it, propriety is something we think seriously 
about, but this reflection seems to remain vague enough that we notice and perceive 
propriety without being able to give a rational articulation of it.125  It seems at once to be 
the foundation of virtue as a whole and distinguishable as a part.                  
However, the crucial importance of propriety is clear.  Nicgorski argues that 
“virtue or right…is understood by Cicero as essentially propriety” (1984, 562).  Indeed, 
Cicero now asserts that “the duty derived from [propriety] follows above all the road that 
                                                
125 Cicero’s depiction of propriety is therefore well-encapsulated by Justice Potter Stewart’s famous 
attempt to define pornography with the claim that “I know it when I see it” (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964). 
 171 
leads to agreeing with and preserving nature” (I.100).126  Cicero clarifies his initial 
attempt to define propriety by distinguishing between two kinds of the virtue (I.96).  The 
first is “involved with honorable behavior as a whole” and the second, “something 
subordinate to this…relates to the individual parts of what is honorable” (I.96).  The two 
parts of propriety thus do not, according to Cicero, correspond to the whole of virtue, on 
one hand, and a part of it, on the other.  Instead propriety seems to relate in different 
ways to virtue in its entirety: while the former pertains to virtue as a whole, the latter 
conceives of and pertains to each individual virtue separately, but touches them all.  The 
former denotes “that which agrees with the excellence of man just where his nature 
differs from that of other creatures,” while the latter, subordinate, view “wishes propriety 
to be that which agrees with nature in such a way that moderation and temperance appear 
in it, along with a certain appearance (specie) of a free man (liberali)” (I.96).  The 
difference between the two definitions of propriety is, therefore, vast.  The “subordinate” 
definition is explicitly concerned with maintaining the external markers of virtue (c. 
I.130; Kapust 2011, 101).  It is consistent with our nature because it shows the outward 
signs of human excellence by seeking a gentlemanly appearance through moderation and 
self-restraint.  According to this view, all things are subject to proper self-restraint or 
moderation.  This kind of propriety looks like virtue, but, Cicero suggests, falls short of 
the real possession of it.127  The superior propriety that pertains to the whole of virtue 
conceives of what is fitting for a human being as the cultivation of the excellence that is 
particular to human nature rather than as self-restraint in all things.  But, as Nicgorski 
                                                
126Cicero has, however, already bestowed similar praise upon the both pursuit of truth and liberality (I.13, 
18, 48).  But propriety is the guide to virtue, perhaps, because neither of the more splendid concerns for 
wisdom, or liberality can cultivate the civic fellowship that is the object of the laws (III.23).  
127 Cicero echoes here his reference to the “mere images of virtue” of which most people are capable 
(I.46). 
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notes, Cicero ultimately “emphasizes the singularity or homogeneity of all true virtue to 
the point of saying that the distinctions among virtues are simply matters of common and 
imprecise speech” (1984, 562; DO II.35).128  By showing the difference in the way 
propriety comes to sight when virtue is understood as a unified whole versus a set of 
separate parts, Cicero’s discussion quietly anticipates the different ways that virtue is 
understood “when truth herself is debated” and when “speech is entirely adapted to 
common opinion” (II.35).129   
Cicero offers only a glimpse of this true propriety.  His discussion of the virtue is 
concerned almost exclusively with its subordinate form.  This becomes clear when he 
takes up the view of nature as poet and playwright for which he criticizes Cato in De 
Finibus (DF III.24).  Just as the “poets…will look to what is suitable and proper for a 
huge variety of roles…our parts have been given to us by nature” (I.98).  But whereas 
Cato attributes wisdom to the human being who fulfills his role, Cicero’s depiction is 
silent about wisdom: in his discussion of the roles given to us by nature he calls neither 
nature nor the decorous individual wise.  Our roles, Cicero writes, consist in “constancy, 
moderation, temperance” and “a sense of shame,” that “arouses the approval of one’s 
fellows” (I.98).  And though Cato claims that nature, by giving us our roles, teaches us 
virtue that is fully self-sufficient, Cicero’s account of nature here teaches us especially 
that we must concern ourselves with how we are viewed by others.  We must go so far as 
                                                
128 Nicgorski does not, however, explain why Cicero finds it necessary or helpful to maintain the 
imprecision of common speech here and throughout Book I or what accounts for Cicero’s professed 
difficulty in explaining what propriety is.   
129 In her translation, Annas insists that although “the manuscripts say ‘individual elements [partes],’” 
Cicero “is clearly contrasting the seemliness of honorableness as a whole…with the special seemliness of 
the fourth group of virtues” (DO I.96n.2); she revises the text on the basis of this interpretation so that it 
speaks of the second kind of propriety as relating to “an individual element ” (emphasis added).  Nicgorski, 
in spite of pointing to the significance of Cicero’s distinction between the popular way of speaking about 
virtue and virtue in its true form, also takes Cicero to speak here of the two kinds of propriety in terms of 
the whole and one part of the honorable (1984, 562). 
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to “exercise a reverence towards men, both towards the best of them and also towards the 
rest” (I.99).  Cicero thus shows that the aim of the subordinate version of propriety is not 
excellence or the recognition of excellence, but congenial relations among one’s fellows, 
regardless of their virtue.  It is the sense of shame in particular, the self-restraint that 
comes from concern with how one appears in the eyes of others, that Cicero makes 
central to propriety and, as a result, to the inculcation of civic virtue.  He emphasizes this 
with a surprising demotion of justice in this account.  We must note, Cicero explains, that 
“there is a difference between justice and shame…the part of justice is not to harm a man, 
that of a sense of shame not to outrage him” (I.99).  The distinction itself, however, is 
also strange.  As Cicero’s condemnation of Caesar’s unjust neglect of “all the laws of 
gods and men” shows (I. 26, emphasis added), outrage and offense are usually considered 
unjust.  But he now intimates that shame, more than justice, is the crucial political virtue.  
It makes us desire the good opinion of others whom we might otherwise (and perhaps 
justly) ignore.  While the shameless person is unfettered by the desire to maintain a 
dignified appearance and rejects the special status of taboos, shame restrains us by 
enlarging and transforming what we think of as vice from that which is harmful to that 
which is not only harmful but also insulting.  By imbuing us with this desire, shame acts 
as a supplement to the narrowness of justice in the regime by restraining (or, failing this, 
punishing) in the way that justice wants to achieve but cannot.130   
Having examined how one who cultivates propriety appears and behaves with 
respect to others, Cicero turns inward to examine such a man’s soul.  The soul, he argues, 
is divided into a part that desires (appetitus) and a part that reasons (I.101).  Both appetite 
                                                
130 Kapust glosses over the strangeness of Cicero’s assertion of the difference between justice and 
propriety by attributing to Cicero the view that “seemliness corresponds to justice” because each “involves 
giving others their due” (2011, 102).  Cicero seems to suggest instead that shame, like liberality, corrects 
for justice’s failure to give each his due.  Whereas liberality seeks to reward those who deserve it, shame 
punishes those who deserve it in a manner that a law against harm cannot achieve.  
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and reason exert power over the soul, but the appetite “snatches a man this way and that,” 
while reason “teaches and explains what should be done and what avoided” (I.101).  It is 
possible, then, for reason as teacher to inform and shape the desires, which, on the basis 
of learning what ought to be sought and what avoided, come to move in concert with 
reason.  But, having introduced the soul in this way, Cicero immediately drops this 
picture and instead begins to speak repeatedly of the relation of the appetites to reason in 
terms of obedience.  He claims now that “reason…commands, and appetite obeys” 
(I.101-102).  Our aim, he writes is to “ensure…that the appetites obey reason, and that 
they are calm and free from every perturbation of the soul” (I.102).  What he describes, 
however, is a soul that is always in danger of being at odds with itself.  The tranquility of 
the soul we must seek is attainable on this view only if the appetites are “adequately 
restrained by reason” (I.102).  Otherwise our desires push and pull us in all directions, 
“whether attracted by something or repelled” (I.102).   
It is in this context that Cicero introduces the law of nature, about which he has 
been silent in his previous discussions of nature and reason.  Without the restraint 
imposed by reason, the appetites “transgress due measure and limit…They abandon, they 
cast off, obedience, they do not submit to reason, to which they are subject by the law of 
nature” (I.102).  The law of nature makes possible the performance of duty.  It “is 
practically a definition of duty,” according to Cicero, that one should never “do anything 
for which he cannot give a probable cause” (I.101).  Duties, as Cicero shows throughout 
De Officiis, consist in actions arrived at through sober judgment, above all about the 
common good.  Such judgment is impossible if the desires of the soul “overstep their 
bounds” (I.102).  Thus, nature also punishes deviations from its law.  To show the cost of 
disobeying the law of nature, Cicero returns to the crucial role of shame in cultivating a 
concern for how we are seen by others.  Failure to obey the law of nature in one’s soul 
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manifests itself physically: “one can see the faces of angry men, of men aroused by some 
passion or fear, of men exulting in excessive pleasure; the faces, the voices, the gestures, 
the postures of them all are transformed” (I.102, see also I.131).  The punishment that 
nature hands down for the lack of restraint is to make us displeasing and ridiculous to our 
fellow human beings.  The primary role of the law of nature is therefore to offer a natural 
support for the sense of shame that inculcates the care for maintaining one’s dignity 
before others and, on this basis, deference to them for the sake of their good opinion.131  
It is the natural basis of the civil law not only, as Cicero will later claim, in the 
prohibition against injustice, but also and especially in strengthening civic fellowship, 
which is the purpose of the civic and natural law alike (III.23).   
The discussion of propriety necessitates a reexamination of the basic 
characteristics of human nature, for “it is a part of every inquiry about duty always to 
keep in view how greatly the nature of a man surpasses domestic animals and other 
beasts” (I.105).  To this end, Cicero now exaggerates the gulf that separates man from 
beast, declaring that animals “perceive nothing except pleasure,” and neglecting his 
earlier claims that animals also care for their offspring and even display courage (I.105; 
cf. I.11, 50).  This revision serves first to distinguish the great heights to which human 
nature is able to ascend.  Unlike animals, Cicero now recalls, “a man’s mind…is 
nourished by learning and reflecting; he is always inquiring or acting, he is led by a 
delight in seeing and hearing” (I.105).  Moreover, reflection on “the excellence and 
                                                
131 Wood argues, speaking of Cicero’s corpus as a whole, that “the rule of nature applicable to humans is 
simply the divine reason ruling the soul of each of us, enabling us to distinguish between good and evil, the 
natural and the unnatural, and to direct our conduct accordingly” (1988, 72).  The connection between the 
law of nature and the divine in De Officiis is, however, ambiguous.  In Book I the law of nature guides 
human beings according to propriety and shame rather than divine reason. In Book III, Cicero does speak 
of “nature’s reason” as “the law human and divine,” but this statement follows his claim to speak “more 
splendidly” in the manner of the Stoics, whose teaching he ultimately must concede has not been proven to 
be true (III.23, 20, 33; on the significance of this last claim, see Kries 2003, 386-387).  For a treatment that 
attends to the ambiguities in Cicero’s treatment of the law of nature, see Pangle 1998. 
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dignity of our nature” shows that it is “honorable to live thriftily, continently, seriously, 
and soberly” (I.106).  But many human beings, Cicero must admit, fall far short of this 
peak.  Some “are men not in fact, but in name only” (I.105).  While these beast-like 
human beings are uneducable, most people fall somewhere between the extremes.132  
Shame is the restraint, according to Cicero, by which a human being who is “captivated 
by pleasure…will deceitfully conceal his appetite” (I.105).  Cicero does not blame the 
use of this deception, but neither does he praise it.  He seems rather to accept its necessity 
in the cultivation of the virtue attainable by the majority of human beings and, therefore, 
also to accept its qualified goodness.  The cultivation of shame as the core of the virtue of 
propriety is necessary not only because of how we are different from other animals, but 
also because of how we are similar to them.  
Cicero only claims, however, that giving “a probable cause” for one’s actions is 
“practically a definition of duty” (I.101, emphasis added).  It is therefore not sufficient in 
itself.  The defect lies, perhaps, in the way one determines “the probable cause” and, 
therefore, in the difference between the soul that must use reason to restrain the desires 
and one that uses reason to teach them.  Both may have appetites that are “controlled and 
calmed,” but only in the latter case do the desires follow reason freely on the basis of an 
account of the good we should seek (I.103, 101).  When reason commands, rather than 
teaches, we may still pursue what is good for us, but only through a kind of force or 
authority against which the desires continue to struggle.  A fuller definition of duty, then, 
would rest on the superior kind of propriety that pursues what is fitting through the 
                                                
132 In De Republica, Cicero’s Scipio offers the more radical view that “although others are called human,” 
only the wise, who “are refined in the arts appropriate to humanity are human beings” (DR I.28).   
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cultivation of the rational excellence peculiar to human nature rather than through 
restraint in all things and the appearance of freedom (cf. Nicgorski 1984, 562).133   
   Cicero adds that there is also need for thorough attention to one’s own individual 
character as a compliment to self-restraint.  This discussion both shows the extent to 
which he accommodates his account of virtue to ordinary human beings and offers a 
glimpse of the source of propriety in its higher sense (I.107, 110).  This need is rooted 
first in a deepening of his account of nature’s determination of our roles as human beings.  
Nature, according to Cicero, has “dressed [human beings], as it were…for two roles” 
(I.107).  In addition to the nature we share in common with other human beings, the 
“enormous bodily differences” and “still greater differences in men’s souls” show that we 
also each have a nature that is “assigned specifically to individuals” (I.107-8).  This 
common sense articulation of the “dissimilarities of nature and mores” among individuals 
leads Cicero to revise his initial claim that “everything honorable and proper” derives 
from what is common to human beings (I.109, 107).  Even among the best human beings, 
the way that each individual can make use of his capacity for reason and speech will 
differ (I.108-9, 115).  For this reason, “the propriety that we are seeking might more 
easily be maintained” if, while “[attempting] nothing contrary to universal nature,…we 
measure our own [pursuits] by the rule of our own nature” (I.110).134  But this 
acknowledgment of the diversity of individual human possibilities necessarily also 
influences how we ought to view the part of our lives that we share in common with 
others.  By rooting the attention to individual nature in the virtue of propriety, Cicero 
                                                
133 In this way, Cicero’s argument about what is most fitting for a human being points toward Scipio’s 
more radical view in De Republica (I.28). 
134 Gill notes well that in Cicero’s account potential conflicts between the dictates of one’s individual 
nature and “conventional social values” are anticipated and “explicitly pre-empted” (1988, 179, 193-4).  
Burchell also notes that Cicero allows for attention to individual nature only within these bounds—since 
“social conventions are the bulwarks of honestas”—but recognizes no potential tension between them 
(1998, 111).  
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indicates that he understands this too to serve the strengthening of the bonds of political 
society.  In this way, he suggests that a regime is best served if it allows a degree of room 
for the great difference in the kinds and levels of abilities among citizens.  Because this 
conception of propriety is meant as a practical teaching, it must allow for a certain 
relaxation of the strictness of the Stoic view of virtue.  Thus, Cicero does not hold, with 
Cato, that only those who have perfect wisdom should be called virtuous (DF III.48, 
IV.21).  Instead, he argues that propriety requires the recognition that “it is appropriate 
neither to fight against nature nor to pursue anything that you cannot attain” (I.110).  
Virtue consists in the fulfillment of a gentlemanly sense of proportion rather than 
perfection.  We ought to aim, therefore, for “an evenness both of one’s whole life and of 
one’s individual actions” (I.111).     
But while this conception of propriety is more permissive than traditional 
Stoicism about the possibility of virtue in those who fall short of the perfection of human 
nature, it is more exacting in another way.  The “evenness” in one’s life that Cicero 
speaks of arises truly only out of self-knowledge.  Moreover, Cicero warns that this 
“deliberation is the most difficult thing of all” (I.117).  The knowledge we need begins 
with the ability to “judge…[one’s] own good qualities and faults” (I.114), but this is not 
on its own sufficient.  It requires that we “grasp…with soul and thought…who and what 
we wish to be, and what kind of life we want” (I.117).  Reflection on the question of how 
we ought to live is, for Cicero, fundamental to virtue.  Such self-examination seeks above 
all to “be constant to ourselves for the whole length of our life” (I.119).  In the best case 
it is a solitary activity that refuses to recognize the weight of any authority in shaping 
how we understand the good life, both “so that we do not imitate [our ancestors] in their 
faults” and, Cicero admits, in case “our nature is not strong enough to be able to imitate” 
our ancestors in their strengths (I.118, 121).  What Cicero describes, then, is a propriety 
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that looks most to the state of one’s soul rather than to how we relate to others.  It takes 
nature, which “carries the greatest weight in such reasoning” as its guide (I.120), but 
assigns the work of discovering what is good for us and how we ought to live to human 
judgment, rather than to nature in the role of the poet.  As he explains the kind of 
knowledge we ought to seek and how it may be attained, Cicero thus leaves behind the 
view that virtue is the fulfillment of roles that we passively receive from nature.  In this 
way, Cicero quietly reintroduces the critique of the Stoic nature-poet that he first offers in 
De Finibus, even as he employs a version of that view to support his moral teaching (DF 
IV.34-36).  
Cicero acknowledges, however, that “it is…an extremely rare type of person who 
is endowed with outstanding intellectual ability or a splendidly learned education, or 
both, and who has also had the time to deliberate of which course of live he wants above 
all to follow” (I.119).  So rare is such an individual that Cicero presents Hercules as his 
exemplar.  The hero “went out to a lonely place” and “sat there for a long time while he 
pondered by himself which path it was better to take” (I.118).  But, Cicero cautions, “it is 
not the same for us,” who lack a divine nature (I.118).  Cicero mentions in this passage 
that he takes the story of Hercules’ deliberation from Xenophon’s Memorabilia (II.2.21-
34).  It is all the more striking, then, that Cicero makes no mention of Socrates in this 
account of the pursuit of knowledge about the best way of life.  By depicting only 
Hercules engaging in what seems to be a genuinely Socratic activity, Cicero focuses our 
attention on the great difficulty of this endeavor.  It requires not only a sharp mind, but 
also the courage or strength of Hercules.  The portrayal of Hercules as a stand-in for 
Socrates calls attention to the gulf that separates the individual who is able to undertake 
true self-examination from the greater part of humanity that is capable only of the useful 
and necessary, but more superficial, judgments about the strengths and weaknesses of 
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their character.  To make this emphatically clear, Cicero devotes almost as much of this 
discussion to the many natural and conventional obstacles in place against the possibility 
of self-examination as he does to the explanation of how we can pursue it.  To begin 
with, each of us must inevitably decide which way of life is best “as adulthood is 
approaching, just when his counsel is at its very weakest” (I.117).  If these initial 
judgments are mistaken it is also unlikely that the mistake will be recognized, for they 
cannot help but color the experiences and judgments that follow.  We therefore 
“[become] engaged upon a fixed manner and course of life” from which it is difficult to 
depart (I.117).  Moreover, while we ought to attribute “the greatest weight” to nature in 
forming our judgments (I.120), we usually do the opposite: 
we imitate those whom each of us thinks he should…[and] are generally imbued 
with our parents’ advice and led towards their customs and mores. Others are 
swayed by the judgment of the masses, and long especially for the things that 
seem most beautiful to the majority.” (I.118)135 
Cicero thus gently indicates that the same moral teaching which ties us to our 
fellows for the sake of the common good impedes the self-examination that can lead to 
better judgment about how we ought to live.  Whereas his treatment of liberality stresses 
the role of the family and ancestral customs as the seed of political association, Cicero 
now points to the deficiency of accepting those customs on their own authority as a guide 
for the good life.  And though he does not deny that “some…have followed the right path 
of life…through parental guidance,” Cicero gives this possibility the same weight as the 
luck of “good fortune,” for which one can be happy, but cannot claim credit (I.118).   
Cicero now also disparages those who are moved by what the multitude praises and 
                                                
135 Kapust goes too far, then, in attributing to Cicero the general view that “decorum, which encourages 
speakers and actors to meet the expectations and standards of those observing them, draws on a common 
sense rooted in human rationality, thus grounding the observer-imposed constraint on the orator and moral 
actor in something more than mere opinion” (2011, 94, emphasis added). 
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blames, contradicting his argument that reverence not only for the good, but also for the 
many is a crucial part of the care for propriety that solidifies the concern for the common 
good by making us wish to be pleasing to our fellows (I.99). 
In addition to the obstacles that impede our discovery of what life is best, Cicero 
recognizes that necessity and circumstance often prevent us from pursuing that way of 
life even if we recognize it.  Circumstances may require that we take on responsibilities 
that go beyond our natural abilities (I.115, 120), and they may conversely prevent us 
from making the most of our talents.  Perhaps, Cicero leads us to wonder, the best that 
most human beings can hope for is that we arrive at something that approximates the way 
of life for which we are best suited through a combination of our own good nature and 
the good fortune to have a virtuous family in a decent regime.  Indeed, as if recognizing 
this, he soon begins quietly to retreat from the view that solitary and rigorous self-
examination is necessary for the good life to the claim that “it befits a youth to revere his 
elders and to choose from them the best and most upright, upon whose counsel and 
authority he might depend” (I.122).  The “prudence of the old” is necessary to make the 
young “wary of intemperance and mindful of a sense of shame” in order to prepare them 
for participation in the life of the regime (I.122).  Cicero thus emphasizes again that 
shame and self-restraint are the core of the education necessary for all but the best human 
beings.  Together these qualities act as a substitute for the education provided by the 
rational pursuit of self-knowledge that is possible in only the rarest cases.  But by 
standing in for this more exacting pursuit, the familial and civic education in propriety 
obscures its own rational defects from view.  Although the combination of good nature, 
circumstance, and education that makes serious self-examination possible is 
exceptionally rare, as citizens we are taught to esteem the opinions and experience of our 
fellows as though they achieve true excellence.  It is therefore “not…inappropriate,” 
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Cicero argues, to seek the advice of “men who are learned or experienced…for the 
greatest part of them tend to be carried along to where they are led by nature herself” 
(I.147).  But Cicero goes beyond the sensible claim that one can learn and benefit from 
the experience of the best of one’s elders.  He adds that, just as artists “want the vulgar to 
inspect their own work, so that they may correct anything that most people 
criticize…there are very many occasions when we ought to rely on the judgment of 
others in choosing or rejecting, or altering and correcting, our actions” (I.147).  To be 
sure, Cicero does not argue that virtue requires that we relinquish our own judgment 
entirely.  Like the artists who “ask not only themselves, but others too, what is wrong,” 
deliberation about duty requires that we look to our own opinions and those of others in 
combination (I.147).  But Cicero asserts that deference is the correct course in most 
cases.  Civic virtue is therefore characterized by submitting one’s own judgment to the 
experience and judgments of the so-called better men, informed by the regime’s “mores 
and civic institutions,” to whom we should look for advice (I.148).  While those who 
form judgments in this way will think of themselves as independent, their deference 
implicitly takes the opinions of the majority as its standard.  
Cicero openly admits to the difference between this dilution of the primacy of 
one’s own judgments and what one might call the philosophic life.  But he warns that “no 
one should be led into the error of thinking that because Socrates or Aristippus did or said 
something contrary to mores and civic custom, that it is something he may do himself” 
(I.148).  Through the pairing of Socrates and Aristippus, a student of Socrates who 
ultimately turned to hedonism, Cicero recalls the story of Hercules’ deliberation about the 
way of life he ought to pursue (I.118).  Cicero does no more than attribute the story to 
Prodicus, but he encourages his reader to seek out the original by noting that the fable 
appears in the works of Xenophon.  According to Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates 
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relates Prodicus’ story to Aristippus as part of a conversation spurred by Socrates’ 
recognition “that one of his companions was too undisciplined” (1994, II.1.1).   
But Cicero’s reference to the two Athenians is nevertheless odd.  On one hand he 
gives Socrates no credit for his attempt to convince Aristippus of the importance of 
continence.  But on the other, he presents no moral condemnation of Aristippus’ 
hedonism (cf., for example, DO III.116, DF I.23).  Instead he praises both Socrates and 
Aristippus for their “great, indeed, divine goodness” on account of which they “acquired 
such license” to ignore the “mores and civic customs” of Athens (I.148).  Cicero seems to 
suggest that from the perspective of the regime, Socrates and Aristippus are the same.  
We can admire their strange loftiness, but because both appear to flaunt their freedom 
from the mores of the city, both must be rejected as role models for good citizens (but cf. 
Xenophon 1994, II.1.13-15).  Nevertheless, Cicero’s elevation of Aristippus to Socrates’ 
level intimates an openness to the possibility of a serious philosophical hedonism that 
Cicero rarely displays elsewhere.  Moreover he moves from this praise immediately to a 
condemnation of the Cynics—the intellectual predecessors of the Stoics—for a teaching 
that is “hostile to a sense of shame” without which “nothing can be right, and nothing 
honorable” (I.148).  The Cynics, Cicero claims, are more dangerous to the cultivation of 
civic virtue than Aristippus the hedonist.136  Cicero wishes perhaps to return our attention 
to the danger posed by popular philosophies that attempt in public to lay bare the rational 
deficiencies of political life and, in particular, of the concern for propriety on which civic 
virtue depends (I.128).  In so doing, however, Cicero seems to urge caution also to the 
                                                
136 Cicero does not mention in this context that Aristippus was himself a member (perhaps the founder) of 
the Cyrenaic school.  When he mentions Aristippus again, referring explicitly to his association with the 
Cyrenaics and the similarity of that school with Epicureanism, Cicero declares that “we must fight against 
these ‘with horse and foot’ as the saying goes, if it is our proposal that honorableness be guarded and 
preserved” (III.116).  Cicero’s objection, then, is perhaps directed more towards the popularization of 
hedonism through the schools than it is to hedonism itself.  
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philosophically inclined of his readers who may resist the popularization of philosophy, 
for he claims that no one ought to model themselves after Socrates and Aristippus.  But 
while he declares that we must avoid “the reasoning of the Cynics,” he warns against 
following what Socrates and his companion “did or said” (I.148). Cicero therefore leaves 
open the possibility of attempting to follow Socrates or Aristippus in their reasoning.  
This endeavor, however, necessarily rejects following either as an authority.  To act as 
Socrates did because he did it is an obstacle to learning rather than a sign of it (c. DND 
I.10, TD. V.11).  Socrates was justified in his actions by virtue of his excellent nature.  
Only by attempting to discern our own natures can we set ourselves on the path to 
understanding his reasoning and determine whether it is appropriate for us.   
As a result, Cicero suggests, we should not be too quick to imitate Socrates and 
Aristippus in their public actions.  Even those who pursue the superior propriety that 
determines how to live through rational inquiry need to concern themselves with the 
appearance of propriety of the lower kind.137  They should attempt to present themselves 
as Cicero presents himself, supporting and defending, rather than debunking, the customs 
and conventions of the regime and the virtues of political life.  But this presentation is not 
mere appearance.  The attempt to give civic virtue a serious defense is also central to the 
Herculean or, more truly, Socratic activity of inquiring for oneself about the best way of 
life.  Only by articulating what civic virtue is in its best form can one decide whether it 
succeeds or fails in its claim to lead to what is truly good for human beings.  But Cicero 
never allows us to forget that while some are able to discern how they ought to live on the 
basis of reason alone, most human beings require habituation that appeals to our 
                                                
137 Cicero does not imply, then, that “common prudence provides a standard against which to judge the 
works of philosophy” (Nicgorski 1984, 575 emphasis added).  Instead Cicero seems to suggest that the 
philosopher or potential philosopher will abide by and take seriously the mores and virtues of political life, 
but will do so in the service of his own rational pursuit of self-knowledge rather than an acceptance of the 
authoritative claim of those mores to be good for us.  
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nonrational and irrational desires and cares in addition to, and perhaps more than, our 
reason.  This habituation is nevertheless worth preserving wherever possible because it is 
the chief means by which the regime can justly claim to benefit its citizens.  Cicero can 
rightly claim on this basis to articulate a popular and civic teaching about virtue that is 
“joined to nature” because it accounts for the impossibility of guiding political life by 




 As the previous chapters have shown, Cicero has little confidence in the 
possibility of fully rational politics.  He acknowledges that most human beings are not 
very good at pursuing what is best for themselves, but he does not share with our modern 
critics of the irrationality of modern democracies the hope that systems of thought that 
stand above the fray of political life and claim to simplify our pursuit of the good can 
resolve this difficulty by imposing rational (or purportedly rational) rule.  As Cicero 
shows throughout his corpus, this hope is misguided not only because it neglects the 
necessity of allowing sufficient outlet for our nonrational passions, but also—and perhaps 
more importantly—because it is blind to the ways a healthy political order directs and 
makes use of the irrational parts of our nature for the common benefit.  In light of 
Cicero’s analysis, the problem with the libertarian paternalist proposals of our own day, 
for example, becomes clear.  While they attempt to leave room for freedom of choice, 
they also try to steer us towards goods they have little faith we will recognize on our own.  
Like Stoicism, then, this kind of paternalism fails to pay adequate attention to the fact 
that good citizenship and good judgment in politics is not the result of reason alone.  If 
we take Cicero’s reflections seriously, we must question whether any regime can succeed 
for long if its policies seek to steer us towards a goal without taking up the much harder 
task of educating us about why we ought to pursue it.  For this, only an education that 
seeks to train citizens in the responsible use of their freedom and to moderate the 
passions by offering a better account of the goods to which they aim is adequate to the 
task.  
 But Cicero’s account of this education contains much that seems alien to modern 
politics.  His emphasis on the crucial role of shame in forming the civic fellowship that 
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cultivates the concern for the common good is especially foreign to us.  The libertarian 
paternalists’ desire to maintain freedom of choice against the undue external influence is 
itself indicative of the gulf that separates their view from Cicero’s account of the roots of 
good judgment about politics in the virtues that ultimately take their bearing from 
political and social convention and the opinions of the majority.  Cicero, however, gives 
us reason to reconsider the value of these virtues.  Although he admits that they cannot 
serve as a guide for a rational life, he insists they are nevertheless indispensable for 
healthy politics and in most cases good for us as individuals.  For if we are honest with 
ourselves, very few of us can claim truly to follow the light of reason alone in all things. 
The virtues as Cicero presents them are not as rigid, lofty, or rational as the Stoics wish 
them to be, but they serve a serious educative and political purpose.  Liberality does not 
give rise to duties that can or should be enforced by law, but together with propriety it 
forms the core of the education that exhorts citizens to recognize the benefits that the 
regime allows us to pursue in common.  By binding us more tightly to the regime, these 
virtues not only encourage us to make sacrifices large and small for the sake of the 
community when necessary, but also attempt to mitigate the danger of the most 
problematic injustices that arise out of great ambitions against which, according to 
Cicero, piety and law are often weak restraints. 
But Cicero does not regard this education as necessary only for the sake of the 
political order as a whole. He suggests that it inculcates in individuals the prudence and 
moderation or self-restraint (sought also by the libertarian paternalists) by cultivating and 
clarifying the connection of these virtues to goods—not only safety and prosperity, but 
also friendship and honor—that citizens recognize and desire.  These virtues are crucial, 
Cicero shows, because they help us to approximate through a combination of reason, 
passion, and tough-minded self-restraint the more ordered soul of the rare individual who 
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is able to pursue the happiness most suited to human beings in the rational investigation 
of the truth about nature.     
 But Cicero’s account of the limits of reason does not lead him to submit 
philosophy to the standard of the nonrational virtues of political life.  He holds that the 
serious attempt to guide one’s life by reason is the best way of life possible for human 
beings, but admits that this activity points away from the morality of community that 
informs the proper civic understanding of virtue and duty.  The philosopher, Cicero 
argues, abides by the law but his reasons for doing so will not mirror the citizen’s:  he 
understands the benefit of a decent political order, but because he does not acknowledge 
the authority of its mores and conventions, he will not be bound to the regime in the 
manner of the good citizen.  This understanding of philosophy is the root of Cicero’s 
concern about its spread in popularized form.  Cicero shows that the schools’ 
enlightening projects leave citizens in a dangerous limbo, no longer attached to the civic 
morality that teaches prudence through a moderating self-restraint, but also lacking the 
more solid prudence that comes, Cicero suggests, from the rational pursuit of wisdom.  
As a result, Cicero defends against the schools a civic virtue that is irrational at its core.       
But neither this defense, his presentation of himself, nor his depiction of the 
philosophical life requires or merits the view—taken by Voegelin, Wood, Nussbaum, 
Nicgorski, and others—that Cicero ultimately subordinates philosophy to politics.  
Instead, he insists that the attempt to understand human nature is better served by 
observing and contemplating the benefits that accrue to human beings from the 
maintenance of political and social conventions rather than dismissing those conventions 
for being irrational or unnatural.  For this reason, Rousseau seems to go too far when he 
writes of Cicero that we see in his works one “who along with his friends laughed at the 
immortal Gods to whom he so eloquently bore witness on the Rostrum” (2007, 10n).  
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While we may certainly question whether Cicero himself believed in the ancestral 
religion of his republic, his critical presentation of Cotta in De Natura Deorum suggests 
that he found the mocking refutations of his Academic interlocutor not only politically 
but also theoretically problematic.  These Academic refutations share with the Stoic and 
the Epicurean teachings the tendency to obscure one’s own hopes and desires from 
oneself and to impede, rather than encourage, the self-examination that is the basis of 
philosophical inquiry.  Cicero’s critique of the schools is also, then, a defense of genuine 
philosophy.  His quiet demonstration of the gulf that separates the life of civic virtue from 
the life of reason is the necessary supplement to his account of the virtues of political life. 
In his writings Cicero attempts to present a model of philosophical inquiry as he 
understands it and, in so doing, to safeguard the possibility of this way of life for the 
future.  In this way, as Strauss writes, “what Plato did in the Greek city and for it was 
done in and for Rome by Cicero” (2000, 206).  Cicero also indicates, however, that his 
own participation in the politics of his regime contributed to his philosophical activity.  
Moreover, insofar as he shows that serious attention to the benefits and dignity of 
political life is a stepping stone to philosophy, Cicero suggests that citizenship in a decent 
regime will encourage and preserve the possibility of the philosophic way of life in those 
for whom it is possible.  His defense of republican politics is necessary, then, not only for 
the majority of human beings for whom civic virtue is the best guide for a good life, but 
also for the potential philosopher.  To be sure, Cicero nowhere implies that he devoted 
himself to the preservation of the Roman republic for the sake of philosophy alone, but 
his writings seem to suggest that his political activity included this philosophical purpose.  
Cicero’s presentation of himself does not, then, seem to take Strauss’ view that his 
“political action on behalf of philosophy has nothing in common with his actions against 
Catiline and for Pompey” (2000, 206).  Indeed, Cicero seems to have manifested in his 
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own life his teaching that reason and the law can point to similar ends on the basis of 
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